Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated.     

Believing in employment discrimination: The case of Forrest Mims,Scientific American,and title VII protection

This article reviews the law regarding Title VII employment discrimination protection from religious discrimination. The issues surrounding the principal legal protection in this regard are explored in the context of a recent controversial case in which an author, Forrest Mims, was not hired as a regular contributor forScientific American magazine, ostensibly because of his belief in the theory of creation over the theory of evolution. The definition of what constitutes a protected religious belief or practice is seen to have expanded over time. However, a belief in creationism is not necessarily seen as being tantamount to a religious belief under present legal interpretation of Title VII. The implications of this finding for future needed Title VII revision are discussed.     

民间信仰的社会功能及导控--构建和谐社会视角

民间信仰是构建社会主义和谐社会中不容丢弃的大众文化资源，是不可或缺的重要因素。必须正确运用民间信仰的社会功能，化解与社会主义道德相悖的东西。必须在法治视野内导控民间信仰，使之成为我国和谐社会构建中可利用的重要文化资源。     

Corporate Lobbying, Regulatory Conduct and the Porter Hypothesis

Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy.     

Modelling exchange of probabilistic opinions

Summary. This paper studies how communication or exchange of opinions influences correlation of beliefs. The paper focuses on a situation in which agents communicate with each other infinitely many times without observing data. It is an extension to the ‘Expert Problem’ in Bayesian theory, where the informational flow is asymmetric. Moreover, this paper generalizes the existing literature of communication that employs the common prior assumption (CPA) by allowing for heterogeneous beliefs. Some basic convergence results are shown in contrast with the results obtained under the CPA. Furthermore, several economic implications of the basic results are provided. Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The results presented in this paper are taken from my Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge the inspiration obtained from innumerable discussions with Mordecai Kurz about this subject. Also, I appreciate comments from Kenneth J. Arrow, Peter J. Hammond, Maurizio Motolese, Carsten K. Nielsen, Ho-Mou Wu and the anonymous referee.     

Impact of Divergent Consumer Confidence on Option Prices

This paper investigates the impact of divergent consumer confidence on option prices. To model this, we assume that consumers disagree on the expected growth rate of aggregate consumption. With other conditions unchanged in the discrete-time Black–Scholes option-pricing model, we show that the representative consumer will have declining relative risk aversion instead of the assumed constant relative risk aversion. In this case all options will be underpriced by the Black–Scholes model under the assumption of bivariate lognormality. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The effect of heterogeneous beliefs on mergers and acquisitions

This article investigates the effect of heterogeneous beliefs on firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. Using data of China’s financial market, which is featured with great heterogeneity of belief, we find that heterogeneous beliefs are positively associated with the occurrence of M&A transactions, and firms with greater heterogeneous beliefs are more likely to pay the transactions with stock. Moreover, we show that government intervention, measured by state ownership, weakens the effect of heterogeneous beliefs on firms’ M&A decisions.     

Beyond Asymmetry: Substantive Beliefs in Preference Formation and Efficiency of Asymmetrical Negotiations

Contrary to extant propositions on the primacy of trade dependency in compelling faster agreement by subordinate states in asymmetrical economic negotiations, in the European Union–Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (EU–ACP) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, it is the states that were least materially vulnerable that were quickest to accept an EPA. Why so? I argue that the speed and propensity of ACP states to accept and ratify their EPAs were principally hinged on variances in preference formation based on what Ikenberry and Kupchan [(1990), ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International Organization, 44 (3), pp. 283–315: 283] call ‘substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs’. The quickest states to ratify an EPA were those which most intensely shared the EU's neoliberal belief in an automatic correlation between trade liberalisation and economic growth, rather than those that were most materially vulnerable. Therefore, by taking the normative sources of preference formation by subordinate states seriously, we can not only derive a parsimonious explanation of EPA negotiating efficiency but also form a foundational conceptual model of predicting efficiency in asymmetrical negotiations that unifies the role of both normative and material considerations.     

Integration of and Deliveries among the World Zionist Organization,Israel, and Diaspora Countries: System Articulation with the Social Fabric Matrix

Abstract:

The religious economics (not economics of religion) concern here is the relationship between the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and Israel, which is known as a geopolitical power in its region and which is also known as an economic success story. Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi explained how the political economy of medieval Europe was influenced and guided by Christian morality. This paper extends the analysis of religious economics by using the social fabric matrix of original institutional economics to define and structure the integration of the WZO, Israel, and the Diaspora countries. This allows us to observe how to conduct such work and to learn how Israel is guided and influenced by the WZO. It also helps to explain Israel’s “risk of tearing itself apart” as noted in a recent article in the New York Times.     

Portfolio constraints,differences in beliefs and bubbles

I propose an arbitrage-based theory of bubbles in economies with general portfolio constraints and differences in beliefs. I find that, in general, bubbles cannot exist unless the constraints restrict the demand for credit sufficiently to induce low interest rates. Speculation due to heterogeneous beliefs does not cause bubbles. Ruling out bubbles under asymmetric information requires stronger assumptions: the presence of some uninformed agents and mild portfolio restrictions (debt or borrowing constraints), or alternatively, the existence of some impatient and fully informed agents.