Accidental Bequests: A Curse for the Rich and a Boon for the Poor*

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics, such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance and those who do. The first tagged group receives a Mirrlees second‐best tax schedule; the second group, when its type is fully revealed, faces a first‐best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high‐ability types worse off and low‐ability types better off. High‐ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100 percent, while low‐ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller, as well as larger, than 100 percent, and it might even be negative.     

A Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy with Inheritance

An overlapping generations model of an exchange economy with two sources of uncertainty is considered. Individuals have a finite expected life span and uncertain annual income. Conditions concerning birth, death, inheritance and bequests are fully specified. Under such conditions, the existence of a stationary Markovian equilibrium is established in some generality, and several explicitly solvable examples are examined in detail. Received August 6, 2001; revised version received March 12, 2002 Published online: November 11, 2002     

A two-state analysis of estate taxes and charitable bequests from the most generous decedents

This study uses Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) and probate records for the years 2000–2005 to analyze charitable bequests of the most generous decedents from two states, Virginia and Louisiana. We focus on the most generous decedents because they account for a large portion of total charitable bequests. The most generous decedents' charitable bequest tax price (i.e., one minus the marginal tax rate) elasticity is not significantly greater than one in both our full sample and the subsample of the decedents filing federal estate tax returns. Our finding suggests that allowing charitable bequests to be deductible is not a treasury efficient policy for the most generous decedents. We also find that the tax price and wealth effects for the most generous decedents are overestimated by the Tobit model that has been traditionally utilized by prior studies. Furthermore, filers' charitable bequests are predicted to decrease if the estate tax is repealed.     

Decisions nonindustrial forest landowners make: an empirical examination

Our purpose is to estimate a model of non-industrial forest landowner behavior that considers certain types of behavior that have escaped discussion and rigorous investigation in the literature, yet which are critical to future policy making. Our focus on the many different but related decisions landowners make broadens the typical understanding of landowner behavior to show how bequest motives, debt and participation in non-timber activities, and harvesting decisions are interrelated and dependent on landowner preferences, market, and land characteristics.     

Effects of uncertain lifetime and annuity insurance on capital accumulation and growth

Summary.  This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capital accumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of those effects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. The model is an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginal product of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution of this paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequests may lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptotic growth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuities market or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that if individuals face a positive probability of surviving in every period, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect of uncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to an equilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists a perfect annuities market. Received: April 17, 1996; revised version: December 9, 1997     

Household Response to Government Debt: Evidence from Life Insurance Holdings

We use state‐level panel data on life insurance in force in the United States and find that a $1 increase in government debt, at either the state or federal level is associated with a $0.96 increase in the face value of the average life insurance holdings per capita for a household in the average state. This increase represents an intention to save that would almost completely offset the government debt in specific states of the world (i.e., if the insured dies). Because this state of the world is rare, the immediate increase in actual savings is only about $0.03, the cost of the additional insurance. We find, in addition, that this response occurs mainly on the intensive margin, meaning that the size of the average life insurance policy increases when government debt increases. Along the extensive margin, we find the number of policies in force falls slightly with federal debt, and rises slightly with state debt increases. The results show altruistic planning in response to changes in government debt that are consistent with Ricardian Equivalence and the long‐run neutrality of government debt.     

Wealth Distribution and Optimal Inheritance Taxation in Life-cycle Economies with Intergenerational Transfers

Intergenerational transfers are introduced into a general equilibrium life-cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity. In our overlapping generations model, heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their children. Furthermore, agents face stochastic employment opportunities. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy. Our results indicate that bequests only account for a small proportion of observed wealth heterogeneity. The introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare, as measured by the average lifetime utility of a newborn, and equality of the wealth distribution.
JEL classification : D 31; D 91; H 21; C 68; E 21     

Taxation, Bequests, and Short and Long Run Timber Supplies: An Overlapping Generations Problem

This paper uses an overlapping generations model with one-sided altruism to study the effects of several forest taxes that target bequests and affect timber supply. Unlike previous work, we investigate bequests and timber supply in both the short and long run when bequests are costly (e.g., taxed). The landowner's problem is examined in the short run, while the government's problem is examined in the long run assuming the existence of a steady state. We also consider taxes targeting harvests, growth, savings and bequests. Several new results are established concerning the interactions of taxes that might be used by a government to alter short and long run forest capital stocks: (i) the presence of a forest bequest tax affects the neutrality of harvest tax in both the short and long run, (ii) in the long run the bequest tax decreases bequests and timber supplies. When the bequest tax is not present, the capital income tax is neutral with respect to bequest and timber supply, while the harvest tax is neutral only if forest productivity is also not taxed. Finally, (iii) in the short run, the substitution and total effects of taxes in landowner decisions generally depend on the presence of the bequest tax. The results have implications for Pigouvian tax design and second best tax choice.     

The Effect of the Recent Inheritance Tax Reform on Bequest Behaviour in Japan

This paper examines the behavioural response of households to wealth transfer taxation using household survey data from Japan, with particular attention being paid to the implications of different bequest motives that households may have. The data reveal that relatively few households plan to reallocate the newly taxable amount of wealth to their own consumption or inter vivos transfers in response to the recent lowering of the basic deduction of the inheritance tax. Our analysis shows that this partly reflects the fact that a relatively large share of households have no or a weak bequest motive in Japan. However, our estimation results also suggest that parents with an altruistic bequest motive are more likely to avoid an increase in their children's tax bill by reallocating the newly taxable amount of wealth to inter vivos transfers than those with no or a weak bequest motive. By contrast, parents with an exchange bequest motive are more likely to respond to the tax reform by reallocating the newly taxable amount of wealth to their own consumption, though they seem to exhibit a similar response to those with an altruistic bequest motive in some cases.