The role of network embeddedness across multiple social networks: Evidence from mobile social network games

This article examines peer influences from network relationships within a social network game (i.e., embeddedness) and across such games (i.e., multiplexity). Drawing on social influence theory, we develop a bivariate Poisson model of users’ repeated visits and latent attrition that accommodates peer interaction after controlling for homophily. We estimate the model using data from two social network games with considerable overlap among network members. We find that friends who are only multiplex across games exert greater peer influence on users’ game visits than members who are embedded within a single game. We also determined that ignoring network multiplexity across games may lead firms to mistarget users due to biased peer influences of embedded friends. This result provides an unresearched explanation—strength of peer influence—for the mixed findings in previous literature on network embeddedness. We utilized our results to conduct several scenario analyses to demonstrate how firms can effectively manage users’ engagement and target users in multiple social network games.     

Victory margins and the paradox of voting

This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational–instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myerson's models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US.     

跨国垄断在中国:现状、影响及规制

该文通过统计数据和案例分析认为跨国垄断已经在中国发生，并指出存在着两种不同类型的跨国垄断，即跨国企业整体垄断某个行业和单个跨国企业垄断整个行业；进而分析了两种不同形态的垄断对经济造成的不良影响。最后，探讨了如何防范和规制跨国垄断，认为防范跨国垄断要从多方面着手，除了最重要的竞争政策手段以外，还必须在反垄断法中加强对跨国垄断的规制。     

Bridging inter- and intra-firm boundaries: management of supplier involvement in automobile product development

Outsourcing has become an important strategy for many firms. Yet, firms need to compete with their competitors who also outsource and may share the same suppliers. This article explores how a firm could outperform others in managing the division of labor with a supplier in product development. Drawing on the empirical data collected from the Japanese auto industry, this paper shows that an automaker needs capabilities to coordinate various activities both externally with a supplier and internally within its own organization, in order to gain better component development performance. Overall, the results imply that outsourcing does not work effectively without extensive internal effort. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated.     

Research notes and communications strategic planning as competitive advantage

Since 1970, over forty empirical studies have examined the performance consequences of formal strategic planning. This line of research has drawn heavy criticism from reviewers on methodological grounds, and has produced confusing, apparently contradictory results. This article reevaluates the planning-performance relationship from a resource perspective, arguing that strategic planning does not satisfy the criteria for sustainable competitive advantage– although it may produce economic value, it is easily imitated and may be substitutable. The article suggests that previous studies produced inconsistent results because they did not account for the dissemination of strategic planning over time, or for industry differences in strategic planning factor markets. An empirical test in two industries finds that formal strategic planning and financial performance are unrelated in a ‘planning equilibrium’ industry, but positively related in an industry with strategic planning factor market imperfections.     

Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments

Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University.     

Does an Industry Effect Exist for Initial Public Offerings?

We examine the impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) on rival firms and find that the valuation effects are insignificant. This insignificant reaction can be explained by offsetting information and competitive effects. Significant positive information effects are associated with IPOs in regulated industries and the first IPO in an industry following a period of dormancy. Significant negative competitive effects are associated with larger IPOs in competitive industries, those in relatively risky industries, those in high‐performing industries, and those in the technology sector. IPO firms that use the proceeds for debt repayment appear to represent a more significant competitive threat to rival firms relative to IPO firms that use their proceeds for other purposes.     

Does success diminish competitive responsiveness? Reconciling conflicting perspectives

Previous research provides conflicting evidence of the association between the past performance of a business and its competitive responsiveness, with researchers observing both positive and negative relationships. To clarify this issue, the authors test a model using survey data from the retailing industry. The model delineates direct and indirect mediated paths through ability to respond, motivation to respond, and awareness of competitors’ actions to show how past performance can have both positive and negative influence on competitive responsiveness. However, the overall impact of past performance of an organization on its competitive responsiveness is positive. The implications of these findings for research, practice, and theory are discussed. Satish Jayachandran (satish@moore.sc.edu) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Moore School of Business at the University of South Carolina. His research interests are focused on issues related to the market responsiveness of firms. His research has been published in theJournal of Marketing and theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science. He was a recipient of the Harold H. Maynard Award for 2001 from theJournal of Marketing. He was nominated a young scholar by the Marketing Science Institute in 2003. Rajan Varadarajan (varadarajan@tamu.edu) is Distinguished Professor of Marketing and holder of the Ford Chair in marketing and e-commerce at Texas A & M University. His teaching and research interests are in the areas of strategy, international marketing, and e-commerce. His research on these topics has been published in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theAcademy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Sloan Management Review, California Management Review, Business Horizons, theJournal of Business Research, and other journals.     

Parallel sourcing and supplier performance in the Japanese automobile industry

Japanese auto makers are reported to enjoy high supplier performance through long-term relationships, specific investments, and sole sourcing. Quality management consultants in the U.S. have been strongly advocating adoption of these practices. But economic and management theorists would predict that the combination of a high level of relationship-specific investments and sole sourcing will lead to problems with supplier performance. In fact the Japanese auto makers use a hybrid form of organization we term parallel sourcing. We present a transaction costs model that shows how parallel sourcing provides incentives for supplier performance associated with multiple sourcing while preserving claimed benefits of sole sourcing.