Industry specific effects in investment performance and valuation of firms

A necessary criterion for a performance measure in corporate governance is the degree to which it mirrors how well the management succeeds in maximizing firm value. Such a performance measure is marginal q which links changes in firm value to the investments undertaken by the management. Empirical studies of investment and performance based on marginal q have demonstrated the usefulness of this measure. Most research however, has mainly focused on long-term performance. This paper takes a short-term perspective and, based on the marginal q-theory, considers how firms’ market values change in the extreme stock price cycle of a stock market bubble. Using a data set of listed Swedish corporations we find an anomaly in form of a new industry specific effect that, in addition to investment, explains changes in firm value.

“一保一控”政策背景下的房地产业发展研究

在未来一段时期,我国经济要实现“一保一控”的宏观调控目标,扩大内需是关键。国际经验表明,每一次的房价大幅度下降,都可能伴随着消费的停滞和经济的衰退。政府的宏观调控,既要有利于避免房价大幅上涨带来泡沫,也要防止房地产市场的过度波动对宏观经济稳定的冲击。因此,防止我国房地产业出现“大落”,应包含在“一保一控”宏调政策的内容之中。     

理性选择向非理性选择转化的行为分析

本文针对不确定条件下的人类选择行为提出一个新的可供研究的观点:人的非理性选择在很大程度上是由理性选择转化而来的。文章首先简要评说了早期行为经济学的动物实验和认知心理学,认为人的选择行为是理性和非理性的同构;继而,通过解析丹尼尔·卡尼曼等人创立的前景理论所蕴涵的理性向非理性选择转化的思想,构建了这种转化的抽象模型;最后,作为对本文分析观点的一种联系实际的论证,研究了金融市场中的非理性选择以说明这种转化现象的客观存在。本文的分析可视为对行为经济学非理性选择理论之深邃见解的一种挖掘。     

2017年北京社区卫生服务中心处方集中点评结果

目的 汇总分析北京市16个区县近100家社区卫生服务中心处方抽样点评的结果 ,比较各区之间的差异,细化点评结果 ,促进全市合理用药.方法 抽取2017年6月第2周,全门诊不包括草药处方,共计50189张处方,进行精细化集中点评.结果 2017年北京16个区县社区卫生服务中心平均处方金额为160.07元,注射剂使用率为5...     

Are voters rational?

We test whether a voter's decision to cast a vote depends on its probability of affecting the election outcome. Using exogenous variation arising at population cutoffs determining council sizes in Finnish municipal elections, we show that larger council size increases both pivotal probabilities and turnout. These effects are statistically significant, fairly large and robust. Finally, we use a novel instrumental variables design to show that the jumps in the pivotal probabilities are the likely candidate for explaining the increase in turnout, rather than the other observed simultaneous jumps at the council size cutoffs. Moreover, our results indicate that turnout responds only to within-party pivotal probabilities, perhaps because they are more salient to the voters than the between-party ones.     

我国合理市盈率与股市泡沫的实证分析

市盈率是被广泛用来测量股市泡沫风险的一个重要指标。本根据“股票的理论价格应该是未来各期红利的贴现之和”这一传统金融理论，导出用以衡量股市泡沫成分的基准——合理市盈率的计算方法。通过分析发现市盈率的合理值是一个动态值，据此测量出的上海A股市场泡沫成分自1993年以来呈明显下降趋势，说明我国股票市场上的投资日趋成熟，投资行为日趋理性。     

Speculative bubbles or market fundamentals? An investigation of US regional housing markets

This paper investigates the existence of speculative bubbles in the US national and 21 regional housing markets over three decades (1978–2015). A new method for real-time monitoring exuberance in housing markets is proposed. By taking changes in the macroeconomic conditions (such as interest rate, per-capita income, employment, and population growth) into consideration, the new method provides better control for housing market fundamentals and thereby it is expected to significantly reduce the chance of false positive identification. Compared with the method of Phillips et al. (2015a, 2015b), the new approach finds a dramatic reduction in the number of speculative housing markets and shorter bubble episodes in the US. It locates only one bubble episode in the early-to-mid 2000s over the whole sample period in the national housing market. At the regional level, it identifies two periods of speculation: late 1980s and early-to-mid 2000s. The early-to-mid 2000s bubble episode lasts longer and involves 16 metropolitan statistical areas.     

Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium

In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791, 2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal), which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments, random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular, we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist. This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois.