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Following Dagan et al. [Dagan, N., Volij, O., Serrano, R. (1997). A non-cooperative view on consistent bankruptcy rules, Games Econ. Behav. 18, 55–72], we construct an extensive form game for veto-balanced TU games in which a veto player is the proposer and the other players are responders. The set of Nash outcomes of this extensive form game is described, and compared to solutions of TU games such as the nucleolus, kernel and egalitarian core. We find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the nucleolus of the game is a Nash outcome. 相似文献
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To any assignment market we associate the unique exact assignment game defined on the same set of agents and with a core that is a translation of the core of the initial market. As it happens with the core, the kernel and the nucleolus of an assignment game are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of its related exact assignment game by the vector of minimum core payoffs. Agents on each side of the market are classified by means of an equivalence relation and, when agents on the same class are ordered to be consecutive, the related exact assignment market is defined by a partitioned matrix, each block of the partition being a glove market. 相似文献
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Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Maria Montero 《Games and Economic Behavior》2006,54(2):380-397
This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a “divide the dollar by majority rule” game with random proposers. A power index is called self-confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley value and other commonly used power indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses a weak version of Kohlberg's [SIAM J. Appl. Math. 20 (1971) 62] balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium. 相似文献
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Jingang Zhao 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):635-648
Summary. This note provides two necessary and sufficient conditions for the relative interior of the core (and the base polyhedron)
to be non-empty: (i) the second largest excess of the prenucleolus is negative; (ii) the grand coalition's payoff is greater
than the minimum no-blocking payoff. Such conditions imply an intuitive method in proving core existence, they also imply
results on the sensitivity of the base polyhedron and the core.
Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: May 8, 2000 相似文献
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