Crisis leadership in economic recession: A three-barrier approach to offset external constraints

An economic recession is a type of crisis originated from external factors that may imperil an organization’s survival depending on the intensity and duration of the crisis. In peripheral European countries, such as Portugal, the recent financial crisis had devastating effects on various business activities. As a result, Portugal represents an important case study in examining how some corporate leaders have handled the economic recession successfully. I interviewed 20 corporate managers to capture their perceptions of the leadership traits and behaviors exhibited by their CEOs in guiding their companies through the recession. In economic recessions, negative constraints do not affect the most effective leaders, who instead erect barriers against the high-pressure conditions to create a supportive, positive work environment. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness, leaders must act as blocking agents against the negative social impacts of the economic crisis, including the fragility of trust in organizational life (i.e., a barrier against distrust), uncertainty of the future (i.e., a barrier against uncertainty), and toxic emotions (i.e., a barrier against toxic emotions).     

Commemorating the 50‐Year Anniversary of Ball and Brown (1968): The Evolution of Capital Market Research over the Past 50 Years

We commemorate the 50th anniversary of Ball and Brown [1968] by chronicling its impact on capital market research in accounting. We trace the evolution of various research paths that post–Ball and Brown [1968] researchers took as they sought to build on the foundation laid by Ball and Brown [1968] to create a body of research on the usefulness, timeliness, and other properties of accounting numbers. We discuss how those paths often link back to the groundwork laid and questions originally posed in Ball and Brown [1968].     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

预应力拱支双层网壳的静力性能研究

双层曲面网壳在结构的稳定性方面较单层网壳有优越性,在一些跨度较大或支撑较弱的建筑中更多地采用双层曲面网壳结构。预应力拱支双层网壳结构体系是在综合双层网壳和预应力拱结构等优点的基础上,构思出的一种新型大跨空间结构形式。该文主要采用一算例讨论预应力拱支双层网壳结构在三种工况下的内力及变形特点等受力性能,显示出该新型杂交结构体系整体性能得到改善,具有一定的应用前景。     

Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.     

基于“行为经济学理论”的旅游者行为分析

传统的旅游者行为分析方法,主要是进行定性的分析,将各个因素进行框架分析,而对旅游者行为的影响因素分析深度不够。借助行为经济学的理论和分析方法,从旅游者的心理活动角度入手,注重旅游者的心理变量分析,应用前景理论和心理账户分析旅游者行为,充分考虑了情境因素和体验因素,使得关于旅游者的行为分析更加细化和接近现实生活。     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.     

Stop and Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market

This article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers' productivity, a government objective to insure farmers a minimum "parity" income, an endogenous land rent, and diminishing returns on alternative (nonprogram crop) land uses. In this setting, acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy, although compensated acreage limits are. When there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs, optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation—or "buyout"—program in which high-cost producers participate and low-cost producers do not.     

非对称信息下商业银行资本配置研究——基于PCA理论模型分析

资本配置是银行风险管理的核心,是决定银行竞争力的重要因素.经典的资本配置理论均以信息在银行内部各机构完全对称作为基本假设,忽略了总分行问的委托代理关系.鉴于此,本文借鉴PCA模型,在商业银行内部构建一套资本配置的优化机制,以提高银行资本配置的有效性.     

基于上市公司虚假财务报告治理的独立审计行为优化研究

独立审计人员的行为错位与虚假财务报告的产生存在一定的内在联系。从独立审计行为优化的视角研究虚假财务报告的治理,不仅是提升独立审计执业水平的客观要求,也为虚假财务报告的治理提供了一种全新的思路。通过对上市公司虚假财务报告治理的研究,确立了独立审计在中国上市公司虚假财务报告治理机制中的科学定位,构建了基于上市公司虚假财务报告治理的独立审计行为优化方案设计,提出了优化独立审计行为的对策实施体系。