人民银行员工激励机制设计的进化博弈分析

博弈理论是当代主流经济学发展最迅速和影响最大的分支学科之一。其中,进化博弈理论由于引入了“进化稳定策略”（ESS）的概念,有效解决了博弈双方有限理性的现实问题,在解释经济管理现象时更具说服力和生命力。本文结合人民银行实际,通过构建进化博弈理论的复制动态模型,试述人民银行员工激励路径的选择及机制设计的有关问题。     

不完全合同理论的新视角——基于演化经济学的分析

长期以来,主流不完全合同理论一直没有在理论逻辑上圆满解答"合同为什么不完全",其理论基础存在很大的争议,这也导致其研究范式存在内在的逻辑矛盾与冲突,大量有关不完全合同的研究本质上却是关注完全合同。本文尝试从演化经济学的视角重新审视不完全合同理论,强调必须从知识不完全性的视角来阐释合同的不完全性,认为个体的有限认知是合同不完全性的重要理论基础,在此视角下探讨了不完全合同的功能、生成及其演变,并重新考察了权威在不完全合同中的作用。     

科学与实证——一个基于“神经元经济学”的综述

诞生于20世纪90年代中晚期的神经元经济学(Neuroeconomics)是经济学的最新分支和经济学前沿研究的最新领域,它运用现代神经科学的范式、方法和技术工具分析人类的经济行为以及脑组织(主要是神经元及其相关的神经突触联结和神经网络)在人类决策过程中的功能、作用和机制,把经济学的实证研究提升到一个前所未有的高度,对经济学传统理论提出一系列意义重大的修正,从而为经济学的发展深化开拓了一个全新的空间。     

Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics

Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run. Correspondence to: J. Noailly     

Evolution of momentum and popularity

In this paper, the evolutionary behavior of two types of investor in a capital market with two risky competing securities is investigated. It is shown that, if all investors are momentum-oriented, then only those who are the most sensitive to popularity will survive. Conversely, if all investors are popularity-oriented, then they will all invest in the same security.     

Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences

We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278–305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from “lexicographic evolutionarily stability” (defined by extending the common characterization of evolutionary stability to lexicographic preferences) in the order in which limits in the payoff space and the space of invasion barriers are taken.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

2000～2018年乡村教师队伍建设研究热点与演化趋势研究

从CNKI数据库收录的2000—2018年文献中,筛选出2148篇"乡村教师队伍建设"领域相关文献,利用CiteSpace和SA-TI3.1软件,对样本文献外部特征、关键词共现、知识演进趋势与热点前沿展开知识图谱分析。首先,展示了乡村教师队伍建设研究现状,梳理了发展动态。其次,划分了"科学发展观""教师教育""特岗教师"和"义务教育管理体制"四大热点研究领域。在此基础上将乡村教师队伍建设研究分为3个演进阶段,并总结出"农村小规模学校""乡村教师专业发展""特岗教师"和"教师流动"四个方向为该领域的前沿热点。最后,分别从公费师范生、基础设施建设和乡村教师的幸福感等方面获得了一些启示。     

演化经济学——无序态及其整合

20世纪80年代以来演化经济学取得了长足进展,但由于缺少统一的基础性分析框架、对关键性概念的不同理解,演化经济学总体上仍处于一种无序态。要避免这种无序态,演化经济学须在层级区分、层级融合与核心理论构建上取得实质性进展,演化经济学的方法论决定了这种整合将是一个长期的过程,它不仅有赖于演化经济学本身的发展,还依赖于其他相关学科的进展。     

Validating a customer well-being index related to natural wildlife tourism

This study reports an attempt to validate a customer well-being (CWB) index related to natural wildlife tourism. It was hypothesized that the CWB index related to wildlife tourism has a positive influence on travel outcomes (length of stay, number of visits, and total expenses), mediated by perceived value and customer loyalty. These hypotheses were tested using four waves of surveys of customers (overnight visitors) intercepted at the park in a two-year period. The survey data provided support for the hypotheses, which, in turn, lend validation support to the CWB index. Managerial implications of the customer well-being index are also discussed.