Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing

This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding problem and still extract the information.      

中国政府统计抽样调查制度的总体框架研究

随着中国市场经济体制的逐步确立,政府的职能在逐渐转变,政府对统计数据的要求也在变化,这就要求政府统计调查制度也随之改革。适应市场经济体制和中国政府管理的特点以及城乡统筹发展的要求,政府统计调查应该以抽样调查为主体,抽样调查队伍和机构应主要设立在地市一级,调查的指标体系和内容应该改革与调整,企业抽样调查应该采用名单框和区域框结合的双框抽样方式。对于抽样调查得到的数据资料,不仅应当汇总得出各种可用于宏观经济管理与分析的总量指标数据和分类数据,而且还应当建立起全部被调查企业和被调查家庭的数据库,供政府部门和国内的科学研究机构进行微观社会经济活动主体层次的研究。     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding

In this work we show that the separation property identified in the franchise bidding literature depends strictly on the hypothesis of coincidence of the regulator's beliefs with those of the competing firms. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is more truthful to hypothesize that the regulator's information is vaguer than that of the producers, so we introduce the possibility that the regulator is dealing with a double informational asymmetry as compared to the firms. In this case, the separation property is no longer valid, and the optimal tariff becomes a decreasing function of the degree of competition exercised during the auction.     

“中国丹霞”福建泰宁世界自然遗产地社区居民点发展模式评价模型研究

为科学优选自然保护地社区居民点发展模式，构建客观评价模型对社区居民点发展模式进行定量评价显得尤为重要。基于“中国丹霞”福建泰宁世界自然遗产地9个社区居民点的调研数据，采用序关系分析法，以居民点人口结构、居民点景观风貌与传统文化、居民点产业发展模式，以及居民点位于遗产地的位置4个一级指标和相应二级指标为评价准则，构建该遗产地社区居民点发展模式优劣评价模型。研究表明，该遗产地9个社区居民点发展模式中，4个为疏解型，3个为搬迁型，2个为控制型，没有发展型。研究结果可为该遗产地社区居民点科学遴选发展模式提供定量评价依据，也可为生态价值高的自然保护地社区居民点发展模式的遴选提供参考。     

模糊自动控制理论在高速公路机电设备中的应用

文章介绍了在直流并励电动机控制中引进模糊自动控制,可以实现电动机恒流起动、恒速运行,降低电机的故障率,保障它的运行。     

论企业的双重属性

本文从企业人、资产、产品、价值、环境等与企业行为相关的五方面较为全面地分析了企业双重属性的内涵,指出企业必须认识到自己所天然具有的社会及经济属性,并以此作为指导企业发展设计和规范企业行为的意识准备。     

Double Dividend with Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency and Intergenerational Equity

This paper analyzes the double dividend and distributional issues within an overlapping generations model framework with involuntary unemployment. We characterize the necessary conditions needed to obtain a double dividend, when the revenue of the environmental tax is recycled by a variation of the labor tax rate. We show that an employment dividend may occur without any efficiency dividend and that the young generation is not always harmed by the fiscal reform, even without any intergenerational transfers. Therefore, three dividends (environmental, efficiency and intergenerational equity) can occur simultaneously.     

解读2005年中国国际收支平衡表

国际收支平衡表不仅综合记载了一国在一定时期内与世界各国的经济往来的情况和在世界经济中的地位及其消长对比情况,而且还集中反映了该国的经济类型和经济结构。2005年,中国的国际收支巨额顺差,具有鲜明特色.透过国际收支平衡表,可以发现中国国际收支的结构特征、问题所在,进而提出改进措施和政策建议。     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.