以德报怨策略与企业机会主义行为:基于高新技术企业的研究

基于自我执行协议理论及交易属性,集中探讨企业采取以德报怨策略应对合作者剥削行为的驱动因素以及企业以德报怨策略如何影响合作者机会主义行为。通过对173个中国高新技术企业买方数据问卷调查,采用PLS对假设进行检验。结果显示,交易属性中的交易可观察性是以德报怨策略的前因变量,并且受交易复杂性的影响。同时,以德报怨策略能够减少交易双方的机会主义行为。     

新时代大学生知行合一问题研究

我国已从高速增长阶段进入高质量发展阶段,新通信技术、新媒体、互联网的迅速发展,不同价值理念传播速度前所未有,对大学生的冲击力度巨大,一定程度上造成大学生认知上的模糊和混乱。大学生知行不一的问题应当引起高等院校管理部门及师生的高度重视。大学生知行不一主要表现在两个方面:一是思想认识上的模糊和错误;二是行为表现距离社会规范的要求差距比较大。造成大学生知行不一的原因有三:一是道德认知本身存在众多分歧和争议;二是道德选择与现实利益之间的冲突和矛盾;三是情感在道德选择中的作用。要不断完善促进大学生知行合一的基本路径:一是落实思想政治理论课“立德树人”的目标;二是创新教学方式方法;三是改革和完善教学科研管理制度;四是加强校园文化能力建设。     

Takeovers and Corporate Governance: Whose Interests Do Directors Serve?

Using internal records of board meetings, this research explores issues relating to the motivation of directors' action during takeover negotiations. The records relate to a time period when regulation was low and directors had ample opportunity to engage in adverse selection and moral hazard. In such circumstances, it might be supposed that they would have sought to protect their own tenure rather than seek to maximize shareholder wealth by recommending acceptance of a bid. However, in the case study under examination the directors worked hard to maximize the bid price by auctioning the company despite having little equity exposure themselves. The directors also sought to protect the interests of the staff when negotiating with bidders. Intentionally this behaviour was not disclosed to the shareholders and, on occasion, threatened the success of the negotiations. The article concludes that the actions of the directors were motivated by strong reputational effects not widely recognized in the contemporary literature as being a force that powerfully drives corporate governance.     

非对称竞争对联盟成员机会主义行为倾向影响的实证研究——以我国运动用品（鞋服）制造业为例

本文以我国运动鞋服制造业企业联盟为研究对象，就非对称竞争对联盟成员机会主义倾向的影响这一新的研究领域进行了实证研究，证实了联盟成员间非对称竞争对成员企业的机会主义倾向会产生显著的影响。同时，本研究从竞争行为和竞争意向两个层面上对非对称竞争进行分析，结果表明，相对于行为层面，非对称竞争意向会对成员企业机会主义倾向产生更为显著的强化作用。本研究的相关结论对于进一步的研究与企业管理实践均有一定价值。     

债务重组、退市压力与审计意见

本文以新准则实施后2007年和2008年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究发现新准则下进行机会主义债务重组的公司主要是已经连续两年亏损面临停牌风险的公司,而一年亏损的公司则对这一极端盈余管理手段的使用比较谨慎,并不倾向于进行债务重组来避免被特别处理。同时,发挥外部公司治理功能的审计师能够在一定程度察觉这些公司的机会主义行为,但是由于我国退市制度中没有对审计意见的严格规定,使得审计意见对公司进行机会主义债务重组行为的制约作用较弱。     

When do formal control and trust matter? A context-based analysis of the effects on marketing channel relationships in China

Formal control and trust are two typical governance mechanisms employed to safeguard business transactions. Yet the effectiveness of each mechanism for firm relationship outcomes remains unclear. Some relevant literature suggests that formal control and trust simultaneously can help secure transactions, whereas other research argues the two control mechanisms can substitute for each other. This study applies social embeddedness theory and differentiates strong tie from weak tie relationships. In so doing, it reveals the role of strong versus weak social ties in leading to parallel conclusions about the relationship between formal control and trust and their effects on relationship outcomes. On the basis of empirical tests in a Chinese marketing channels context, this study finds that the joint effects of formal control and trust on governing transactions depends on the relational tie that the focal partners share. Specifically, formal control and trust complement each other only in weak tie relations. On the basis of this new perspective, the authors offer theoretical and managerial implications for managing interfirm governance mechanisms in transitional economies such as China.     

Most-Favored Treatment Provisions as Nondiscrimination Guarantees

A firm employs suppliers who make specific investments. Because output demand is uncertain and the cost of enumerating contingencies high, the firm retains some unilateral control over the input quantities it purchases. To allay suppliers’ concerns over potential opportunism the firm must commit not to pit them against one another ex post by threatening to buy less from those who refuse to discount their prices. By extending most-favored treatment guarantees the firm commits not to discriminate. In some circumstances this generates efficient and opportunism-free outcomes. In others it is less effective but may remain attractive relative to other options. Evidence from field market contracts for natural gas corroborates this nondiscrimination hypothesis.     

The control of intra-channel opportunism through the use of inter-channel communication

Within channels of distribution, there has been some degree of cooperation among channel members. In many cases, channel members actively cooperate with one another in competition against other channels. However, competing channels of distribution also have common interests, including controlling intra-channel opportunism. This research focuses on the use of social mechanisms for controlling intra-channel opportunism.This study investigates whether firms effectively employ inter-channel communication as a method of controlling opportunistic behavior. Under a social control mechanism, firms would pass along information concerning their channel member's reputation. Comparing two different types of firms within a single industry allows for the examination of how firm properties dictate the use of social control mechanisms.     

组织人力资本投资风险及原因的新探讨

组织人力资本投资存在高风险已成为共识,因此各种类型的组织为提升竞争力而进行人力资本投资需要充分考虑投资风险问题。如何规避风险成为各类组织投资时关注的焦点,但是必须要搞清楚人力资本投资风险产生原因才能有针对性的提出风险规避的对策。过去对人力资本投资风险产生原因的研究,多数是从人力资本载体的不确定性、投资收益的长期性和间接性的角度进行的。本文则从员工个人人力资本与组织人力资本存在区别的角度,剖析组织人力资本投资风险产生的原因,认为组织人力资本投资风险产生原因是多种因素的综合,其核心是人力资本的不可控性和人力资本个体的机会主义行为倾向,夹层是组织中存在可以钻空子的机会,外围是社会及组织中缺乏对机会主义行为的制约机制所造成的。这一分析有利于组织深入研究规避人力资本投资风险的对策,为组织人力资本投资风险决策提供科学依据。     

The interaction effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships

In this study, we examined the effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. Drawing from the theoretical grounding of transaction cost economics, personality trait theory, and contingency theory, we proposed three distinct perspectives on opportunism mitigation in buyer–supplier relationships: (1) organizationalist, (2) individualist, and (3) interactionist, where relational norms, agent cooperativeness, and the interaction between them, respectively, serve as the key predictors in these three perspectives. The results of replicated experiments indicated that relational norms and agent cooperativeness interact with each other in mitigating opportunism and that the interactionist perspective yielded the highest explained variance in opportunism. This suggests that the interactionist perspective, a multi-level theoretical lens encompassing the dynamic interplay between organization-level and individual-level factors, was a more complete model in explaining opportunism than either the organizationalist or individualist perspectives. The consensus which emerged from post-experimental interviews of purchasing professionals is that agent personalities play an important role in buyer–supplier relationships. Some purchasing professionals had observed that uncooperative agents or personnel turnover in the boundary-spanning functions can substantially undermine even established relational exchanges. These qualitative findings are in line with our theoretical arguments and experimental outcomes.