Health and political regimes: Evidence from quantile regression

This study investigates how political regimes affect health conditions such as infant and child mortality rates and life expectancy using data from 180 countries observed between 1960 and 2013. Panel quantile regression is used to examine the effects at different intervals throughout the distribution of health outcomes. The estimation results indicate that democracy has significant positive effects on health outcomes and that its impacts are greater when health outcomes are worse. These results are robust to different democracy and health indices. The effects of different types of democracies and dictatorships are also considered, that is parliamentary, mixed (semi-presidential) and presidential democracies, and civilian, military and royal dictatorships. The parliamentary form of democracy has the largest positive impact on health outcomes at the worst quantile of health outcomes, although the difference in the impacts of the three types of democracies is not necessarily large. Furthermore, all types of dictatorships have a negative impact on health outcomes, with military dictatorship having the worst outcome when health outcomes are worse. Finally, the effects of democratization on health outcomes are significantly positive when the health outcomes are worse.     

话语民主理论下可持续发展中的公民参与

可持续发展目标的追求需要公民的集体判断，公民参与作为可持续发展的基本原则之一，有利于实现可持续发展的目标，也是为避免“公地悲剧”尴尬局面的必然选择。从话语民主理论的角度来看，我国可持续发展进程中存在着公民参与可持续发展的不完善性和公民淡漠的问题，以及官僚式的独白现象。因此，要构建公共能量场确保可持续发展政策执行过程公民话语的正当性和合法性，实行一些人的对话参与可持续发展，通过“重复性实践”使可持续发展中的公民参与制度化。     

Income inequality, democracy and growth reconsidered

Persson and Tabellini (Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992a. Growth, distribution and politics. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 593–602; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992b. Growth, distribution and politics. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–22; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth? Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 600–621) as well as Alesina and Rodrik (Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1992. Distribution, political conflict, and economic growth. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 23–50; Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth, Q. J. Econ. 109, 465–490) have argued that income inequality reduces economic growth rates among democracies because it promotes distributional struggles. In this paper I question the supportive evidence for a number of reasons. Measures of income distribution and democracy are unreliable and permit only very tentative conclusions. Changes in data sources or recoding of some influential cases affect results. It is questionable whether equality effects on growth apply only within democracies, as a median voter interpretation of this relationship should make one expect. The general idea that distributional struggle hurts the growth prospects of nations, however, receives some empirical support.     

The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy

We study the connection between inheritance systems and the historical evolution of the relationship between a society’s economic structure and its political system, with a focus on Europe from feudal times. The model predicts that, in an early agrarian phase, aristocratic political systems prevail, while democracies tend to emerge with industrialization. At the same time, as indivisible landed estates are replaced by capital as the primary source of wealth, the inheritance system evolves endogenously from primogeniture to partition. The dynamics of output, distribution, class structure and political participation are in turn reinforced by the system of intergenerational wealth transmission, with primogeniture tending to concentration and partition to equalization. “But the law of inheritance was the last step to equality.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835).     

The political economy of redistribution under democracy

We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. Hence, the corollary question concerns the conditions under which democracy is sustainable. We find that democracies survive in wealthy societies. Conditional on the initial income distribution and the capacity of the poor and the wealthy to overthrow democracy, each country has a threshold of capital stock above which democracy survives. This threshold is lower when the distribution of initial endowments is more equal and when the revolutionary prowess of these groups is lower. Yet in poor unequal countries there exist no redistribution scheme which would be accepted both by the poor and the wealthy. Hence, democracy cannot survive. As endowments increase, redistribution schemes that satisfy both the poor and the wealthy emerge. Moreover, as capital stock grows the wealthy tolerate more and the poor less redistribution, so that the set of feasible redistributions becomes larger. Since the median voter prefers one such scheme to the dictatorship of either group, democracy survives.We would like to thank, Daron Acemoglu, Marco Basetto, Alberto Bisin, V.V. Chari, Pat Kehoe, Onur Ozgur for very useful comments.     

Visions and scenarios of democratic governance in Asia 2030

Using the Six Pillars foresight workshop process, forty-five Asian political, policy and activist leaders explored the futures of democratic governance. Organized and funded by Oxfam and the Rockefeller Foundation, the organizing hypothesis was that without a change in the nature of governance in Asia, poverty could not truly be uprooted. Changes in governance needed to be imagined and created from the ground up, not just imposed by the past or the elite. Five visions with accompanying causal layered analysis were developed by participants. Generally, these visions focused on more inclusion not just at the level of voting, but in terms of the participatory creation of alternative futures of culture, technology, economy and polity.     

Democracy in the ageing society: Quest for political equilibrium between generations

The ageing of society looms large as having a huge impact on the future political landscape, and is increasingly being acknowledged as a serious threat to the sustainability of democracy. The ageing of the voting electorate is contributing to the political imbalance between the old and young generations, and has the potential to levy excessive burden on future generations. With this background in mind, this research seeks to point out, through reform of the electoral system, the problems of silver democracy caused by societal ageing, and to suggest ways to achieve political equilibrium between generations. Key suggestions are: 1) changing the basis of electoral districts from geographic area to age-cohort; 2) establishment of a new future generations district which can speak for the rights of those who are currently underage; and 3) weighting of votes cast by the younger generations, who may be at a numerical disadvantage in elections.     

Do unfair perceived own pay and top managers’ pay erode satisfaction with democracy?

Many people are relatively unsatisfied with the democratic system as it currently exists. In this empirical research note, the authors present evidence that German workers, who perceive their own pay or top managers’ pay as unfair, are on average significantly less happy with the democracy in Germany. Thus, fairness perceptions in the labour market and of income inequality seem to have spillover effects on the overall satisfaction with the democratic system.     

Using Machine Learning for measuring democracy: A practitioners guide and a new updated dataset for 186 countries from 1919 to 2019

We provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on the measurement of democracy and present an extensive update of the Machine Learning indicator of Gründler and Krieger (2016). Four improvements are particularly notable: First, we produce a continuous and a dichotomous version of the Machine Learning democracy indicator. Second, we calculate intervals that reflect the degree of measurement uncertainty. Third, we refine the conceptualization of the Machine Learning Index. Finally, we significantly expand the data coverage by providing democracy indices for 186 countries in the period from 1919 to 2019.     

Does democracy cause growth? A meta-analysis (of 2000 regressions)

The relationship between democracy and economic growth has been widely debated in the social sciences with contrasting results. We apply a meta-analytical framework surveying 188 studies (2047 models) covering 36 years of research in the field. We also compare the effect of democracy on growth with the effect of human capital on growth in a sub-sample of 111 studies (875 models). Our findings suggest that democracy has a positive and direct effect on economic growth beyond the reach of publication bias, albeit weaker (about one third) of that of human capital. Further, the growth effect of democracy appears to be stronger in more recent papers not surveyed in Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008). Finally, we show that the heterogeneity in the reported results is mainly driven by spatial and temporal differences in the samples, indicating that the democracy and growth nexus is not homogeneous across world regions and decades.