Contractual signaling,relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements

I analyze a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. The asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. I show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment.     

Multinational firms, exclusivity, and backward linkages

How does the nature of contractual relationships between a multinational and its local suppliers affect backward linkages and welfare in the local industry? We address this question in a two-tier oligopoly model where a multinational transfers technology to its suppliers if they accept an exclusive contract that precludes them from serving its local rivals. Invited suppliers balance the benefits of gaining access to new technology and the derived demand of the multinational against the opportunity of selling to other local firms. Exclusivity reduces competition among local suppliers and can lower backward linkages and local welfare relative to autarky.     

My deal expires soon: Can time restriction and exclusivity induce clickthrough in hospitality promotional offers?

The high penetration level of information and communication technology presents challenges for hospitality marketers in designing a promotional offer that stands out from the plethora of social media posts and mobile text messages received by potential customers. Without users’ clickthrough on the posts or hyperlinks, purchases will not occur. This study explored time restriction as a determinant and offer exclusivity as a moderator of clickthrough. Drawing from a scenario-based experiment, the results showed that a time-restricted offer, but not an exclusive offer, induced clickthrough intention through positive offer evaluation. A convergent result was revealed in the field experiment that examined actual clickthrough. Moreover, the time restriction effect was contingent on offer exclusivity. Their dynamics add knowledge to the advertising and hospitality marketing literature. It is recommended that hospitality marketers impose time restrictions to increase clickthrough rate and it is not advisable to incorporate exclusivity messages in their promotional offers.     

Brokers’ contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market

We bring new evidence to bear on the role of intermediaries in frictional matching markets and on how parties design contracts with them. Specifically, we examine two features of contracts between landlords and agents in the Manhattan residential rental market. In our data, 72 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between landlords and agents (the remaining 28 percent are non-exclusive); and in 21 percent of listings, the landlord commits to pay the agent’s fee (in the other 79 percent, the tenant pays the agent’s the fee). Our analysis highlights that these contractual features reflect landlords’ concerns about providing agents with incentives to exert effort specific to their rental units and to screen among heterogeneous tenants.     

技术创新网络分裂断层、知识权力与创新独占性——知识势差的调节作用

创新独占性可表征创新合作群体对于自身知识、技术创新成果的利用和分享程度，决定着创新合作群体能够在多大程度上从创新成果中获利。创新独占性具有外部排他性和内部互补性的显著特征，有必要从技术创新网络视角出发，审视创新子群间相互关系对创新独占性的影响机理。以参与合作研发的高新技术企业群体为研究对象，构建技术创新网络分裂断层对创新独占性影响路径的概念模型。结果显示：技术创新网络分裂断层对创新独占性产生正向影响，知识权力在技术创新网络分裂断层与创新独占性之间发挥中介作用，技术创新网络分裂断层对创新独占性的影响受知识势差的负向调节。     

Gains and losses of exclusivity in grocery retailing

Conventional wisdom dictates that convenience goods should be distributed as intensively as possible. Still, exclusivity arrangements are rapidly gaining way in grocery retailing. We discuss the possible performance outcomes of exclusivity deals, and propose a unified framework (i) to quantify the gains and losses of such arrangements in consumer-packaged-goods markets, and (ii) to decompose the total monetary gains and losses into a variety of sources. Our framework considers both the manufacturer and the retailer granted the exclusivity right, and accounts for the fact that both dyad parties may be active in multiple, inter-related, categories.     

Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower–lender relationship

This paper presents a stylized model of a borrower–lender relationship where funds are gradually invested in a project with uncertain return. We show that an exclusive financing relationship arises endogenously in equilibrium due to initial lender’s superior information on the project’s progress. The analysis also identifies a novel distortionary effect of exclusivity and the consequent loss of future rents on the ex-ante choices of the borrower. When she chooses the amount of funds to be initially invested in the project, the borrower chooses to overinvest making the future rent extraction by the initial lender as costly as possible. We would like to thank Alberto Bisin, Andrew Chen, Boyan Jovanovic, Hideo Konishi, David Mauer, Efe Ok, Mike Riordan, Charles A. Wilson, and seminar participants at Society of Economic Design 2002 meetings in New York and Southern Methodist University for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Valuing Exclusivity from Encroachment in Franchising

Conflict is created when business format franchisors penetrate existing markets with new outlets that increase system-wide sales, but negatively affect the sales and profits of existing franchisees. Territorial exclusivity contracts are used to manage channel conflict in such situations. We present a model to value territorial exclusivity from the perspective of both the franchisor and the franchisee. We show that under certain circumstances there is positive value to the franchisor by including the exclusivity clause in the contract and to the franchisee by purchasing this exclusivity. When this happens, the likelihood of franchisor-franchisee encroachment-related conflict is reduced.