How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

Optimal collective dichotomous choice under quota constraints

Summary. This paper presents optimal collective dichotomous choices under quota constraints. We focus on committees that have to decide whether to accept or reject a set of projects under quota constraints. We provide a method for optimal ranking of projects which is suitable for solving this problem. The main result generalizes a number of earlier results in the subject. To outline the applicability of our method, we demonstrate its usage in the area of information filtering. Received: February 14, 2000; revised version: January 19, 2001     

Storable votes

Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting votes intertemporally allows agents to concentrate their votes when preferences are more intense, and although the scheme will not achieve full efficiency, storable votes typically lead to ex ante welfare gains over non-storable votes. Welfare gains can be proven rigorously in the case of 2 voters. With more voters, counterexamples can be found, but the analysis suggests that the welfare improvements should continue to hold if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) the number of voters is above a minimum threshold; (ii) preferences are not too polarized; (iii) the horizon is long enough.     

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.     

THE TREASURY SELECT COMMITTEE: ITS REACH AND ITS ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

The Treasury Select Committee's role has evolved in recent years. Since the banking crisis it has undertaken important work in holding government bodies to account and in helping to influence the policy agenda.     

Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?

It is shown that the voting record of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England helps predict future policy rate changes. This result is robust to the inclusion of market participants’ expectations as measured by the slope of the term structure of money market rates and interest rate futures. Moreover, expectations seem to adjust to the information contained in the voting record, which suggests that publishing the minutes of MPC meetings increases the transparency of monetary policy.     

基于新发展理念的新时代机关事业单位团委工作创新模式研究

机关事业单位团委工作弱化、虚化、边缘化问题严重,即使团委开展活动,存在团员青年参与积极性不高、活动影响力和效果有限等问题。为此,基于新发展理念,构建新时代机关事业单位团委工作创新模式,通过制定工作规划、塑造品牌活动、寻找工作载体、构建分形化管理模式、利用新媒体手段、强化情景体验、构建宣传工作联盟、开展团员积分管理、开启“素质+”活动、组建“青社”培养工程等,努力开创机关事业单位团委工作新局面。     

Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.     

PACking a punch: Political Action Committees and corruption

Political Action Committees (PACs) are unique and prominent players in American politics. Yet, formal research on some aspects of PACs is lacking. Using US data over the period 1970 to 2009, this research demonstrates that the growth in PACs is positively associated with greater corruption. A 10% increase in the number of PACs per capita would increase corruption by about 8%. Upon disaggregation, corporate PACs, rather than labour PACs, are positively associated with corruption. The effects of economic prosperity, government size and population on US corruption are generally in line with the literature.     

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.