国际碳排放权交易价格决定与最优出口规模研究

本文分析了总量控制和交易、基准排放和信用两种碳排放权交易体系中的价格决定原理,并以边际减排成本等于市场均衡价格为基础,分析《京都议定书》框架下国际碳排放权交易规模和利益分配不公等情况;然后构建两阶段模型,讨论“非附件B国家”碳排放权出口规模的决定因素及其影响效应,并通过估测中国碳排放权出口规模决定因素的函数值或参数值,计算中国第1承诺期的最优出口量;最后提出中国参与国际碳排放权交易的政策建议。     

基于可交易排污许可证的中小企业环境规制工具分析

本文构建一个基于可交易排污许可证的环境规制政策工具分析模型,探究许可证价格的决定机制,分析许可证市场的短期均衡和长期均衡,探讨可交易排污许可对中小企业利润和产量的影响,并引入创新机制,考察加入补贴的环境规制工具对中小企业的影响。研究表明,初始免费可交易排污许可证+补贴(特别是差额补贴)的工具组合能够以较低的规制成本激发中小企业创新,而且在长期内,创新收益能够弥补规制成本。     

评深圳市碳排放权交易相关规定之进步与不足

碳排放管控制度、配额管理制度、抵消制度、交易制度和第三方核查制度是《深圳经济特区碳排放管理若干规定》的基本制度。深圳市的进步主要体现在：＂四种类型、三个板块＂的独特交易体系的设计。但在交易主体的界定以及无偿分配的配额量方面还是存在着一定的缺陷。     

排污权交易--解决外部不经济问题的一个新思路

本文分析了污染这种外部不经济问题的形成 ,接着探讨了运用科斯定理解决这种外部不经济的可能 ,随后分析了用排污权交易解决污染这种外部不经济的两种途径 :污染者———受害者交易和污染者———污染者交易。最后提出了排污权交易在中国推广的必要性及其推广中需要注意的问题。     

Market power and compliance with output quotas

This paper examines the compliance behaviour of a dominant firm in an output quota market when the firm is able to exercise market power in both the quota and the output markets. Provided the firm has an initial quota endowment which is strictly positive, under some circumstances the firm may find it profitable to comply or even over-comply in its quota demand, even in the absence of enforcement. The results are compared to those found in the pollution permit literature for a firm with market dominance only in the permit market, to which some additional observations are also added concerning efficiency outcomes under non-compliance.     

Global trading of carbon dioxide permits with noncompliant polluters

An international mechanism intended to curb global carbon dioxide emissions, mirrored after the Kyoto Protocol, is composed of decentralized regulatory and enforcement authorities and two supranational agencies that are in charge of promoting international transfers and imposing punitive fines. Regulatory enforcement is costly and imperfect. Polluting firms located in various sovereign nations may not comply with emission regulations. We show that there is a combination of decentralized emission quotas and centralized income transfers and fines, with decentralized leadership in policy making, which induces regional regulatory authorities to internalize all environmental and pecuniary externalities.      

Abatement and Permits when Pollution is Uncertain and Violations are Fined

This paper considers a firm’s choice of abatement and of the number of permits if actual pollution is stochastic such that full compliance cannot be ensured. This straightforward extension induces non-trivial and unexpected comparative static properties, such as: permits and abatement can be either substitutes or complements, higher fines can lower the number of acquired permits (or abatement), and higher permit prices can reduce abatement. Yet integrating these reactions into a (competitive) permit market eliminates puzzling features. This is an additional justification of tradable permits over standards, where regulators must cope with potentially counterproductive firm reactions. A first version of the paper was written at the School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology, Sydney and I am grateful for the enjoyed hospitality. I am also grateful for the valuable comments from an anonymous referee.     

基于碳排放权价值的中美贸易利益评估

本文采用投入产出分析方法,利用中国2007年投入产出表,测算了2006-2008年中国与美国货物贸易隐含的二氧化碳排放量,并根据欧盟排放交易体系(ETS)碳排放权价格,评估了中美贸易利益。结果表明,2006-2008年中美贸易的结果是中国无偿为美国排放了二氧化碳。考虑到碳排放权价值后,中方贸易利益减小。中国以牺牲环境为代价的低价格出口模式不可持续,中国有必要调整外贸政策。