Bankers on the Board,Market Competition,and Conflicts of Interest

Abstract

Bankers on the board are expected to act as a fund-raiser and to help lowering financial costs, but they can impose conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. We empirically analyse the impact of banker-directors on corporate leverage and investment, using Korean firm data during the period from 2000 to 2012. Bankers on the board turn out to play different roles depending on market competition and macroeconomic circumstance. In less competitive industries where banks are less concerned about financial distress as a creditor, the presence of bankers on the board has higher leverage and more active investment, which can align with the interest of shareholders. However, in more competitive environment where firms are more concerned about financial distress and external financing, bankers on the board do not always increase leverage and investment, which can be divergent from the interest of shareholders.     

Association for Social Economics ASE newsletter

Bill Waters’ dissertation “Entrepreneurship, Dualism, and Causality: An Appreciation of the Work of Joseph A. Schumpeter” completed at Georgetown University in 1952 is significant for two reasons. The first is clear enough from the very beginning: Schumpeter and the entrepreneur. The other comes to light through hindsight: Bill brings to bear an understanding of economic affairs which is personalist rather than individualist or collectivist in nature. In short, Bill sees as the main activating force in economic affairs not the impersonal forces of the market, not the central planning board, but the person who innovates, who acts bolding in economic affairs, the banker who creates credit, and the capitalist who supplies old funds. Thus the Waters’ dissertation says much not only about Schumpeter but also about Bill himself. His dissertation is his only book-length publication.     

浅析我国公务员考核形式化的表现与危害

我国公务员考核的形式化主要表现在＂互惠主义＂与＂轮流坐庄＂、＂宽大化＂倾向与＂称职大平台＂、＂从众心理＂与群众考评失效等三个方面。公务员考核的形式化不仅会挫伤公务员工作的积极性、损害我国的公务员制度,还会降低政府的工作效率,同时也不利于我国的公务员队伍建设。     

Real estate franchising: The case of Coldwell Banker expansion into China

This article discusses the Chinese real estate market, with special reference to Shanghai, and depicts an interview with Taiwan's largest real estate company, which bought the master international franchising rights of Coldwell Banker for China. As China's real estate market only recently opened to foreign investment, and since franchising in China is in its infancy, this article provides a unique examination of international franchising into a new product market area in the country. In addition, the article highlights some practices that could be adopted by professional service firms in their international expansion and discusses post-WTO implications to real estate franchising in China.