Optimal freeware quality in the presence of network externalities: an evolutionary game theoretical approach

New software products often face difficulty in achieving market penetration. A potential remedy is to offer a freeware version of the software to encourage initial adoption and establish a larger user base for the software, thereby increasing the commercial version's value to adopters in future periods. However, to avoid complete cannibalization of the commercial version, the freeware version's quality must be sufficiently low and the price of the commercial version must not be too high. We model the effect of these two decision variables, price and freeware quality, on the adoption of software using static and evolutionary game theory.     

Freeware as a competitive deterrent

Using perfect foresight and adaptive models, this paper examines the effect of competitor asymmetry, consumer sensitivity to incentives and adaptive processes on freeware strategies and competitive outcomes. Four roles played by freeware in competitive markets are identified – it can be a mechanism to build or speed up the growth of a network without the need to lower prices on the commercial version, a deterrence mechanism, a hindrance to a rival’s network building efforts, and a coordination device in the presence of forward looking consumers. We determine the optimal prices of the commercial version, the decisions to introduce freeware and the freeware qualities for both competing firms.