广播谈话节目中细节的运用与处理

广播谈话节目是广播节目主持人与嘉宾、听众之间的以思想观念、感情心理的深层交流为目的的双向交流节目。怎样使节目能够不断出新、出彩从而吸引听众呢?细节的运用与处理大有文章可做。细节分为两种，即必然的细节和偶然的细节。必然的细节更多地运用在节目的开场和结尾，它可以很好地烘托节目主题；偶然的细节，它可以使节目”形散而神不散”、自然流畅、浑然天成。有人说细节成就精品就是这个道理。在谈话节目中，必然细节和偶然细节是可以根据实际情况灵活运用于开场白、主体部分及结束语中的，决不能视为固定不变的公式。     

A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication

M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91.     

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap talk messages – hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders. We find that, when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component, in equilibrium information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. The market for information is in most cases a monopoly, and there is underinvestment in information acquisition. We also show that regulatory interventions, in the form of firewalls, only make the inefficiency worse. Efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked.     

浅析“网络谈心”的利与弊

":网络谈心"是南通大学"谈心屋"衍生出的一种子模式,是一种为了适应时代的快速发展和信息的高速进步而产生的思想政治教育新途径、新方法。"网络谈心"使谈话双方跳出了谈话时间、地点等诸多方面的限制,使谈心者可以畅所欲言。本文试图通过对"网络谈心"的利与弊分析,从而对"网络谈心"在高校"谈心屋"中的发展起到一定推动作用。     

浅淡物流业纳税面临问题之探讨

物流业是一个新兴业态。在现行税收征管制度下,物流企业总揽分包运输和仓储等业务,存在着事实上的营业税重复纳税问题。物流公司纳税问题成了国家一大问题,为了使一个纳税物流公司了解和掌握物流公司纳税的形式以及政策、正确履行纳税义务,本文对物流公司纳税问题进行了归纳和深入探讨。     

策略性信息传递与技术贸易的无效率

技术进步是经济增长的引擎,然而,发展中国家未能有效地利用国际技术贸易从发达国家获得自己想要的技术。原因在于,在贸易谈判开始前的了解信息阶段,由于要素禀赋的不一致,发达国家企业具有策略性传递技术质量信息以获取卖者剩余的倾向。预期到这种倾向,发展中国家的企业对发达国家企业传递的信息持不信任态度。通过寻找更多的技术供给方、减少信息质量的可能状态和参照价格标尺,策略性信息传递引起的技术交易无效率可以得到改善。     

Decentralized advice

We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.     

Incentives for risk reporting — A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach

This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, discretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike prior literature, which focuses on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible communication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but can have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring and the precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting requirements and empirical research, overall results suggest that we should not overestimate the informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.     

城镇廉租房项目REITs模式研究

廉租房政策是我国社会保障体系的重要组成部分,目前我国廉租房制度建设正面临资金瓶颈,廉租房供应远远不能满足城镇住房弱势群体的需要。借鉴房地产投资信托基金REITs模式将有助于解决这一融资难题。本文针对我国廉租房制度建设现存问题,探析了廉租房建设中引入REITs模式的必要性和可行性,对廉租房项目REITs模式的运作目标、运行程序和运行保障措施进行分析,以推进廉租房项目市场化运作。