Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

Accounting for Option–based Compensation: The Economic Cost Approach

The intrinsic value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the difference between the stock price on the date of the grant and the exercise price of the option. The fair market value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the market value of stock options on the date of the grant. These approaches do not reflect the changes in the option–based compensation cost after the grant date. This paper proposes an economic cost approach that not only adjusts for the changes in the value of the options during its life but also records the issuance of the stock at fair market value on the exercise date.     

Replacement Investment: Optimal Economic Life Under Uncertainty

Replacement investment is essentially a regenerative optimal stopping problem; that is, the key decision concerns when to terminate the life of existing plant – and hence when to start over again. This paper examines this optimisation problem within a continuous time framework and studies the qualitative and quantitative impact of uncertainty on the timing of new investment (and the criteria that should be used for terminating the life of existing plant).     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Managing Earnings with Intercorporate Investments

Abstract:  We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.     

On Sraffa's Standard commodity: is its price invariant with respect to changes in income distribution?

In his 1960 book, Sraffa suggested using a composite commodity,which he called the ‘Standard commodity’, to solveRicardo's search for an invariable measure of value, i.e., astandard capable of isolating the price movements of any othercommodity induced by changes in income distribution. The absencein Sraffa's book of an explicit proof of the invariance propertyof this standard gave rise to many misunderstandings about itsmeaning and its role as an invariable measure of value. In orderto clear up these questions, Bellino (On Sraffa's Standard commodity,Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 28, 121–32, 2004)has proposed a ‘proper’ definition of an ‘invariablemeasure of value’, showing that Sraffa's Standard commoditydoes fulfil the requirements of this definition. He claims thatthe fulfilment of this property (but not the constancy of its‘nominal’ price) qualifies the Standard commodityas an invariable measure of value. In this paper, a proof ofthe invariance of the price of the Standard commodity with respectto changes in income distribution is given, and the equivalenceof this property with Bellino's definition of invariance isshown.     

Glamour and Value Strategies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange

This paper evaluates the performance of glamour and value strategies and tests the extrapolation model for the Japanese equity market. In general, value stocks outperform glamour stocks by between 6 and 12 percent per annum for the five years after portfolio formation. Evidence from past, future and expected growth provides strong support for the story developed in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). It is difficult to attribute the value premia to the difference, if any, in risk factors. In addition, the book-to-market premium is much closer to an arbitrage opportunity than the size premium.     

复杂性管理策略:关注整体性

复杂性管理的策略首先要关注和认识复杂系统的整体性,这要通过关注系统的结构、多元化的视角、容忍模糊性和不确定性、借助直觉等手段来达到。在关注和认识整体性的基础上,需要进一步维护和促进复杂系统的整体性,这需要通过保护系统的自组织、创造自组织环境条件、发现和维护序参量、鼓励多元化以及与环境相协调来达成。     

当前我国政府绩效管理问题探析

当前,我国政府绩效管理中存在的问题,主要是政府绩效管理缺乏统一的政策指导和制度保障,对政府缋效管理的理论研究与实践发展滞后,社会参与机制不完善,激励制度匮乏等。我国应通过立法来推进政府绩效管理的制度化和规范化;学习和借鉴西方先进思想,加强政府绩效管理的理论研究,建立有效的绩效评估指标体系和完善的激励制度。从而提高我国政府效能。增强政府管理能力。