Benefits Of Communications Infrastructure Capital In U.S. Economy

In this paper we empirically estimate the contribution of the communications infrastructure to the growth of output and productivity at the dis-aggregate industry and at the aggregate economy levels. The estimated value of the marginal benefits or the shadow price of the communications infrastructure capital is positive in each of 34 industries representing the major industrial sectors of the U.S. economy. This effect captures network externality benefits and can be interpreted as a willingness to pay by each industry for communications infrastructure capital services over and above their direct payments for communications services. These results suggest that an increase in communications infrastructure capital services reduces cost in all the industries and as a consequence that of the entire economy. The relatively high value of estimated total marginal benefits for the aggregate economy indicates a high social rate of return to the investments in communications infrastructure.     

Computers And Growth

The purpose of this paper is to describe the impact of investment in computers on the growth of the U.S. economy. The economic literature on computers is relatively rich in information on the decline in computer prices and the growth of computer investment. Constant quality price indices for computers have been included in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) since 1986. These indices employ state of the art methodology to capture the rapid evolution of computer technology.

While the annual inflation rate for overall investment has been 3.66 percent for the period 1958 to 1992, computer prices have declined by 19.13 percent per year! Similarly, overall investment grew at 3.82 percent, while investment in computers increased at an astounding 44.34 percent! These familiar facts describe growth in the output of computers. The objective of this paper is to complete the picture by analyzing the growth of computer services as inputs.

In a pioneering paper Bresnahan (1986) has focused on pecuniary externalities arising from the rapid decline in computer prices. Griliches (1992, 1994) has emphasized the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary externalities in the impact of computer investment on growth. This paper is limited to pecuniary externalities or the impact of reductions in computer prices on the substitution of computer services for other inputs. As Griliches (1992) points out, this is an essential first step in identifying nonpecuniary externalities or ‘spill-overs’ through the impact of a decline in computer prices on productivity growth. ^{* *}Brynjolfsson (1993) has proveded a detailed survey of studies of nonpecuniary externalities or ‘spill overs’. Recent studies include those of Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1994a, 1994b) and Lichtenberg (1993).

In two important papers Stephen D. Oliner (1993, 1994) has introduced a model of computer technology that greatly facilitates the measurement of computer services as inputs. In this paper we estimate computer stocks and flows of computer services for all forms of computer investment included in NIPA. We construct estimates of computer services parallel to NIPA data on computer investment by combining these data with information on computer inventories. For example, the International Data Corporation (IDC) Census of Computer Processors includes an annual inventory of processors in the U.S.

In Section 1 we present data on investment in computers and constant quality price indices from NIPA. These data incorporate important innovations in modeling computer technology stemming from a joint study by IBM and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) completed in 1985. This study utilized a ‘hedonic’ methodology for constructing an econometric model of computer prices that accurately reflects rapid changes in computer technology. This methodology generates an index of computer prices that holds the quality of computers constant.

In Section 2 we present the model of computer services originated by Oliner (1993,1994). This differs in important respects from the model of capital services used in the previous studies of U.S. economic growth surveyed by Jorgenson (1989,1990). The model employed in previous studies is based on the decline in productive capacity with the chronological age of a capital good. Oliner assumes that computers maintain their productive capacity until they are retired. Decline in productive capacity occurs only through removal of used computers from the inventory through retirement.

In Section 3 we construct estimates of stocks of computers that incorporate IDC data on computer inventories and derive the implied flow of computer services. While output of computer investments has grown very rapidly, the input of computer services has grown even faster. The price of these services has declined at 23.22 percent per year over the period 1958 to 1992, while the input of these services has grown at 52.82 percent! This is prima facie evidence of an important role for computer price declines as a source of pecuniary externalities.

In Section 4 we combine computer services with the services of other types of capital to produce a measure of capital input into the U.S. economy. We link this with labor input to obtain the contributions of both inputs to U.S. economic growth, arriving at the growth of productivity as a residual. We find that the contribution of computer services to input into the U.S. economy is far more important than the contribution of computer investments to output. This is a significant step toward resolution of the Solow paradox: ‘We see computers everywhere except in the productivity statistics. ^{* *}Robert M. Solow, quoted by Brynjolfsson (1993). Declines in computer prices generate very sizable pecuniary externalities through the substitution of computer services for other inputs. By contrast Solow focuses on nonpecuniary externalities that would appear as productivity growth.

In Section 5 we conclude that information on inventories of computers is critical in quantifying the role of computer services as inputs. The constant quality price indices for computers incorporated into NIPA are also essential. A price index for computers that reflects only general trends in inflation would result in a highly distorted perspective on the growth of GDP and capital services, especially during the past decade. To capture the contribution of all forms of investment to U.S. economic growth, similar price indices should be included in NIPA for capital goods with rapidly evolving technologies, as proposed by Gordon (1990).

The long term goal should be a unified system of income. product, and wealth accounts, like that proposed by Laurits Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) and Jorgenson (1980). This incorporates capital stocks, capital services, and their prices. Achieving this goal will necessitate much greater elaboration of the accounting system described in Section 3. These accounts would incorporate data on prices and quantities of investment, stocks of assets, and capital services for all forms of capital employed in the U.S. economy.     

HIV infection and economic growth

This paper presents an endogenous growth model based on a simplified ‘learning by doing’ model. In this model, a negative shock, namely HIV infection, leads to a stationary active population. We show it is possible to neutralize the effects of the HIV shock while at the same time insuring steady economic growth. However, this result vanishes in the absence of a policy to fight against the HIV shock. Further, an increase of the HIV infection rate negatively affects the growth rate of the economy. This last finding implies that a high and sustainable economic growth rate is incompatible with a high incidence of HIV infection of the active population.     

Long-run growth in the OECD: A test of the parallel growth paths hypothesis

A prediction of a class of neoclassical growth models is that countries with similar levels of integration in the world economy will have parallel long-run growth paths. We test this hypothesis for the OECD, using estimates of long-run mean growth rates of per capita output for each country for the period 1870–2005. The results show strong evidence for unconditional β-convergence only in the post-WWII period of 1951–1974. The results serve as a caution against drawing inferences regarding long-run growth patterns from this sample of countries when the time frame includes the post-WWII golden-age period.     

Growth Slowdown in China since 2008: Will There Be a Hard Landing in the Near Future?

China has witnessed an unprecedented great leap forward in investment since the 2008 global financial crisis, and at the same time real GDP growth has undergone a significant slowdown. This paper examines China's growth slowdown since 2008 up to 2013 using a growth accounting model in a systematic way. It is found that China's growth slowdown since 2008 almost completely comes from a sharp slowdown in total factor productivity growth. During this period, the positive effect on growth from expanding investment has been completely offset by the negative effect of the slowdown in total factor productivity growth. Currently, China's economy has slid into the Solow downward path. Under these circumstances, a soft landing is completely infeasible. Unless the Chinese Government implements substantial rebalancing and comprehensive and in‐depth market‐oriented reform, accompanied by large‐scale de‐investment (decreasing in the ratio of investment in GDP) and massive employment adjustment, China will be unable to avoid the Solow downward path, and a hard landing in investment will be inevitable in the near future.     

Only income diverges: A neoclassical anomaly

The neoclassical growth model (NGM) is only consistent with the absolute divergence in output levels we observe if some determinants of steady state income are also diverging. In this paper we show that accumulation rates of physical and human capital are actually significantly converging, as are openness to trade and several variables measuring institutional quality. Output divergence in the face of input, policy and institutional convergence is a deep anomaly for the NGM.