Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lobbying as a potent political marketing tool for firm performance: A closer look

This study endeavors to enhance political marketing literature about the impact of lobbying on firm performance. Our sample is composed of 140 U.S. firms and spans the years 2007–2014 to encompass the 2007–2009 recession and the subsequent recovery period. Our findings indicate that lobbying expenses positively contribute to firm performance. Also, government contracts in both ways, dollar amount and number of government contracts, act as mediators between lobbying expenses and firm performance. In addition, organizational slack moderates the relationship between lobbying expenses and government contracts. The managerial implications suggest that lobbying expenses can be leveraged as a potent tool for firm performance. Firms with larger lobbying efforts acquired both, higher dollar amounts and a greater number of government contracts.     

The Effects of Search-Related and Purchase-Related Mobile App Additions on Retailers’ Shareholder Wealth: The Roles of Firm Size,Product Category,and Customer Segment

Mobile channel additions have been shown to increase consumer-brand relationships, brand satisfaction towards and overall purchasing from a retailer, but what is less apparent is whether shareholders are fully rewarded for retailers’ mobile channel additions. Results from an event study on 115 announcements relating to mobile app additions of publicly traded U.S. retail firms between 2009 and 2016 indicate that the stock market responds generally positively to mobile app additions, but specifically to the two mobile app addition types. Stock market responses to search-related and purchase-related app additions are moderated by firm size, product category, and target customer age. For announcements of search-related apps, the market responds more positively to product retailers than to service retailers, and to small firms than large ones. For announcements of purchase-related apps, the market responds less positively to firms that target younger customers than firms who do not especially target them.     

Job growth in early transition: Comparing two paths*

Small start‐up firms are the engine of job creation in early transition. We ask about differences in their growth across two different transition economies: Estonia, which experienced rapid destruction of pre‐existing firms, and the Czech Republic, which reduced the old sector gradually. We find that the majority of job growth corresponds to within‐industry reallocation. The within‐industry growth of small start‐up firms is similar in the two countries, in line with the convergence to Western industry firm‐size distributions. We also find similar patterns in the evolution of wage differentials between start‐ups and old firms and small differences in the extent of low‐wage employment in start‐ups across the two transition paths. JEL Classifications: J2, J3, J4, L1, O1, P2.     

公司业绩与财务杠杆

本文从实证角度分析了我国上市公司的财务杠杆对公司业绩的影响。结果表明,往年财务杠杆和当年财务杠杆对当年公司业绩的影响截然相反。财务杠杆对公司的息税后收益和息税前收益均有影响。长期负债率和长期借款率对公司业绩的影响分别比同年的流动负债率和短期借款率对公司业     

浅论我国农产品流通企业扩张的基本规律与政策规制

通过对农产品流通企业扩张形式全面的理论梳理, 研究总结了二种类型的农产品流通企业扩张基本规律,即纵向扩张和横向扩张,并对中国农产品企业扩张问题进行了实证研究,最后对我国农产品流通企业扩张提出建议.     

中国生殖健康产业的需求与市场

根据生殖健康的内容 ,将生殖健康产业划分为两大市场和 7类产品。通过对人口、购买力和购买欲望发展趋势的分析 ,提出中国生殖健康产业市场需求潜力巨大的预测。在培育生殖健康产业的过程中 ,产业发展要素的协调、市场化的策略与步骤、多方面合作的机制是政府目前需要优先考虑的三大问题