Internal Funds Allocation and the Ownership Structure: Evidence from Korean Business Groups

We examine the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the funds transfer in the internal capital market within Korean business groups (chaebols) during the period from 1998 to 2001. We find that the funds allocation in the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights is better aligned with the investment opportunities and therefore, more efficient than in the firms where they have low cash flow rights. This effect is stronger when they have controlling powers large enough to expropriate minority shareholders. However, during the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. The results evidence the tunneling behavior in the internal capital market within a chaebol that the ownership structure distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling shareholders.JEL Classification: G31, G30     

Foreign Ownership and Firm Innovation: Evidence from Korea

ABSTRACT

This study examines whether foreign equity investment promotes domestic firms’ innovation activities. Using panel data on the Korean firms during the 1999–2013 period, we find that foreign ownership has a positive effect on firms’ innovation activities. Furthermore, we also show that, as compared to non-chaebol firms, chaebol firms’ innovation activity becomes much greater with the increase of foreign ownership. Finally, we investigate industry-level spillover effects of innovation. Specifically, we find that foreign ownership promotes innovation activities via forward linkage, the effect of which is also more pronounced in chaebol firms.     

Transnational HR network learning in Korean business groups and the performance of their subsidiaries

This study explores (1) how two distinct dimensions of transnational human resources (HR) network learning, i.e. globally linked and locally leveraged learning, are related to the performance of the foreign subsidiaries of Korean business groups (chaebols) and (2) how strategic HR learning mediates the relationship between these two dimensions of transnational HR network learning and the performance of foreign subsidiaries. We propose that each dimension of transnational HR network learning is related independently and jointly to the performance of a chaebol's foreign subsidiaries. Our results suggest that locally leveraged HR learning has a stronger relationship with the performance of sales subsidiaries, whereas globally linked HR learning has a stronger relationship with the performance of manufacturing subsidiaries. In addition, we find that the interaction between the two dimensions of transnational HR network learning has a weaker positive relationship with the performance of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries than that of foreign sales subsidiaries.     

Tax Motivated Income Shifting and Korean Business Groups (Chaebol)

Abstract:  This paper examines tax-induced income shifting behavior among affiliated firms in Korean business groups (chaebols). Korean corporate income tax law does not require consolidated tax returns, and business groups with a large number of affiliated member firms have incentives to shift income across member firms to reduce the overall taxes of the group. For a large number of Korean companies that are subject to external audits, we perform univariate and multivariate regression analyses on the income shifting behavior of chaebol firms compared with non-chaebol control firms. Our evidence suggests that tax-motivated income shifting activities exist among chaebol firms, and that the extent of income shifting is found to depend on its effect on non-tax cost factors such as the earnings, leverage, and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. We also find that income shifting is more pronounced in chaebol firms where the control-cash flow divergence is relatively large, suggesting that income shifting is affected by the controlling shareholders' opportunism. Our study provides some insights on the intra-group income shifting activities where research is limited.     

Financial Liberalization and Corporate Investments: Evidence from Korean Firm Data*

This paper examines whether financial liberalization procedures introduced in Korea in the early 1990s succeeded in relaxing financing constraints on firms. Because external funds are more costly than internal funds in an imperfect capital market, corporate investments depend on the availability of internal funds. As financial liberalization mitigates constraints on firms, the sensitivity of investments to cash flow can be reduced. Using panel data on Korean firms, we found that cash‐flow effects on investment spending decreased drastically during the liberalization period. In particular, small, non‐chaebol and established firms that were severely constrained gained most from liberalization. Chaebol firms appeared to lose preferential access to credit after liberalization.     

Credit ratings and corporate disclosure behaviour: evidence from regulation fair disclosure in Korea

This article provides evidence that firms with high market expectations disclose more information to investors, utilizing the fair disclosure regulation in Korea to proxy for their disclosure choices. This finding is consistent with the argument that in order to retain their dominant positions, highly evaluated firms are more concerned about the market’s perception of them as providers of timely and detailed disclosure. We also find that the impact of market expectations on disclosure is more pronounced for chaebol firms. Combined with prior research on the relationship between firm performance and voluntary disclosure, we provide important implications for the determinants of corporate disclosure     

Analysis of loan guarantees among the Korean Chaebol affiliates

This paper analyses corporate loan guarantees among the Korean chaebol affiliates. Loan guarantees are found to be efficiency‐neutral under a set of ideal conditions characterized by perfect and symmetric information, no agency problem, and no governmental interference in private financial contracts. In reality though, corporate loan guarantees have negative as well as positive effects. The negative effects of loan guarantees arise from the agency problem between the controlling minority shareholders and outside investors. Government's implicit support to financial institutions worsens the problem. Without such distortions, a loan guarantee by the guarantor firm may signal the quality of the investment project of the borrowing firm, if the guarantor firm has more information than the lending bank with regards to the type of the borrowing firm's investment project.     

Chaebol and Industrial Policy in Korea

Although the degree of sectoral targeting changed dramatically from the 1960s to the 1970s and then from the 1980s onward, Korea maintained an outward‐oriented, bottom‐up, and integrated approach to industrial policy, relying on close public–private consultation and international benchmarking. The government and the chaebol systematically studied what had to be done to fill the missing links in the domestic value chain and move up the quality ladder, through technology acquisition, human resource development, and construction of optimal‐scale plants aimed for the global market. As the capacity of the private sector increased and sectoral targeting became a more difficult proposition, Korea shifted to a more sector‐neutral approach, which provided support for industry rationalization and R&D regardless of sectors. This was in line with a larger shift from industrial policy to competition and corporate governance policy, starting with the enactment of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in 1980.     

Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?

This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.