休闲经济与自由本质

随着人们自己支配的时间和收入的增加,休闲将成为生活中的一个重要组成部分.而休闲经济作为日益火爆的经济现象也越来越受到人们的关注.分析和研究与此有关的种种问题,特别是与人的本质及生存条件的种种联系是本文的主旨.     

论公正及其与自由、平等的关系

尽管学术界对自由、平等和公正问题有许多研究和阐释,但较少将自由、平等与公正问题联系起来从总体上进行考察和研究,以致关于自由、平等和公正及其关系问题成了人们最说不清、道不明的问题。本文试图立足于当代人类社会现实及其走向,着重从与自由、平等相互关联的视角研究公正问题,力求纲要性地对公正及其与自由、平等之间的关系提供一些阐释和见解,最终论证这样一种基本观点:现代公正是一种综合性的价值要求,它要求社会自由和平等,也要求对自由和平等可能导致的社会问题给予适当解决。     

加入WTO吉林省面临的机会与挑战

我国加入WTO后，面对贸易自由化的局面以及众多的机遇和挑战，吉林省要进行合理的资源配置。     

企业主体性产权理论的构建 --相关和自主统一的属性所有权

企业是市场经济活动的主体，应该具有其主体属性，并且正是其主体属性决定它的主体地位和作用，并形成主体性产权。但是，学术界缺乏对这个问题的研究，主要是因为受西方经济学传统的限制，要突破这种限制必须把经济学与管理学结合起来进行研究，以构建企业主体性产权理论。企业主体性产权是其相关属性产权与自主属性产权的统一。企业相关属性及其产权是基础和结果，主要说明企业主体性产权的共性；企业自主属性及其产权是原动力和境界，主要说明企业主体性产权的个性。它们的互补和统一突出地体现在企业家及其产权上。企业主体性产权的目的是在防止“蛋糕”缩小的同时把“蛋糕”做大，其核心是基于相互关系的约束而进行自主创造的激励，其模型的运行特点是协同一自主创造。企业主体性产权理论的应用，可以保证和促使中国企业循着超越自然历史发展。     

马克思的资本批判与人学思想

资本原则作为现代社会的本质性原则,在马克思主义研究当中已经成为基本的共识,而马克思资本批判的核心就是揭示资本原则对人的统治.本文结合对历史和现实的观察和反思,回到马克思资本批判的历史境域之中,阐释马克思在资本批判中揭示的人的现代性处境、本质和人作为人全面实现和发展自己的现实条件.从根本上清理人学研究中的抽象性倾向,建立入学研究的历史唯物主义地基,并从研究范式上进行必要的转换.     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

AGAINST LEVIATHAN: A REVIEW OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF NORMAN P. BARRY1

Classical Liberalism in the 21st Century is a collection of essays from colleagues and friends of the late Norman Barry, Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Buckingham. Most share Barry's Hayekian perspective. The essays cover themes such as: international competition in trade and between jurisdictions; the corporate social responsibility fad; secular economic errors; policies relating to alleged global warming; the state's impotence at removing externalities; the moral functions of competition; and, above all, Barry's rigour and eloquence in the economic and political case for freedom.     

Press freedom and jumps in stock prices

Press freedom varies substantially across countries. In a free environment, any news immediately becomes public knowledge through mediums including various electronic media and published materials. However, in an unfree environment, (economic) agents would have more discretionary powers to disclose good news immediately, while hiding bad news or releasing bad news slowly. We argue that this discretion affects stock prices and that stock markets in countries with a free press should be better processors of economic information. Using an equilibrium asset-pricing model in an economy under jump diffusion, we decompose the moments of the returns of international stock markets into a diffusive risk and a jump risk part. Using stock market data for a balanced panel of 50 countries, our results suggest that in countries with a free press, the better processing of bad news leads to more frequent negative jumps in stock prices. As a result, stock markets in those countries are characterized by higher volatility, driven by higher jump risk and more negative return asymmetry. The results are robust to the inclusion of various controls for governance and other country- or market-specific characteristics. We interpret these as good stock market characteristics because a free press improves welfare and increases economic growth.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A REJOINDER

In our 2011 survey of the literature in the Journal of Economic Surveys on the effect of government size on economic growth in wealthy countries we find a relatively consistent pattern: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5–1 percentage point lower annual growth rate. This conclusion is questioned by Colombier. In this rejoinder we present a rebuttal of Colombier's argument based on a detailed scrutiny of his own statistical evidence and regression results. Furthermore, we note that several new papers that have appeared since our original paper was published give support to our main conclusion.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE

Abstract The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach – of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time – reveals a more consistent picture. The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5% to 1% lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth. One hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy. Another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market‐friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by ongoing research.