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1.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the supervisory role of the board of directors in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We focus our study on the European case, for which there is no previous exhaustive evidence on this topic. Using information on 985 mergers and acquisitions carried out over the period 2003–2016 by companies in the major European countries, we analyze the influence of supervisory capacity of the board (small size, higher proportion of outsiders and separated Chairperson-CEO positions) on acquirer returns, differentiating between Anglo-Saxon and continental European contexts. Our results confirm that the effectiveness of corporate governance practices depends strongly on their fit with the broader institutional context. Specifically, we find that a smaller size of the board of directors and the separation of the positions of Chairperson and CEO lead to higher acquirer returns in European Anglo-Saxon countries. By contrast, we do not find evidence that any proxy of supervisory capacity of the board significantly improves acquirer returns in the rest of countries.  相似文献   
2.
This paper discusses the determinants of China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) with a special focus on the role of government policy. In particular, we investigate the types of policies that are most influential in promoting OFDI. Our main contribution is to analyse, for the first time, China’s OFDI policies by means of quantitative indicators. We refine policies definitions and distinguish between Regulation Policies, Service Policies, Promotion Policies and Supervision Policies, and we develop a methodology for collecting, screening and coding policies; then we create new indices to capture different types of policies. We find that Regulation Policies, Service Policies and the general attitude of the government have significant effects on China’s OFDI at the national level.  相似文献   
3.
We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.  相似文献   
4.
陈康  刘琦 《金融研究》2018,459(9):126-142
本文利用2006-2015年间的数据研究了融资融券对投资-股价敏感性的影响。利用融资融券作为股价信息含量的一个外生冲击变量,本文研究发现,我国A股市场确实存在反馈效应,融资融券政策的实施增强了标的公司投资-股价敏感性,这个结论在采用倾向得分模型(PSM)配对后依然成立,说明融资融券使股价融入了更多有利于管理层投资决策的信息。其次,融资融券对投资-股价敏感性的影响在机构投资者比例高、流动性高、处于新兴行业的这类管理层反馈效应更强的股票组中更显著。参照以往研究考虑了融资约束对反馈效应的调节作用,同样发现融资融券对投资-股价敏感性的影响在国有企业和规模较大的企业组中更显著。最后,融资融券交易规模越大,投资对股价的敏感性越强。  相似文献   
5.
机构投资者与政府补贴等优惠政策作为企业经营的重要资本来源和制度保障,势必对企业技术创新产生重要影响。以我国沪深两市战略性新兴上市企业2010-2015年面板数据为研究样本,对异质机构持股、政府补贴与企业技术创新的关系进行实证分析。结果发现:机构持股对企业技术创新没有显著影响,政府补贴可以促进机构持股对企业技术创新尤其是实质性技术创新产生显著正向影响;基金持股对企业技术创新存在显著负向影响,券商持股与QFII持股对企业技术创新分别存在不显著和显著正向影响;政府补贴能够降低基金持股对企业技术创新的负向影响,有效促进基金持股对企业技术创新的正向影响,并通过调节作用促进券商持股和QFII持股对企业技术创新产生更加显著的正向效应;政府补贴对基金持股与企业非实质性技术创新关系的正向调节作用更加显著,对券商持股和QFII持股与企业实质性技术创新关系的正向调节作用更加显著。  相似文献   
6.
This paper contrasts goal-directed and institutional approaches to the development of performance measurement (PM) in the Swedish university sector, which has been subject to increasing emphasis on management by objectives since the early 1990s. We adopt a macro perspective, focusing on recent changes in PM related to governmental control of universities and colleges and combine an extensive review of archival data with interviews in our empirical analysis. It is concluded that although the goal-directed model cannot be completely rejected as a heuristic informing recent changes in PM, a process-orientated institutional perspective considerably enriches the analysis by making it less static and more contextually informed. In particular, the latter perspective better explains the evolution of loose couplings between formally stated goals and performance indicators and between different systems for PM by directing attention to the complex interplay between conflicting constituent interests in the evolution of resource and cost allocation practices and quality control procedures. However, our empirical analysis also leads us to reconsider the conceptions of loose coupling as either a “given” feature of institutionalised organizations or an outcome of more pro-active resistance at the micro level prevailing in much earlier work in institutional theory.  相似文献   
7.
Recent accounting scandals have brought focus on the role of management in financial statement manipulation. This focus on micro-behavior does not capture the complexities of earnings management. Taking an institutional rather than agency theory approach, earnings management is posited as a decoupled behavior. A behavior that results from not only agency-based motivations of self-interests, but also regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive legitimacy pressures. Conformity to the central logic of “maximizing shareholder value” found in the “US financial market” institutional field provides the context in which to explore earnings management as a decoupled behavior. Insights for earnings management include the blending of agency and institutional theory perspectives to gain a more complete understanding of the behavior and the positing of a continuum of earnings management conducive to this merger. Institutional theory benefits from exploring the nesting in multiple institutional fields.  相似文献   
8.
在合并会计的研究中引入现代经济学理论 ,可以使我们以开阔的理论视野 ,重新审视合并会计的理论和实务问题。本文在这方面进行尝试 ,以现代经济学为指导 ,重点讨论了合并会计的目的——原则和合并会计制度等问题。  相似文献   
9.
This paper suggests an explanation for the heavy trading volumeobserved on the US capital markets, the world's largest. Heterodoxeconomic theory puts much of this volume down to speculation.Mainstream theory tends to support this thesis, either directlyor indirectly, by giving space to the idea that trading activityis for the most part exogenous to the functioning of the capitalmarkets. The central hypothesis of this paper is that the tradingvolumes observed are an endogenous feature of the capital markets,because they are to a great extent determined by the needs ofthe institutional investors who predominate on these markets.This endogeneity of trading is posited in connection with theemergence of a new ‘core–satellite’ paradigmin institutional investment, a development that essentiallymanifests the asset-management industry's transformation froma small industry serving a few wealthy clients to a mass industryserving large sections of the population.  相似文献   
10.
伴随着我国经济体制改革向纵深发展,国有企业负债比率过高的问题更加突出显示出来。为了解决这个问题,我国实施了“债转股”政策。本文讨论四个命题:(1)国有企业是负债比率过高还是收益率过低;(2)“债转股”政策究竟是使国有企业“财务解困”还是“体制解困”;(3)“债转股”政策究竟是转移金融风险还是化解金融风险;(4)资产管理公司为国有企业和国有商业银行解困,将来谁为资产管理公司解困。本文认为“债转股”政策设计存在功能缺陷与制度依赖。国有企业“债转股”政策的成功依赖于国有企业(商业银行)现代企业制度的建立与完善。  相似文献   
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