Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

“棘轮式”代理问题与子公司经理人激励:家族集团治理

家族集团中,在企业家通过本期产出水平来确定子公司经理人所应上缴的产出分配收益的情况下,经理人会通过调整自己的努力水平,间接控制自己在下期的上缴额度,从而导致激励效率损失.但是,如果企业家能收取固定的产出分配收益,并确定高额违约金,就能够有效地规避子公司经理人代理问题.     

工程建设项目战略灵活性的实物期权评价

为了进一步提高项目价值,项目经理必须认识项目规划和管理的不确定性。传统的工程项目规划、预算和管理往往认为不确定性降低了项目的价值,并没有从中充分地挖掘增加项目价值的机会。实物期权方法就是利用战略灵活性来识别和把握在动态不确定中所隐蔽的项目价值。通过一个高速公路项目的案例来展示实物期权方法所带来的管理灵活性对评价和选择战略的重要意义。还讨论了实物期权应用中的一些问题,指出了今后研究的方向。     

中国管理会计的未来发展: 研究方法、热点实务和人才培养

本文从研究方法、热点实务和人才培养三个方面,讨论了我国管理会计发展的现状、面临的 问题和未来发展,目的是为我国研究者的研究提供一些新研究思路和选题、为我国实际工作者组织实务勾 勒一个基本的方向。     

管理会计信息披露及其市场识别——来自中国沪深股市的经验证据

财务会计通常被理解为对外报告会计。因管理会计服务于公司内部的管理决策,与公司价值具有内在关联性,因而管理会计信息的对外披露与市场识别此类信息之间具有理论上的逻辑一致性。文章以管理会计信息的整体披露水平能否被市场有效识别为研究命题,对沪深股市年度报告中管理会计信息披露的市场识别程度及其规律进行了实证研究。结果表明:管理会计信息披露能够被市场投资者识别并使用,但此类信息的披露需要市场耗费一定的时间予以吸收;同时,与财务会计信息披露相比,管理会计信息披露水平提高同等程度,更容易被市场识别。     

试析印度发展风电产业的经验对我国的启示

随着世界经济的快速发展,全球能源和环境问题日益突出,风力发电已成为产业化发展最快的可再生清洁能源技术。印度作为发展中国家,其风电产业发展迅速并取得了显著成就。本文结合印度发展风电产业的主要经验,分析了我国发展风电产业面临的主要问题并提出了相应对策。     

管理沟通理论的历史演变与发展

本文通过对不同时期管理理论的发展的研究,综述了管理沟通理论的历史演变与发展,总结了不同阶段下管理沟通理论的特征,以及管理沟通理论的发展趋势。