Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Moving from the lab to the field: Exploring scrutiny and duration effects in lab experiments

The most important issue facing experimental economists is the generalizability of lab results. This letter examines more than 1200 doctor/patient consultations, in which scrutiny and duration of treatment were varied. We show that scrutiny has an important but short-lived effect.     

资产价格泡沫研究述评:实验金融学视角

本文从实验金融学的视角介绍了资产泡沫最新的定义和分类,阐述了投机性泡沫、理性泡沫与非理性泡沫之间的区别和联系,着重从信息对称、信息不对称、有限套利泡沫、异质信念和实验金融五个方面系统评述了资产价格泡沫理论的发展历程和新进展,指出该领域进一步的研究方向和中国开展资产价格泡沫研究的重要意义。研究表明,随着现代金融学的高速发展,学界对资产泡沫的研究日益深入。特别是非理性和实验金融学视角的引入,突破了传统金融框架的束缚,为这一课题研究带来了新的认知和理解。即便如此,目前仍无法根除资产泡沫产生的可能性。很多相关问题,如资产泡沫产生的时间和根本原因,仍然等待着学者们去探索和研究。     

Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot reject the simple hypothesis described above either.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments

Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University.     

Proper scoring rules for general decision models

If a decision maker whose behavior conforms to the max-min expected utility model is faced with a scoring rule for a subjective expected utility decision maker, she will always announce a probability belonging to her set of priors; moreover, for any prior in the set, there is a scoring rule inducing the agent to announce that prior. We also show that on the domain of Choquet expected utility preferences with risk neutral lottery evaluation and totally monotone capacities, proper scoring rules do not exist. This implies the non-existence of proper scoring rules for any larger class of preferences (CEU with convex capacities, multiple priors).     

A commentary on ‘The long road to publishing: A user-friendly exposé’

Many of the pressing questions currently facing accounting education researchers are best addressed through experimental research. For example, experiments are useful in testing the effect of innovative educational practices on student learning. The purpose of this paper is to briefly review the literature addressing sources of invalidity which may cloud the results of experiments and describe several procedures which are helpful in controlling for these sources of invalidity. Examples are provided, from published accounting education research studies, which illustrate how researchers have attempted to address several of these threats to validity. Experiments must be carefully planned and designed, so the experiment on completion fulfills the objectives of the researcher. Although experiments are more difficult to conduct in the educational environment than in a scientist's laboratory, many procedures are available to assist accounting education researchers in designing tightly controlled experiments.     

THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS ABOUT MOTIVATION CROWDING OUT: A POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE?

The empirical relevance of motivation crowding out is a controversial issue in economics and psychology. As already pointed out by Frey and Jegen ( 2001 ), this is partly due to the historical development of two distinct and parallel strands of literature that stem from different theoretical traditions, have radically different tenets and therefore, are difficult to reconcile. In this survey, we go back to the details of the debates that took place independently among psychologists and economists, and sketch an integrative interdisciplinary approach likely to favor a more fruitful collaboration between economics and psychology. From this perspective, experimental economics (both field and laboratory) is viewed as a major research field shedding new light on the conditions of relevance of motivation crowding out.     

Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior

Second chance offers in online marketplaces involve a seller conducting an auction for a single object and then using information from the auction to offer a losing bidder a take-it-or-leave-it price for another unit. We theoretically and experimentally investigate this practice and compare it to two sequential auctions. We show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the second chance offer mechanism only exists in mixed strategies, and we observe that this mechanism generates more profit for the auctioneer than two sequential auctions. We also observe virtually no rejections of profitable offers in the ultimatum bargaining stage.