Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.     

Make One——基于软件功能构件的通用电子设备模式研究

首先，指出并分析了基于传统的系统体系结构模式而设计的信息设备与其应用功能之间存在整体堆积性和时空不变性的优缺点；然后，根据先进的信息产品应用功能软件化、构件化的思想，提出一种新的设备与应用功能可互相分离、应用功能构件可重载的Make One设备模式，讨论了Make One模式设备的功能结构特点；进而，给出了一个Make One设备模型的嵌入式容器－构件实现方案；最后，探讨了在互联网环境下Make One模式的应用服务体系。     

区域旅游协作的帕累托分析

加强区域旅游协作，实现优势互补，谋求共同发展，已经成为了我国旅游界的共识。本文借鉴西方福利经济学的理论，探讨了区域旅游协作过程中实现旅游产业效益帕累托最优、旅游者效用帕累托最优以及两者联合最优的条件。     

Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

混业经营：中国商业银行发展的必由之路

分业经营在经济发展水平较低的时期对金融的发展具有一定的促进作用。在而，对现代金融来说它却带来了一系列的问题，银行风险的恶化、竞争力的下降等，更严重的是，随着我国加入世贸组织，我国商业银行将面临更大的冲击，坚持分业经营无异于作茧自缚，摆在我们面前的路只有一条-混业经营，这是大势所趋。     

综合化经营模式下商业银行的合规风险管理

随着综合化经营的发展,为更有效地进行全面风险管理,一些国家开始要求银行主动合规。与专业银行相比,综合经营的银行要面临更多机构监管,合规管理难度加大。国际银行业管理合规风险的方法和机构设置尽管各不相同,但基本上都包括高管层的总体把握、合规部门的具体管理与协调以及全体员工参与这三个层次。由于我国对合规管理的重视才刚刚开始,综合化经营后的商业银行还将面临法规缺位、监管不一致、合规管理能力不够等问题,这需要银行自身加强合规意识,树立流程管理理念、切实发挥合规部门作用;监管部门也要尽快完善法规、改进三大监管机构的协调机制,保持监管的一致性。     

发展电力普遍服务 服务社会主义新农村建设

概述了电力普遍服务的内涵以及开展电力普遍服务对社会主义新农村建设的重要性,在总结了我国电力普遍服务成果的基础上,对新形势下电力普遍服务发展中面临的问题进行了分析,提出了我国发展电力普遍服务的解决思路和相应建议.     

The China model view is factually false

ABSTRACT

Using a cross-regional analysis of China, this article shows that the China model view is factually false and the universal model view is factually true. It is the marketization and development of non-state sectors, rather than the strong power of government and the state sector, that have driven the Chinese economy to grow fast and to be increasingly innovative. If China wants to sustain its economic performance, it must stay on the way to continuing marketization. Otherwise, China will fall into stagnation.     

Internal habits formation and optimality

In a very influential model with internal habits, Carroll et al., (2017, 2000), establish that an increase in economic growth may cause a positive change in savings. The optimality of this result, and of many other contributions using a similar framework, has been questioned by some authors who have observed that the parametrization used in these models always implies a utility function not jointly concave in consumption and habits. In this paper, we revisit the optimality issue and, using advanced techniques in Dynamic Programming, we answer the following long-standing open questions: (i) Is the solution found in Carroll et al., (2017, 2000) optimal? (ii) Is it also unique or do other optimal solutions exist?