Ten Years of Public Interest Disclosure Legislation in the UK: Are Whistleblowers Adequately Protected?

Purpose The purpose of this article is to assess the operation of the UK’s Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA 1998) during its first 10 years and to consider its implications for the whistleblowing process. Method The article sets the legislation into context by discussing the common law background. It then gives detailed consideration to the statutory provisions and how they have been interpreted by the courts and tribunals. Results In assessing the impact of the legislation’s approach to whistleblowing both in the UK and elsewhere, the author draws upon empirical research. Conclusion The author concludes that PIDA 1998 has not adequately protected whistleblowers and makes 12 recommendations for change. Despite the European Commission’s acknowledgement that whistleblowers can play a part in the fight against corruption, the author notes that common standards for their protection still seem a long way off.     

吹哨者、公司、审计师的博弈分析——基于吹哨者保护制度的研究

公司员工作为内部控制的参与者和执行者，对本公司的内部控制有着深入的了解。如果发现公司对其内部控制存在不实披露，公司员工是否扮演“吹哨者”的角色并进行揭发检举，会直接影响公司和审计师的行为。研究吹哨者保护制度的功效，通过建立单期不完全信息动态模型，对员工、公司和审计师三者之间的利益冲突进行博弈分析。研究表明，完善的吹哨者保护制度可以提升公司员工的吹哨意愿，减少外部审计的成本，同时减少公司对内控的不实披露。     

Ethics as a Dependent Variable in Individual and Organisational Decision Making

This paper draws upon a recently completed research study of the responses of accountants and HR professionals to actual issues at work that had posed them ethical qualms. The study sought to get beyond ethical reasoning about hypothetical scenarios and to address issues of actual behaviour, focusing upon the interviewees explanations of these behaviours. In general terms there was an observable difference between the attitudes and behaviours of accountants and HR professions, but not in the simple, stereotypical sense. The concerns expressed by the interviewees when calculating their chosen courses of action in a given situation, reflected grave concerns for their current and future employment prospects, if they were to raise their concerns, either within their employing organisation, or beyond. The problems of whistleblowers are well documented, but at a time when corporate governance issues occupy the attention of financial markets and corporate boards around the world, and national governments are introducing new laws to ostensibly provide enhanced protection for whistleblowers, the evidence of this study is that moral agency remains at best an aspiration, and at worst a chimera.     

After the wrongdoing: What managers should know about whistleblowing

Most of us are likely at some point to observe wrongdoing in our organizations, and some of us will blow the whistle to someone with the authority to put a stop to the wrongdoing. Or we may be managers, inspectors, or auditors who serve as the official ‘complaint recipient’ when one of our colleagues wants to report wrongdoing in the organization. Whether we blow the whistle or are tasked with cleaning up after someone else does so, we are better off knowing in advance how the whistleblowing process usually plays out. In this article we discuss the pragmatic implications of 30 years of systematic research about whistleblowing: who does it and when, and why they choose to report the wrongdoing internally (within the organization) or externally (to outsiders). To avoid external whistleblowing, which entails all sorts of costs for the organization, we recommend that managers take clear steps: investigate the allegations, make the results of the investigation known to those affected, correct the problem if one is found, and avoid reprisal against whistleblowers. These actions can increase the chance that information about organizational wrongdoing stays inside the organization, where it may be remedied, instead of being made public.     

Communicating the Ethos of Codes of Ethics in Corporate Australia, 1995–2001: Whose Rights, Whose Responsibilities?

This paper considers the commitment to business ethics of the top 500 companies operating in the Australian private sector and communicates the results of a longitudinal study conducted from 1995 to 2001. Primary data was obtained (in 1995 and again in 2001) via a self-administered mail questionnaire distributed to a census of these top 500 Australian companies. This commitment of each company to their code of ethics was indicated and measured via a range of methods used by organizations to communicate the ethos of their codes to employees. Just as they were in 1995, it would appear that companies in 2001 still are good at ensuring that their rights are protected, but at the same time they do not seem to take on the responsibility to ensure that employees' rights are just as well protected. This double standard leads to cynicism towards the current business ethics processes inherent in Australian companies.     

Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions

Whistleblowers are ostensibly a valuable resource to regulators investigating securities violations, but whether there is a link between whistleblower involvement and the outcomes of enforcement actions is unclear. Using a data set of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the U.S. government and the universe of enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation, we find that whistleblower involvement is associated with higher monetary penalties for targeted firms and employees and with longer prison sentences for culpable executives. We also find that regulators more quickly begin enforcement proceedings when whistleblowers are involved. Our findings suggest that whistleblowers are a valuable source of information for regulators who investigate and prosecute financial misrepresentation.