Did the Federal Reserve's MBS purchase program lower mortgage rates?

On November 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced it would purchase mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This program affected mortgage rates through three channels: (1) improved market functioning in both primary and secondary mortgage markets, (2) clearer government backing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and (3) anticipation of portfolio rebalancing effects. We use empirical pricing models for MBS yields and for mortgage rates to measure relative importance of channels: The first two were important during the height of the financial crisis, but the effects of the third depended on market conditions. Overall, the program put significant downward pressure on mortgage rates.     

GSEs,Mortgage Rates,and the Long-Run Effects of Mortgage Securitization

Our paper compares mortgage securitization undertaken by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with that undertaken by private firms, with an emphasis on how each type of mortgage securitization affects mortgage rates. We build a model illustrating that market structure, government sponsorship, and the characteristics of the mortgages securitized are all important determinants of mortgage rates. We find that GSEs generally—but not always—lower mortgage rates, particularly when the GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs implicit government backing allows them to sell securities without the credit enhancements needed in the private sector. Using our simulation model, we demonstrate that when mortgages eligible for purchase by the GSEs have characteristics similar to other mortgages, the GSEs implicit government-backing generates differences in mortgage rates similar to those currently observed in the mortgage market (which range between zero and fifty basis points). However, if the mortgages purchased by GSEs are less costly to originate and securitize, and if the GSEs behave competitively, then the simulated spread in mortgage rates can be much larger than that observed in the data.     

Limiting Corporate Power

In this article, the authors examine the recent evolution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in light of the ongoing and massive public sector bailout of "too big to fail" private banks. The authors propose that instead of using these semi public banks as vehicles for a backdoor bailout of their private peers, they could easily be employed as a centerpiece for a people's bailout.     

Emergence of subprime lending in minority neighborhoods

Subprime lending is concentrated in minority neighborhoods. However, the literature provides little evidence for what led to this concentration. We use the endorsement of credit scores in mortgage underwriting by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) in 1995 to answer this question. We show that prime lenders were substituted by subprime lenders in minority neighborhoods. As a result, the share of subprime lending increased by 5 percentage points in minority neighborhoods, relative to nonminority neighborhoods. Prime lenders with a stronger relationship with the GSEs reduced their lending in minority neighborhoods more, and the level of securitization by the GSEs in minority neighborhoods also decreased.