Intergenerational Correlations of Extreme Right‐Wing Party Preferences and Attitudes toward Immigration

In this paper, we analyze the importance of parental socialization on the development of children's far right‐wing preferences and attitudes toward immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people's right‐wing extremism are their parents' right‐wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes toward immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right‐wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers' and sons' right‐wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking.     

Do unhappy citizens vote for populism?

This paper explores the dynamics behind the surge in populist voting across Europe. It employs individual-level cross-sectional data from 8 waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2016). I attempt to shed light on one particular perspective of viewing populist voting – the role of psychological discontent. I examine robustness to (i) different ways of defining populism, (ii) a selection of alternative specifications and (iii) estimation methods. The results suggest that generalized unhappiness with one's personal well-being – and not merely dissatisfaction with governments – could play a significant role in the rise of European populism. As such, low levels of subjective well-being are proposed as a valid predictor of shifts towards extreme movements.     

Endogenous institutions and political extremism

The election of extreme political leaders is often associated with changes in political institutions. This paper studies these phenomena through a model in which the median voter elects a leader anticipating that he will impose institutional constraints—such as constitutional amendments, judicial appointments, or the implicit threat of a coup—that influence the behavior of future political challengers. It is typically optimal for the median voter to elect an extreme incumbent when democracy is less fully consolidated, when the costs of imposing institutional constraints are intermediate, and when the distribution of potential challengers is asymmetric. The median voter typically elects a more right-wing incumbent when the distribution of potential challengers shifts to the left. Implications of the model for the consolidation of democracy and institutional constraints are discussed, as are several related mechanisms through which politiciansʼ ability to affect institutions may lead voters to optimally elect extremists.