Public sector innovation in a context of radical populism

This article discusses the effect of radical populism on public sector innovation. It begins by considering the origins and components of radical populism and of public sector innovation. It is shown that the Trump Administration has been undercutting each of the factors research suggests facilitate public sector innovation. While radical populists have gained ground in Europe, they are constrained by being part of governing coalitions, and have a more limited policy agenda, primarily focused on reducing immigration. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research on the effect of populism on public sector innovation, both in the US and Europe.     

Do unhappy citizens vote for populism?

This paper explores the dynamics behind the surge in populist voting across Europe. It employs individual-level cross-sectional data from 8 waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2016). I attempt to shed light on one particular perspective of viewing populist voting – the role of psychological discontent. I examine robustness to (i) different ways of defining populism, (ii) a selection of alternative specifications and (iii) estimation methods. The results suggest that generalized unhappiness with one's personal well-being – and not merely dissatisfaction with governments – could play a significant role in the rise of European populism. As such, low levels of subjective well-being are proposed as a valid predictor of shifts towards extreme movements.     

Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined

Previous analyses of the 2016 Brexit referendum used region-level data or small samples based on polling data. The former might be subject to ecological fallacy and the latter might suffer from small-sample bias. We use individual-level data on thousands of respondents in Understanding Society, the UK's largest household survey, which includes the EU referendum question. We find that voting Leave is associated with older age, white ethnicity, low educational attainment, infrequent use of smartphones and the internet, receiving benefits, adverse health and low life satisfaction. These results coincide with corresponding patterns at the aggregate level of voting areas. We therefore do not find evidence of ecological fallacy. In addition, we show that prediction accuracy is geographically heterogeneous across UK regions, with strongly pro-Leave and strongly pro-Remain areas easier to predict. We also show that among individuals with similar socio-economic characteristics, Labour supporters are more likely to support Remain while Conservative supporters are more likely to support Leave.     

Populism and the return of the “Paranoid Style”: Some evidence and a simple model of demand for incompetence as insurance against elite betrayal

We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the result of bad luck) to a simple voter choice model yields a preference for incompetent leaders even if all leaders have the same underlying probability of betrayal. These deliver worse material outcomes in general, but they reduce the feelings of betrayal during bad times. Some evidence consistent with our model is gathered from the Trump–Clinton 2016 election: on average, subjects primed with the importance of competence in policymaking decrease their support for Trump, the candidate who scores lower on competence in our survey (even amongst Trump supporters). But two groups respond to the treatment with a large (approximately 5 percentage points) increase in their support for Donald Trump: those living in rural areas and those that are low educated, white and living in urban and suburban areas.     

Populist policies in the transition to democracy

This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this kind of redistribution as populist redistribution because, first it does not increase the poor's productive capacity (human capital), and second it seeks to “buy” political support (peace) to perpetuate the elite's control of political power. We examine the conditions under which ruling elites choose to deter the poor (by means of military repression and/or populist redistribution), to engage in a dispute with the poor for the control of political power, or, alternatively, to extend democracy. According to the results of the model populist redistribution (or military repression), if any, increases with initial wealth inequality and with the amount of redistribution that the poor can undertake under democracy, and decreases with the relative importance of a human capital externality in production. The model explains why in some cases the use of an apparently inefficient policy of populist redistribution turns out to be optimal for both groups (the ruling elite and the poor class) when the alternative is the use of military repression or default to conflict.     

Demand of direct democracy

The growing demand for referendum challenges the traditional model of representative democracy. In this paper we study under which conditions voters prefer a system of representative democracy to direct democracy. In direct democracies voters choose a policy among two alternatives, under uncertainty about which policy better fits the realized state of the world; in representative democracies voters select a candidate who, once elected, chooses a policy having observed which is the realized state of the world. Voters and politicians' payoffs depend on a common component which is positive only if the policy fits the state of the world, and on a private ideological bias towards one of the policies. In direct democracies voters are uncertain about the future state of the world, while in representative democracies they are uncertain about the degree of ideological bias of the candidates, even if they know towards which policy each candidate is biased. We show that representative democracy is preferred if (i) the majority of voters are pragmatic (the common component prevails), and (ii) society is ideologically polarized, meaning that the majority of voters are ideological (the private component prevails), but the median voter is pragmatic. Direct democracy is the preferred instrument for collective choices in societies in which the majority of voters and the median voter are ideological, implying that the majority of voters have the same ideological bias, as, for instance, it occurs when the populist rhetoric of people against the elite succeeds.     

Microdynamics,granularity and populism: The Finnish case

We study how measures of microdynamics such as job and worker flows, the job reallocation rate and the labor market churning rate are related to populism support. Moreover, we investigate the relation between employment shocks to large firms, granular shocks, and populism. To measure populism, we look at the municipal-level support toward the Finns Party, the Finnish right-wing populist party, during the 2011 and 2015 parliamentary elections. We find that the labor market churning rate and the granular shocks are negatively associated with support for populism. Hirings in continuing establishments are negatively correlated with populism, while hirings due to the entry of new establishments and the job reallocation rate are positively related with populism, a possible consequence of economic restructuring. We complete our analysis by looking at the link between local labor market conditions and the supply of populist candidates, and by examining the usefulness of microdynamics indicators in a predictive setting.     

Low-wage import competition and populist backlash: The case of Italy

This paper studies empirically the role of trade globalization in shifting the electoral base towards populism. We proxy the trade shock with swiftly rising import competition from China and compare voting patterns at the national parliamentary elections from 1992 to 2013 in about 8000 Italian municipalities differently exposed to the trade shock. We instrument import competition from China with Chinese export flows to other high-income countries and estimate the model in first differences. Our results indicate that trade globalization increases support for populist parties, as well as invalid votes and abstentionism. To rationalize these findings, we offer evidence that import competition worsens local labor market conditions – higher unemployment, lower income and durable consumption – and increases inequality. Finally, we point out that local public expenditure may play a role in mitigating the political consequences of the trade shock, arguably because it alleviates economic distress.     

Political Economy and Islamic Politics: Insights from the Indonesian Case

It is argued in this study that the trajectory of Islamic politics in Indonesia has been shaped within larger processes of state formation and socio-economic and political changes associated with the advance of the market economy and the pressures of globalisation. It incorporates the Indonesian case into a vast and well-developed debate that has hitherto focused on North Africa and the Middle East. As such it offers a distinct interpretation that goes beyond the prevailing understanding of Islamic politics in Indonesia as the product of conflicts over ideas, doctrine or culture or the institutional requisites of authoritarianism or democracy. Specifically, it is proposed that Islamic politics has been underpinned variously by the conservatism of small propertied interests, the populism of marginalised urban and small town middle classes and the ambitions of the upper middle classes and business. While these dynamics are found across much of the Muslim world, the political outcomes have been diverse. We show that the Indonesian trajectory has been greatly influenced by the failure of Islamic politics to establish effective cross-class alliances behind the banners of Islam and the ability of the secular state to effectively establish its own apparatus of populist politics.     

Italy: Immigration and the evolution of populism

We study the effect of immigration on the upsurge of right-wing populism in Italy. Our data considers electoral results at the municipality level of the Senate of the Italian Republic and the Chamber of Deputies over the period 2006–2018. Using an IV strategy based on the shift–share instrument, we find that immigration generates a sizable causal increase in votes for the right-wing populist party Lega. Immigration also works as a major catalyst for the electoral distance between Lega and its most direct competitors. We explore how different levels of tax autonomy impact the results, as well as how the re-branding of Lega as a national movement affects the relation between immigration and support for the party.