On the size and number of preferential trading arrangements

This paper uses a multi-country political economy model to investigate the possibility of achieving global free trade through the expansion of Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs). It is shown that bloc expansion would result in global free trade if blocs have an open membership. However, that would not be the case if membership were selective: at some point, the members of the bloc would stop accepting new members and this would lead to the creation of a second bloc. The likelihood of such a second bloc would make the members of the first bloc choose a larger bloc size than they would have chosen if only one bloc was allowed to form.     

Free trade: what are the terms-of-trade effects?

Changes in trade policy affect a nation’s economic welfare through terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade effects. A move to global free trade would imply higher world economic welfare equal to the sum of all nations’ volume-of-trade, or efficiency, effects. Since the sum of the terms-of-trade effects across all nations is zero, terms-of-trade effects are contentious. Konishi, Kowalczyk and Sjöström (2003) have shown that if customs unions do not affect trade with non-member countries, immediate global free could be achieved if free trade were proposed together with international sidepayments equal to the terms of trade effects. How large would these terms of trade effects, and hence transfers, be? This paper presents estimates from a simple computable general equilibrium model of a world economy of perfect competition. We show that, in some cases, terms-of-trade effects are small compared to efficiency gains, and transfers are not necessary for free trade. In other cases, terms-of-trade gains may account for more than 50% of a country’s gains from free trade and transfers could be large.     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy

In this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization, permitted by Article XXIV of the GATT, on country׳s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade. We present a model, in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups. We show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization. On one hand, the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations. On the other hand, when countries share similar political preferences, multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization.     

国外新区域主义研究综述

"新区域主义"不同于"旧区域主义",有它独特的成因、特征,所以不能用原有分析"旧区域主义"的方法来分析"新区域主义"。运用新增长理论和政治经济学进行分析是现今两个重要的方法,而自20世纪90年代以来区域主义和多边主义的关系一直是学界的热点问题。运用新的分析方法得出的结论,无论是在福利效果还是在区域主义和多边主义的关系等方面,都与以往有所差异。文章最后是对现有新区域主义研究的简要评述。     

Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements

This paper characterizes the efficient payoff frontier in a three country model where countries face one time adjustment costs of forming trade agreements, and compares it with the constrained efficient frontier when agreements must be self-enforcing. The presence of self-enforcement constraints puts a limit on the magnitude of transfers that can be made between countries, and makes it more likely that bilateral agreements are observed on the constrained efficient frontier. The existence of adjustment costs leads to the possibility that payoffs under a two step agreement, in which an initial bilateral agreement is expanded to include the third country, may Pareto dominate the payoffs from immediate formation of an agreement among all three countries. However, the condition that a two step agreement be efficient in the absence of self-enforcing constraints is neither necessary nor sufficient for the gradual approach to have a lower minimum discount factor. This paper was prepared for the conference “New Directions in International Trade Theory” held at the University of Nottingham. I thank Andres Rodriguez-Clare, Rod Falvey, conference participants, and anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft.