Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances*

For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects in dirty industries. Against the background of an emerging European‐wide emission trading system, we examine the trade‐off between such compensation and economic efficiency under output‐based and emissions‐based allocation rules. We show that the emissions‐based allocation rule is more costly than the output‐based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in energy‐intensive industries. When the international allowance price increases, the inferiority of emissions‐based allocation vis‐à‐vis output‐based allocation becomes more pronounced, as emission subsidies drastically restrict efficiency gains from international trade in emission allowances.     

Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

Information–driven trading at the Prague Stock Exchange: Evidence from Intra–Day Data

Many observers argue that informed and insider trading is widespread in the emerging financial markets of transition countries, yet rigorous treatment of this issue has been virtually non–existent. The current paper estimates the extent of informed trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) using intra–day transaction data. Our estimates confirm that the average share of informed trading is equal to 0.32, which is high relative to developed markets and varies considerably among stocks. Using the Easley et al. (1996) approach on the very best segment of the PSE we obtained a high average probability of informed trading. Since data used in this study cover the period after the major attempts to improve market regulations, our results indicate that the PSE needs further strengthening to recover credibility and to become a real source of corporate financing. JEL classification: G14, G15.     

证券投资基金“老鼠仓”问题研究

所谓"老鼠仓"是指庄家在用公有资金拉升股价之前,先用自己个人的资金在低位建仓,待用公有资金拉升到高位后个人仓位率先卖出获利.它实质上是利用内幕信息进行违规的利益输送问题,是一种损害证券投资基金持有人利益的不道德行为.主要针对"老鼠仓"形成的原因进行了分析,并提出构建"老鼠仓"防火墙的对策措施.     

企业推广排污权交易的可行性研究

排污权交易(Ernission trading)是一种基于市场(Market-based)的环境政策。本文坚持以科学的发展观，来研究经济发展与环境保护的协调关系，目的是实现环境资源和环境容量的可持续利用。本文分析了企业的排污行为决策，并将环境资源和环境容量的稀缺性纳入排污权交易价格之中。通过价格这个经济杠杆去调节人们对环境资源和环境容量的利用，反映于企业为其排污行为所作的选择，进而论述企业推进排污权交易的可行性。     

从外部性控制策略分析主要环境经济手段的异同

随着世界经济的发展,环境污染问题日益严峻。环境污染是最典型的负外部行为。本文分析了西方经济理论中关于控制环境方面负外部性两种策略的分歧,对比了以这两种策略为理论渊源的排污收费制度和排污权交易制度的异同及各自的适用条件。     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

运用排污权交易改善晋江市垃圾治理现状

如何建设节约型社会是时下舆论讨论的热点问题之一,正确处理好经济发展与环境保护也是建设和谐社会的核心命题之一。本文通过分析晋江市工业垃圾治理模式如何由靠牺牲环境为代价的粗放型模式—模式Ⅰ,向封闭的、可循环的集约型模式—模式Ⅱ转变,证明经济发展与环境保护是完全可以协调统一的;同时,通过分析模式Ⅱ的不足,进一步引入排污权交易理论,结合晋江市的实际情况,创造性地提出了具有实用性和通用性的垃圾治理方式——模式Ⅲ。     

Economic Potential of Biomass Based Fuels for Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation

Use of biofuels diminishes fossil fuelcombustion thereby also reducing net greenhousegas emissions. However, subsidies are neededto make agricultural biofuel productioneconomically feasible. To explore the economicpotential of biofuels in a greenhouse gasmitigation market, we incorporate data onproduction and biofuel processing for thedesignated energy crops switchgrass, hybridpoplar, and willow in an U.S. AgriculturalSector Model along with data on traditionalcrop-livestock production and processing, andafforestation of cropland. Net emissioncoefficients on all included agriculturalpractices are estimated through crop growthsimulation models or taken from the literature. Potential emission mitigation policies ormarkets are simulated via hypothetical carbonprices. At each carbon price level, theAgricultural Sector Model computes the newmarket equilibrium, revealing agriculturalcommodity prices, regionally specificproduction, input use, and welfare levels,environmental impacts, and adoption ofalternative management practices such asbiofuel production. Results indicate no rolefor biofuels below carbon prices of $40 perton of carbon equivalent. At these incentivelevels, emission reductions via reduced soiltillage and afforestation are more costefficient. For carbon prices above $70,biofuels dominate all other agriculturalmitigation strategies.     

The Economics and Bioeconomics of Folk and Scientific Classification

Synopsis This paper is the product of a collaboration between a biologist (Ghiselin 1997) who works on the philosophy of classification and an economist (Landa 1981, 1994) who works on the ‘Economics of Identity’: how and why people classify people based on identity in the context of a theory of ethnic trading networks. In developing the ‘bioeconomics’ (the synthesis of economics with biology) of classification, we crossed a number of disciplinary boundaries—anthropology, economics, sociology, biology, and cognitive psychology including evolutionary psychology’s ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics. Using a bioeconomics approach, we argue that folk classifications—the classifications used by ordinary persons—have much in common with scientific classifications: underlying both is the need for economy of information processing in the brain, for the efficient organization of knowledge, and for efficiency of information acquisition and transmission of information to others. Both evolve as a result of trial and error, but in science there is relatively more foresight, understanding, and planning.