Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations

Efforts may be reduced when players with different valuations participate in a contest. This paper considers the problem of designing a contest to elicit maximum aggregate effort from players with asymmetric valuations. Optimal designs for different classes of contest technologies are computed and characterized. A value weighted contest is optimal in the concave case. In the unconstrained case, the optimal contest is equivalent to a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price. The optimal design discounts the effort of the high valuation player in order to induce him to compete vigorously.     

Income inequality, democracy and growth reconsidered

Persson and Tabellini (Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992a. Growth, distribution and politics. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 593–602; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992b. Growth, distribution and politics. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–22; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth? Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 600–621) as well as Alesina and Rodrik (Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1992. Distribution, political conflict, and economic growth. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 23–50; Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth, Q. J. Econ. 109, 465–490) have argued that income inequality reduces economic growth rates among democracies because it promotes distributional struggles. In this paper I question the supportive evidence for a number of reasons. Measures of income distribution and democracy are unreliable and permit only very tentative conclusions. Changes in data sources or recoding of some influential cases affect results. It is questionable whether equality effects on growth apply only within democracies, as a median voter interpretation of this relationship should make one expect. The general idea that distributional struggle hurts the growth prospects of nations, however, receives some empirical support.     

The puzzle of greenhouse gas footprints of oil abundance

The present inquiry lays a groundwork for the analysis of the net greenhouse gas (GHG) footprint of oil in the oil-abundant settings. To address the research question, the study puts forward a three-sector decision model, which provides a common ground for the assessment of the interaction of the structuralist and institutional factors influencing environmental pollution in the oil-reliant economies. The study shows that fossil-fuel abundance triggers forces, which induce diametrically opposed effects concerning atmospheric pollution. These are the rising carbon-intensive oil extraction and processing and fossil-fueled power generation versus shrinkage of the carbon-intensive manufacturing and growth of the low-carbon tertiarization. The theoretical analysis enables compartmentalization of the essential factors, which determine GHG emissions in the respective countries. To assess the significance of the proposed theoretical framework, the study employs multivariate panel co-integration techniques and two-stage fixed effects estimations for a dataset of 38 oil-producing countries for the time period between 1960 and 2018. In contrast to the existing literature, this study drives apart from the black box approaches that employ just one omnibus variable, per capita income.     

Customer ignorance, price-cap regulation, and rent-seeking in mobile roaming

Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive. Although the network connection switches frequently between available networks, the choice of network is largely independent of wholesale prices. As a consequence, we show that wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. The recent European price-cap regulation forces firms to reduce wholesale and retail roaming prices, but does not solve the underlying problem. There may thus be a permanent need for regulation analogous to what we have for domestic call termination. Furthermore, we show that there is a risk that wholesale price-cap regulation stimulates wasteful rent-seeking activity.     

Group competition for rents

This paper examines rent dissipation in a two-stage group rent-seeking contest without a predetermined distribution rule. the rent in this setting exhibits both public and private good characteristics depending on the stage of the contest. Focusing on the relationship between group size and aggregate rent seeking we find that social waste depends not only on total numbers but also on the distribution of population across groups. We show that group size asymmetry acts to reduce rent dissipation.     

Designing an optimal contest

The paper brings a mechanism design perspective to the study of contests. We consider the problem of selecting a contest success function when the contest designer may also value the prize. We show that any equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by a concave increasing contest success function can be replicated by a linear contest success function. An expected utility maximizing designer should employ a linear homogeneous contest success function. We explicitly derive the optimal contest for a risk-neutral designer and present comparative statics results. Tullock's contest is optimal only when the designer's valuation for the prize is low.     

寻租、过度投资与地方保护

过度投资和地方保护一直是困扰中国经济发展的顽疾。由于这些行为的主体均是地方政府,很多文献试图从政府的角度来解释这两个现象,但是,这些解释与观察到的现实之间有很多差异。在本文中,为了更好的解释过度投资和地方保护现象,我们考虑了寻租动机对于地方政府行为的影响。在考虑了寻租动机后,我们发现,本地企业的最初的决策产能大于后期实际利用的产能。也就是说,存在我们通常说的产能过剩。为了利用这部分未被利用的产能,一个办法是本地企业独占市场,排挤外地厂商,要达到这一目的,只能通过提高外地厂商的成本,也就是实行地方保护主义。     

上市公司外部融资行为的寻租效应分析

本文结合公共选择学派和现代产权学派的寻租理论,分析了我国上市公司普遍存在的融资行为偏好,提出不仅在企业内部而且在企业外部的证券市场和证券监管都为企业寻租提供了空间。由于理性和自私的原因,企业经管人员必然会利用这种可寻租空间谋求自身利益最大化,从而造成社会资源的浪费。因此,需要充分认识寻租行为的不利影响,并有针对性的加以控制。     

非正规部门竞争、政治寻租与新创企业市场创新

市场创新是新创企业生存发展的根本,然而新兴经济体背景下新创企业的市场创新受到多种特定因素的影响。基于制度基础观,利用世界银行中国企业调查数据,实证考察了非正规部门竞争和政治寻租对新创企业市场创新的影响。研究发现,非正规部门竞争和政治寻租均对新创企业的市场创新具有显著的正向影响,但政治寻租未强化非正规部门竞争对企业市场创新的正向影响;非正规竞争导致的对知识产权保护的需求并非是引致新创企业进行政治寻租的主要原因,资金需求和躲避严苛繁琐的政府管制的需要是引诱企业参与政治寻租的主要原因。因此,政策制定者不必过分担忧非正规部门竞争对新创企业的负面影响,而应通过推进企业注册登记便利化和加强知识产权保护逐步消除非正规经济;要通过持续深化市场化改革和简政放权消除企业寻租的动机。     

Complementarity in contests

To facilitate the study of contests in general equilibrium, we examine winner-take-all contests in which the prize is complementary to the effort of the contestants, as inputs are in production functions or final goods in utility functions. We focus on the effects of technological factors and endowments on the effort and the welfare of the contestants. Most of our findings differ considerably from the standard model of contests in which prize and effort are independent. In particular, we find a critical role for the elasticity of substitution between prize and effort. For example, under low elasticities of substitution, a higher prize reduces the effort exerted by the contestants.