Market power and compliance with output quotas

This paper examines the compliance behaviour of a dominant firm in an output quota market when the firm is able to exercise market power in both the quota and the output markets. Provided the firm has an initial quota endowment which is strictly positive, under some circumstances the firm may find it profitable to comply or even over-comply in its quota demand, even in the absence of enforcement. The results are compared to those found in the pollution permit literature for a firm with market dominance only in the permit market, to which some additional observations are also added concerning efficiency outcomes under non-compliance.     

美加两国实施ITQs制度之比较及启示

个别可转让配额(ITQs)制度是当前国际渔业管理中比较有效的一种管理手段,我国新版<渔业法>所规定的捕捞限额制度同ITQs制度没有本质上的差别.为了严格控制捕捞强度,加大渔业资源和环境保护力度,实施制度优势明显的捕捞限额制度已成为今后我国渔业制度发展的一个必然趋势.鉴于此,本文分析了美加两国引入ITQs的原因、ITQs的发展、ITQ制度的设计及其结果,并结合我国的具体国情提出了自己的观点.     

我国捕捞限额制度的性质与路径选择

本文在考察ITQs制度形成的理论背景与介绍ITQs制度的理念与制度优势的基础上,提出了我国实施捕捞限额制度的路径选择问题.     

Conflicting uses of marine resources: can ITQs promote an efficient solution?*

This paper examines the allocation problem arising from conflicting demands for marine resource use by (i) commercial fishers, (ii) recreational fishers, and (iii) conservationists. It is shown that decentralised trading of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) is capable of an efficient allocation of resource use between the first two parties. In contrast, it is found that the standard ITQ system is not capable of performing the same ideal co‐ordination between the conflicting interests of extractive users, that is, all fishers, and the non‐extractive ones, that is, conservationists. The reason is that quota trades between individual fishers and conservationists are inevitably accompanied by (positive) externalities on both other fishers and conservationists. As a result, decentralised quota trades between these parties cannot be efficient. The fundamental economic observation is that quotas for conservation and for extraction constitute two different goods. It follows that a socially optimal market allocation of these two goods requires two prices instead of the single quota price in the standard ITQ system. Thus, to achieve efficiency, the ITQ system has to be extended to incorporate both types of goods. It is shown in the paper that if fishers and conservationists can organise themselves into groups, trades of conservation quotas between the two groups can in principle lead to fully efficient allocation. An interesting implication of this modified ITQ system is that the need for a fisheries authority to set the total allowable catch (TACs) disappears.