美国对华农产品反倾销贸易救济效果分析——基于第三国(地区)市场的视角

在国际贸易中,对出口方的反倾销等贸易救济措施的运用被认为能够为进口方、即反倾销发起者提供有效的贸易保护。但是,如果在对反倾销的贸易保护效果的分析中同时考量第三国市场,则反倾销的贸易救济效果很可能低于发起者预期。本文采用动态面板模型,从第三国市场的角度分析了美国对华农产品反倾销的贸易保护效果。研究结果表明,美国对中国农产品出口的反倾销措施使中国受限产品发生了贸易偏转并挤占了反倾销发起方的海外市场,从而降低了美国反倾销贸易救济预期效果。本文的研究从一个新的视角对美中的贸易摩擦和救济的效果进行了分析,为贸易政策制定及今后双边和多边贸易谈判提供了有益的研究参考。     

中国产业界所应了解的欧盟对华反倾销的不合理因素

欧盟对华反倾销是长期困扰中欧贸易健康发展的重要问题。饱受反倾销之苦的中国企业在面对欧盟反倾销的许多不公正的待遇时,经常是愤愤不平。但因为不熟知其法律和实践,对其司法问题的公正性缺少深入的研判,而错失许多可能的胜诉的机会。揭示欧盟反倾销法和对华反倾销实践的不公正性,提供对抗这些不公正因素的理由和依据,应该是当前反倾销研究的当务之急。本文的写作正是从这一基点出发,而对欧盟对华反倾销实践的不合理、不公正的问题所进行的揭示,作者期待通过该文的分析,有助于中国企业界了解欧盟对华反倾销法的实体和程序规定中的不合理因素,并根据每案的具体案情,进行有理有据的抗辩。这既是促使这些消极方面发生转变的积极的努力,也是中国企业维护自己尊严和利益、改变自己被动地位的重要的突破口。     

世贸组织反倾销谈判及中国的立场

由于反倾销制度的最大特征在于其灵活性和不确定性,各国适用反倾销的标准不一,反倾销对国际贸易自由化的负面影响越来越明显。世贸组织内部关于反倾销制度的谈判也随之硝烟再起。同时,出于不同的政治与经济利益的考量,成员国关于反倾销制度的改革方向的立场也不相同。世贸组织反倾销制度的改革方向对我国的对外贸易发展将会有重大的影响。我国一直是反倾销制度的主要调查国,因此我国应积极倡导在世贸组织中进行反倾销谈判,促使世贸组织出台更加严格的反倾销制度。     

跨越反倾销税的外国直接投资研究述评

征收反倾销税的目的是保护国内产业免受倾销的损害,但外国厂商通过直接投资方式跨越反倾销税壁垒,降低甚至消除了反倾销税对国内产业的保护效果,对东道国贸易与投资政策提出挑战。本文对国外关于反倾销税的外国直接投资效应、跨越反倾销税的外国直接投资对东道国国内企业的影响以及东道国政府的政策选择等方面的研究作简要述评。     

ITC voting behavior on sunset reviews

This paper is the first attempt to analyze ITC Commissioner voting behavior on sunset reviews of antidumping cases. Sunset determinations entail greater complexity than initial antidumping investigations because ITC commissioners must account for the impact of dumping protection as well as competitive forces on industry conditions. Empirical findings indicate that ITC voting is based on both sunset regulation and nonstatutory factors. Results reveal apparent biases against Chinese competitors and poorer nations generally, and favorable treatment toward U.S. steel producers and high-wage industries. There is also evidence of preferential treatment of industries located in states of Senate oversight committee members. JEL no. F13     

Cascading contingent protection and vertical market structure

Cascading contingent protection may occur when protection of an upstream industry transfers injury to the downstream industry and increases the likelihood that this industry asks and receives protection. This paper examines cascading protection within a sequential petitioning model where the upstream industry acts as leader. The analysis identifies market structure and the vertical linkage between the upstream and the downstream industry as important determinants of the occurrence of cascading protection. It is shown that the circumstances which make cascading protection more likely to occur also make it more likely that this protection has serious negative welfare consequences.     

澳大利亚反倾销政策及其特点探析

澳大利亚是世界上第二个制定反倾销政策的国家,其反倾销政策具有自身的特点。同时,在反倾销实践中,澳大利亚被称为全球四大传统反倾销用户之一,而中国则成为澳大利亚实施反倾销政策的首要目标国。本文从澳大利亚的反倾销管理体制出发,分析了澳大利亚反倾销政策的主要内容,进而考察了澳大利亚反倾销政策及其实践的特点。     

贵州企业遭遇反倾销案例研究

从1996年起，中国已经连续11年成为世界反倾销头号目标国。贵州省虽然属于西南欠发达省份，但是同国内沿海经济发达地区一样，面临同样的国际市场和同样的反倾销的严峻形势。针对贵州出口涉外企业遭遇的反倾销调查情况进行研究，着重分析了参与应诉的企业和案件，并提出贵州企业应对国外反倾销的策略。     

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.     

Trade deflection and trade depression

This is the first paper to empirically examine whether a country's use of an import restricting trade policy distorts a foreign country's exports to third markets. We first develop a theoretical model of worldwide trade in which the imposition of antidumping and safeguard tariffs, or “trade remedies,” by one country causes significant distortions in world trade flows. We then empirically test this model by investigating the effect of the United States' use of such import restrictions on Japanese exports of roughly 4800 products into 37 countries between 1992 and 2001. Our estimation yields evidence that US restrictions both deflect and depress Japanese export flows to third countries. Imposition of a US antidumping measure against Japan deflects trade, as the average antidumping duty on Japanese exports leads to a 5-7% increase in Japanese exports of the same product to the average third country market. The imposition of a US antidumping measure against a third country depresses trade, as the average US duty imposed on a third country leads to a 5-19% decrease in Japanese exports of that same product to the average third country's market. We also document the substantial variation in trade deflection and trade depression across different importing countries and exported products.