金融机构市场退出的法律问题研究

金融机构市场退出法律制度是金融生态的有机组成部分，其健全与否会严重影响金融生态的和谐发展。然而，我国当前却缺乏规范、有效的市场退出法律制度，特别是金融机构接管、撤销、破产三大法律规范存在严重缺憾，亟待加以完善。     

我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素

基于1999年到2003年间我国56个本土创业投资退出项目的数据,本文对我国创业投资退出项目的投资回报率及其影响因素进行了实证研究。结果表明:(1)国有创业投资机构退出项目的平均投资回报率显著低于非国有创业投资机构;(2)创业投资机构的资本规模与回报率呈显著负相关关系;(3)上海、深圳两地创业投资机构退出项目的回报率显著高于其他地区;(4)本土创业投资机构的从业时间、投资规模、投资周期、退出方式均与回报率没有显著相关关系。本文在此基础上提出了相关的政策建议。     

风险投资退出机制研究:来自广东的经验

股权退出机制使得风险资本能够实现循环投资,也是风险投资中潜在或外在的有关公司控制权的激励合约的组成部分之一。本文以广东为例,说明了退出机制差异造成了我国内外资风险投资机构的经营差距,而退出机制差异主要体现为国内资本市场体系不完善,进而提出了建设多层次资本市场的相关对策选择。     

International commitment,post-entry growth and survival of international new ventures

This paper makes several contributions to the emerging literature on the post-entry behavior of international new ventures. Based on an extensive longitudinal data set, we investigate the dynamics of commitment, growth and survival of different types of newly internationalizing Belgian firms. Global start-ups have the highest initial and rapidly rising export commitment per market and are also more likely to continue exporting over time than geographically focused start-ups, and traditional staged exporters. However, global start-ups also display the highest failure rate. This high failure rate appears to result primarily from the ‘liability of newness’ and less from the added complexity associated with rapid and wide scope internationalization.     

Staff turnover costs: In search of accountability

The nature of staff turnover accounting procedures in a labour intensive context has been examined by conducting interviews with twenty eight managers in large three to five star hotels and two theme parks. It was found that the main staff turnover accountability procedures adopted involve monthly departmental reporting of staff turnover percentage levels and also the conduct of exit interviews. A degree of staff turnover costing was noted, although this practice was not extensively applied. Most interviewees supported the notion of allocating staff turnover costs to those operating departments experiencing the turnover. A muted form of this practice was observed in one hotel, however most interviewees had never contemplated or heard of the practice. Agency theory has been utilized as a framework for structuring a range of observed and potential staff turnover accountability relationships.     

完善我国公务员退出机制的思考

公务员的各项制度日益健全完善,但由于公务员退出机制的滞后,使得公务员队伍缺乏活力。进一步健全公务员退出机制是提高行政效率,促进公务员勤政、廉政的重要保证,在公务员管理中起着重要作用。围绕公务员退出问题,阐述国内外公务员退出机制的一般理论及其发展,分析公务员退出难的深层次因素,提出完善我国公务员退出机制的相关建议和措施。     

中国工业企业动态演化效率研究：所有制视角

不同所有制企业陆续进入、退出市场以及在市场中展开竞争,是中国渐进式改革在企业层面的一个重要特征。本文借助中国工业企业数据库(1998~2007年),在VDF总量生产率增长分解框架下,测度了不同所有制企业的动态演进效率。研究发现国有企业在总量上的效率贡献最大,民营企业在增量上的效率贡献则最大。经济总量上,内部效率提升环节对总量生产率贡献最大,而增量上,退出环节对总量生产率贡献最大,表明中国经济已经走上了一条内生增长、创新驱动与优胜劣汰的发展道路。进入环节无论在何种情况下效率贡献均为负,说明中国依然是一个进入门槛较高的国家。不同所有制企业对总量生产率的贡献与企业生命周期有关。本文对澄清我国企业改革的所有制误区,推进混合所有制经济改革与寻找经济增长新动力有着重要的理论价值与现实意义。     

Choice of Portfolios and Fee under Principal -Agent Framework with Uncertain Exit - Time

In the real world, an investor is usually not sure about when he or she will exit investment. She can only make estimation prior. With the growth of the scale of open - end funds which can be subscribed and redeemed at any time. Investors began to pay more attention on problems such as whether the fee is reasonable, the payment can encourage the agent or not. Others would consider if the portfolio that the agent chooses is the best one. This paper considers the principal - agent problem with uncertain exit - time under two cases： the action of the agent is observable and unobservable. We derive close - form expressions of the optimal portfolio and the best fee. Finally an empirical analysis is given based on the data of some open - end funds in China.     

Persistent protection in an international exit game

This paper examines the strategic behavior of two countries in a duopoly exit game with declining demand in the export market. We consider whether countries have a strategic rational to maintain, rather than unilaterally or jointly reduce, their subsidies. Conditions under which persistent subsidization is justified from a national perspective are derived. By maintaining subsidies one country can gain a strategic advantage by forcing its rival to exit earlier. An outcome where only one country applies the subsidy is not attainable. Free trade is less likely to occur close to the end of the game.