Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.     

Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

A variant of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of a competitive insurance market is considered, where each uninformed firm is allowed to renegotiate the contracts that its customers initially sign, subject to the restriction that renegotiated contracts be offered to all the firm's customers. Such non-discriminating renegotiation is shown to weaken the profitability of cream skimming to the extent that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome. This outcome is that of Miyazaki and Spence i.e., the incentive-compatible pair of zero-profit contracts, if efficient; and the incentive-compatible, zero-profit pair of contracts maximizing low-risk utility, otherwise.     

A unified framework for open access regulation of telecommunications infrastructure: Review of the economic literature and policy guidelines

The concept of open access (OA) plays a central role in the ongoing academic and political debate on the appropriate regulatory framework for next-generation access networks in Europe. However, clear policy conclusions on the effect of OA regulation were usually precluded by a fundamental lack in common understanding what actually defines an OA policy and along which dimensions of OA regulation can be structured. This paper attempts to reconcile these diverse views by offering a definition and a conceptual framework by which OA endeavors can be identified and uniquely classified. The framework encompasses, among others, mandated OA regulation of vertically integrated firms, public-sector participation, co-investments, and OA in the context of vertical separation. Along this framework, the extant economic literature is surveyed with regard to aspects of competition and social welfare, investment and innovation, as well as practical and legal issues. Based on these insights, a policy guideline is developed that shall assist policy makers in identifying the appropriate OA scenario for the regulation of telecommunications infrastructure.     

Discriminatory tariffs and international negotiations

Recent research has highlighted the efficiency of the MFN principle within the GATT/WTO structure. This paper analyzes the exception made to MFN within Article XXIII that allows discriminatory punishment for deviations from the agreement. We argue that, in the absence of collusion, the MFN exception reduces the severity of punishment and thus lowers the level of cooperation that can be achieved by the agreement. However, discriminatory punishment may still be beneficial as we show that it reduces the problems associated with the potential for renegotiation during the punishment phase. Finally, we argue that our results are also applicable to the question of whether to use trade policy sanctions as a means of enforcing agreements covering domestic policies.     

WTO体制下普惠制的变化与未来——以欧盟新普惠制方案为实证的分析

普惠制的实施历时40余年,它已成为国际贸易中一项重要的法律制度,实施普惠制的法律文件构成WTO规则体系的组成部分。随着WTO体制的建立和贸易自由化进程的加速,更由于受国际金融危机和欧债危机的影响与冲击,WTO发达成员已先后公布与实施新普惠制方案,受惠条件明显提高甚至订入了附加条件的特惠条款,动摇了WTO体制下普惠制的非互惠与公平原则。可以预见,普惠制作为一项制度最终或将退出国际贸易舞台,而作为一种精神还将存续并扩展适用于WTO其他领域。     

Non-discrimination rules for ISPs and vertical integration: Lessons from cable television

The experience of cable television indicates that vertically integrated ISPs have plausible incentives to favor their affiliated content and to restrict entry of nascent rival content services, but these incentives are weakened in some respects, and strengthened in others, by differences in the economic architectures of cable and Internet broadband. Non-discrimination regulations designed to control such behavior are potentially more effective than in cable, but rules governing discrimination both in the upstream access and the downstream retail markets (as the FCC's no-unreasonable-discrimination rule appears to do) are likely to be necessary for effectiveness. Beneficial effects of vertical integration on financing and entry of cable programming networks should also apply to Internet video content development, but emergence since the 1970s of a robust programming supply industry with few vertical ties to cable suggests that such benefits will be less significant in the ISP case. Finally, the history of both the cable and ISP industries makes evident that the fundamental policy concern should not be vertical integration but horizontal market shares of ISPs, both at the local and national levels.     

The advent of 5G and the non-discrimination principle

5G promises to be a game changer for the extended connectivity-based value chain, encompassing a much broader set of digitalized industries than previous solutions. By reshaping competition among market players and among technologies, it changes the trade-offs underlying the application of the non-discrimination principle. In this paper, we provide a unified view of the implications of these technological developments for four instantiations of this principle that span the entire digital value chain: non-discrimination in FRAND licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs), vertical separation remedies, network neutrality and technological neutrality. We conclude that overly rigid and non-technology neutral interpretations of the non-discrimination requirement would be at odds with technological evolution and would be incompatible with the objective to maximize the overall value of digital networks.