开放式创新社区中用户交互反馈对个体创新贡献度的影响

开放社区中的用户交互反馈是用户创新活动的重要组成部分，基于需求满足理论，研究其他用户反馈对个体创新贡献度的影响。结合典型开放式产品设计社区——Local Motors平台，采用数据挖掘方法，从数量、质量和情感3个方面研究开放式创新社区中FOU对个体创新贡献度的影响。结果表明，反馈数量和质量均对个体创新贡献度有显著影响，其中反馈次数对个体创新贡献度有显著正向影响，反馈率和反馈人员多样性对个体创新贡献度有显著负向影响，反馈长度和反馈支持文件对个体创新贡献度没有影响，正向情感倾向在用户反馈和个体创新贡献度之间无任何调节作用。     

网络直播购物情境下的拟剧化营销——基于抖音直播平台的分析与诠释

网络直播购物逐渐成为一种新的网络营销与消费方式。对于该模式的剖析,有助于对网络直播购物这一新兴事物进行全景化的解构与阐释,更好地理解与把握该模式的本质与趋势。本文基于第三方立场与视角,以戈夫曼拟剧理论为基础,锚定抖音平台为实践场景,尝试诠释拟剧理论在网络直播购物情境中的新变化、新形式、新内涵。研究选择Top100网络直播主播为分析对象,采用后台运营数据、页面数据爬虫、人工观察分析等多元数据采集与分析方法,对整个网络直播购物场景进行分析。研究发现,网络直播购物呈现出鲜明的拟剧化营销特质,各类要素间存在循环强化的运行机理,消费者的购物行为有着显著的集体偏好,且主体间的协同合作机制促进了消费的延续。该发现有助于对拟剧化营销运行机制、拟剧理论的新场景及网络直播购物这一新兴商业模式进行客观辩证的思考。     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

Relief aid stocking decisions under bilateral agency cooperation

We aim to quantify the benefits of cooperation between humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stocking decisions. We consider two agencies that stock the same type of relief item at different locations prone to individual disaster risks and agree to transship the shortage amount from available stocks in case of a disaster. We incorporate the disaster risk to the Newsvendor model by conditioning the stock quantity decisions on the event that a major disaster occurs within the lifetime of the stocked relief item. We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity and compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically. We apply this game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul to optimize the stocking decisions of an agency for shelter units in cooperation with another agency. We investigate the characteristics of the solutions under various parameter settings and identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies.     

LEADERSHIP IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: CONSEQUENCES AND INCENTIVES

Initiatives in favor of unilateral action on climate change are frequently challenged by concerns over free riding. Nevertheless, we observe an increasing number of unilateral efforts at different administrative levels and in different parts of the world. Previous academic literature described various individual mechanisms where emissions abroad may increase or decrease as a reaction to unilateral emission reductions. In this paper, we collect a comprehensive set of both positive and negative reactions and analyze them in stylized models. This allows us to identify the most important characteristics that determine the potential of a leader to boost mitigation efforts abroad. We find that this potential depends on (i) a strong ability to generate knowledge through leadership, (ii) a high degree of credibility in the international community, and (iii) a similar economic structure to the most important emitters. While most effects are difficult to quantify, this comprehensive assessment suggests that leakage effects resulting from unilateral mitigation may well be outweighed by positive reactions.     

Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.     

和谐社会与价值--能量理论

本文延续了《经济学的本质》、《经济学的表象》两书提出的“价值-能量”理论,对构建和谐社会的要求、过程和目的进行了科学的分析,并为之奠定了科学的理论基础.     

上市公司CEO的监管机制：一个三方博弈视觉的思考

所有权与经营权的分离是现代企业的基本特征,内部人控制问题已成为制约上市公司健康稳定发展的瓶颈因素。本文通过建立一个CEO、董事会和外部监管机构三方之间的博弈模型,强调了监管的重要性;并从完善董事会职能和加强外部监管力度两个方面对上市公司CEO的道德风险之监管提出合理性建议。     

Game theoretic derivations of competitive strategies in conjoint analysis

While conjoint analysis has been applied in a wide variety of different contexts in Marketing, most applications fail to explicitly consider retaliatory reactions from competitors. In this paper, a methodological extension is developed for conjoint analysis by explicitly modeling competition in a game theoretic context. The Nash equilibrium concept is employed to model competitive reactions to produce design, and its implications for reactive product strategies are discussed. The optimal product design problem for each firm is formulated as a nonlinear integer programming problem, which is solved via a specialized branch and bound method combined with a heuristic. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium, a sequential iterative procedure is proposed. The proposed procedure is illustrated under several scenarios of competition using previously published conjoint data.This research has been supported by the Henry Rutgers Research Fellowship, Rutgers University.