Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization

Received May, 18, 2000; revised version received March, 19, 2001     

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.     

博弈论在治理河流水污染中的应用

针对我国日益严重的河流水污染状况，本文通过对污染源企业和政府之间的关系进行博弈分析，建立监督博弈模型，并以此分析政府对污染源企业的监管力度及经济上的处罚力度。     

投资决策中个人理性与集体理性博弈分析及对策研究

针对近期多起曝光的企业对外投资、担保大案,本文应用博弈论分析方法,在强调个人理性与集体理性矛盾的基础上研究投资决策中两者的完全信息博弈及无限阶段重复博弈,并建立相应的定量分析模型,通过分析博弈参与人均衡行为,指出投资决策中寻租的存在的必然性及巨大危害,并针对性的提出了适合实际操作的对策建议.     

企业竞争中的博弈分析

竞争对消费者有利,对企业不利;竞争者越多对消费者越有利,对企业来说则相反.同时,竞争对消费者和企业的影响程度可以量化.     

对我国医药企业自主创新演化机制的分析

自主创新是当前商业界和学术界研究比较热的话题。政府相应地制定了一系列的政策和法规来鼓励企业进行自主创新。在这种背景下,我国的医药企业也积极响应国家的政策进行自主创新。然而,医药企业创新在实际操作中的行动方向差异很大。针对这种差异,笔者将医药企业创新划分成新功能创新和新设计创新两种,并且通过对一系列的数据和资料分析后,发现我国的医药企业的创新并非实质上的自主创新即新功能创新,而是新设计创新。文中对产生这种局面的演化机制进行了分析。     

A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model, Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight modification of Bala and Goyal’s model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1. JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D81     

具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究

从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。     

Absorbing Team Games

A team is a group of people having the same motives but possibly different available actions. A team game is a game where two teams face each other. An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the entries are absorbing, in the sense that once they are chosen the play terminates, and all future payoffs are equal to the payoff at the stage of termination. We prove that every absorbing team game has an equilibrium payoff and that there are -equilibrium profiles with cyclic structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

上市公司盈余管理行为的博弈分析

本文从分析盈余管理的概念出发,指出上市公司盈余管理的实质是企业管理当局追求利益最大化的一种博弈行为。基于这样的认识,结合博弈论的相关原理,笔者从会计信息不对称、会计政策的制订和选择两方面分析了盈余管理行为产生的原因,并进一步分析了上市公司进行盈余管理的动机,最后提出了相应的建议和对策。