Currency substitution,risk premia and the Taylor principle

This paper studies the equilibrium determinacy properties of a simple interest rate rule in a small open economy subject to currency substitution (i.e., the use of a foreign currency for domestic transactions) and risk premia on foreign borrowing. It shows that if currencies are substitute in the provision of liquidity services the rule׳s response to inflation has to be sufficiently above unity for the equilibrium to be locally determinate. This reinforced Taylor principle requirement appears to be more binding in economies characterized by a larger elasticity of currency substitution, more debt-elastic country risk premia, and intermediate degrees of dollarization in transactions.     

Dollarization, economic growth, and employment

Dollarization brought price stability and higher economic growth to Ecuador. Nevertheless, unemployment remained stubbornly high. Two opposing forces explain this result: sustained growth led to higher labor demand but price stabilization triggered substitution effects by cheaper intermediate goods and capital.     

DOLLARIZATION OF DEBT CONTRACTS: EVIDENCE FROM CHILEAN FIRMS

This paper uses a new data set to estimate the causes and consequences of foreign currency debt in firms' balance sheets. The evidence from this sample of Chilean firms indicates that dollar‐denominated debt increases with firms' size and degree of exposure to foreign competition. We find evidence that dollar‐denominated debt combines with exchange rate movements to produce a negative balance‐sheet effect that reduces firms' investment in periods of strong exchange rate depreciation. This negative balance‐sheet effect is associated with long‐term debt and appears to be nonlinear in the amount of real exchange rate depreciation.     

DO FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS PROMOTE OR DETER FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT IN LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CROSS‐COUNTRY DATA

Foreign currency deposits (FCD) are prevalent in many low‐income developing countries, but their impact on bank lending has rarely been examined. An examination of cross‐country data indicates that a higher proportion of FCD in total deposits is associated with more private credit only in inflationary circumstances. FCD can lead to a decline in private credit below a certain threshold level of inflation. Given that FCD exhibit persistence, deregulating them in low‐income countries could cause more harm than good to financial intermediary development in the long term.     

On dollarization and currency boards: Error and deception

A diagnosis of the laws and balance sheets of the monetary authorities in Argentina, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hong Kong and Lithuania is presented. With the exception of Bosnia, all employ active monetary policies and engage in sterilization. Accordingly, they are not currency boards. The methods used to dismantle the Argentine system in 2001, prior to its eventual abandonment, are presented. An evaluation of the Hong Kong system (1997-1998) suggests that its so-called currency board was not a party to counter-speculation in the stock market. Evidence is presented to show how deception was employed by the US and the IMF during the Indonesian currency board debate (1998) as a means to engineer a political regime change.     

Exchange Rate Choices of Microstates

In this paper I first explain why most microstates (countries with less than two million inhabitants) have gained independence only in the last 30 years. Despite the higher costs and risks microstates face, their ability to better accommodate local preferences, combined with a more integrated world economy, probably explains why there are now more benefits to independence. I explain why microstates at independence have chosen either dollarization, currency board arrangements, or fixed exchange rates rather than more flexible forms of exchange rate systems. I then, using the Geweke‐Hajivassiliou‐Keane multivariate normal simulator, model empirically the determinants of each of the different fixed exchange rate regimes in microstates and analyze the policy implications.     

The unique dollarization case of Lebanon

We perform a thorough analysis of the unique dollarization case of Lebanon, a heavily dollarized economy with recurring public deficits and monetary financing of the public debt, together with contained inflation and a de facto fixed exchange rate lasting for more than 20 years. What makes Lebanon’s case specific is the high level of foreign currency liquidity in the hands of the banking system due to the abundant capital inflows in the last three decades, and the high levels of the central bank’s gross international reserves, contrasting with its low and sometimes negative levels of net international reserves. We shed light on a number of areas that have so far been unexplored in international finance and monetary economics, mainly the difference between gross and net international reserves and their relative fiscal costs, together with a synthetic classification of sterilization techniques. We explain the monetary “freezing” mechanism that helped contain inflation in Lebanon, despite the monetary financing of the country’s recurring public deficits. We also assess the results of Lebanon’s monetary and exchange rate policy in the last two decades, and make a number of policy recommendations in light of previous studies.     

Money and the rule of law in ecuador

The rule of law is defined and its implications in the monetary sphere are elaborated. When national monetary arrangements fail to comport with the rule of law, “dollarization” is desirable. That policy provides for more stable money and expectations about its future value. The salutary effects of Ecuador's “dollarization” program of 2000 are reviewed. In addition, a manifesto for economic reform in Ecuador is presented. Its elements are: financial integration, fiscal transparency and control, tax simplification and reform, supermajority voting, deregulation, and privatization.     

Cost efficiency of the banking industry and unilateral euroisation: A stochastic frontier approach in Serbia and Montenegro

This paper aims at investigating the differences in cost efficiency of the banking industry in Serbia and Montenegro over the period 2005–2012. These two countries operated under a common monetary regime until 1999 and followed two different monetary regimes thereafter: unilateral euroisation in Montenegro and monetary independence in Serbia. A stochastic frontier approach incorporating bank-specific and country-related variables is used to analyze cost efficiency in the banking sectors of Serbia and Montenegro. The analysis shows that a bank operating at given conditions in terms of ownership, market and other specific characteristics presents significantly higher cost efficiency if it operates in Montenegro rather than in Serbia. We argue that this result may relate to the choice of unilateral euroisation made by Montenegro. It is also shown that foreign-owned banks, higher capitalized banks and banks with lower non-performing loans operate at higher cost efficiency.     

Dollarization persistence and individual heterogeneity

A salient feature of financial dollarization, arguably the one that causes most concern to policymakers, is its persistence: even after successful macroeconomic stabilizations, dollarization ratios often remain high. In this paper we argue that this persistence is connected to the fact that the participants in the dollar deposit market are fairly heterogenous, and so is the way they form their optimal currency portfolio. We develop a simple model when agents differ in their ability to process information, which turns out to be enough to generate persistence upon aggregation. We provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this claim.