Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41.     

Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation

The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilib- ria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In contrast, a generic uniqueness result applies when introducing heterogenous time preferences. The unique backwards induction equilibrium in the perturbed game is nonstationary, and neither the original (symmetric) nor the perturbed game provides guidance for equilibrium selection in the infinite game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78, D72, D78, H49.     

Multinational enterprises’ risk mitigation strategies in emerging markets: A political coalition perspective

This paper contributes to the IB literature by investigating MNEs’ risk mitigation strategies in emerging markets. Drawing on institutional perspectives and March’s theoretical concept of forming a ‘political coalition’, we propose that risk mitigation cannot be limited to passive compliance and/or demonstrating good corporate behavior, but should extend to collective efforts by building a political coalition and working with key stakeholders to manage potential risk and obtain favorable outcomes in complex institutional environments. In considering MNEs in contemporary China and India, we offer different types of risk mitigation strategies under various institutional contexts and a framework for future research.     

Build Coalitions to Fit: Autonomy Expectations,Competence Mobilization,and Job Crafting

Job crafting offers several beneficial organizational outcomes, yet little is known about what makes employees engage in it. In particular, the role of leaders in influencing their subordinates to engage in job crafting has been insufficiently studied. Drawing on role theory, we suggest that the congruence of leader‐subordinate autonomy expectations nurtures subordinates’ experiences of having their competences adequately utilized in their jobs. This experience, which involves the competence mobilization of their work roles, subsequently fosters subordinates’ engagement in job‐crafting behavior. A two‐stage field study of 145 leader‐subordinate dyads using cross‐level polynomial regression and response surface analysis supported the (in)congruence hypotheses. The results also demonstrated that subordinates’ perceived competence mobilization mediates the relationship between autonomy expectation (in)congruence and job crafting. In addition, leader coalition as a moderator strengthens the effect of perceived competence mobilization as a psychological condition for job crafting. Implications for practice and future research are discussed. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE WELFARE CUTS IN THE COMPREHENSIVE SPENDING REVIEW AND THE BUDGET 2010

In the Comprehensive Spending Review and in the Budget 2010, the Liberal–Conservative coalition has announced cost‐cutting measures in the benefit system. Some of these measures can be interpreted as ‘random cuts’, where the given scope and structure of a spending programme is retained, while bits and pieces are chopped off here and there. Others can be interpreted as more strategic measures, or reconsiderations of the proper role of government in the respective area. However, where the coalition has pursued a more strategic approach, it has not followed it through consistently. The coalition's consolidation strategy relies too much on temporary caps and freezes, which will eventually expire and give way to renewed spending pressures.     

基于学分制下的计算机基础教学改革研究

根据高校实施学分制的有关精神和实施细则,结合对新生的计算机基础水平摸底测试结果、用人单位对毕业生计算机技术能力的要求调查报告进行分析,提出计算机基础教学应由计算机专业和其他专业老师联合对学生进行分层、分类教学的改革思路。     

Shrinking the quango state: five challenges in reforming quangos

Some problems of governance regularly resurface, and the use and role of ‘quangos’— public bodies operating at arm's-length to ministers—is a case in point. The administrative history of the British state is littered with official reviews and political debates about quangos. Historically, governments, whatever their reforming zeal, have found it difficult to make substantial changes. Now the UK government has initiated a rapid and large-scale set of reforms. This article analyses these changes and highlights five challenges for governments wishing to reform arm's-length bodies: mapping, assessing, reconfiguring, saving, and accounting.     

Indonesian politics in 2012: coalitions,accountability and the future of democracy

Indonesia is a successful but flawed democracy: while the electoral process has worked well, the quality of democratic governance is less encouraging. Missing from the equation between elections and democracy is political accountability. Parties’ obsession with coalition building as a route to political power has made it difficult for voters to attribute success or failure to elected officials. Coalition government allows politicians to send contradictory messages, and in 2012 religious minorities – which are neither banned nor protected – have paid a heavy price for the lack of accountability and leadership. In Jakarta an outsider, Joko Widodo, won the gubernatorial election despite facing an incumbent backed by a broad coalition. His victory illustrates that coalition building does not guarantee success, and that the electorate is mature enough not to be swayed by appeals to religious and ethnic sentiment. This gives heart to those hoping to strengthen democracy and democratic values in Indonesia.     

Jokowi's First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics

When President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, he promised to usher in a new style of politics, generating optimism among many Indonesians that his government would enthusiastically promote reform. Yet Jokowi has since placed greater value on realpolitik than on reform, as evidenced by his choice of cabinet members, his response to the controversy surrounding senior police officer Budi Gunawan, and his handling of attempts by the police and others to weaken Indonesia's respected Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article shows that Jokowi failed to deliver on his promises of reform largely owing to a combination of personal and external factors. He failed to show leadership on anticorruption and human-rights issues, for example—in part because he prefers economic development over democratic reform, but also because he is not immune to the oligarchic politics that dominate Indonesia's political life and promote the interests of Indonesia's elite.     

Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value

We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72.