Changing composition of human capital The Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland1

We show that business education/occupations have expanded and that technical education/occupations have contracted in the Czech Republic and Poland since 1990. We interpret these changes as an adjustment necessary for their transition to a market economy. We do not find the same pattern in Hungary, which we attribute to the earlier timing of its transition. We construct an aggregate model in which labour reallocates in response to changing demand structure. When calibrated with the Czech and Polish data, the model generates a large movement of workers with technical education and experience into business occupations in the early 1990s. The discounted sum of output loss due to the gap between the demand structure and the composition of existing human capital amounts to between 8 and 40 percent of 1990 GDP.     

一种新的尝试:利用JXTA P2P技术搭建自主计算平台

自主计算的目标是为了简化日益繁杂的IT设施管理,从而降低成本、提升效率。本文分析了自主计算的基本特点和需求,结合P2P计算的特性,以P2P的角度重新审视构建自主计算全局架构的方法,阐述了用JXTA实现自主计算自主管理器的思想。     

How are China''s state-owned enterprises doing in the 1990s? Evidence from three interior provinces

Since its inception in the early 1980s, the success of China's enterprise reforms remains hotly debated. This paper introduces a new element into the analysis of state-owned enterprise performance by drawing on the recent increase in inter-regional income disparities. It is argued that as a result of less favourable structural conditions and stronger fiscal dependence on the central government, reform implementation in the interior provinces has lagged behind the progress made along the coast. This hypothesis is investigated using enterprise survey data from three interior provinces which is compared to a similar survey carried out earlier in four coastal cities. The evidence generally supports the view of larger administrative restrictions in the interior and relatively poor economic performance.     

基于战略性的全面人力资源管理信息系统的开发与应用

分析企业人力资源管理信息化现状,提出基于战略性的现代人力资源管理的5P模式;并在此基础上设计与开发了人力资源管理信息系统,用于企业实际,提高了企业人力资源管理水平。     

价值型投资在中国证券市场上的有力证据

本文给出了1994年至2005年间价值型投资在中国A股市场中的有力证据。Fama—MacBeth回归表明在中国A股市场中存在着显著的市盈率和市净率溢价，1994年至2005年中牛市和熊市的滚动策略显示了我国A股市场中的价值效应，并且风险和收益之间基本上呈现出收益大、风险大的特征。本文的实证研究结果将有助于中小投资者以及机构投资者的长期投资决策。     

4P、4C与4R:交易费用经济学的视角

4P是经典营销理论的核心内容之一。随着经济、文化和技术的全球化与区域化不断发展,市场竞争异常激烈,顾客在大部分领域取得了绝对的选择权,营销理论随之出现了4C和4R等“崭新”内容。从交易费用经济学的角度看,4C和4R不是对4P的替代,而是一种重要补充和发展。     

Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent organizational restructuring in Japan in the framework of organizational economics, assuming that the product/market portfolio of the firm is fixed. How does a firm set about organizing its internal divisions? I first summarize some stylized facts on corporate diversification strategy and multi‐divisional (M‐form) organization in large Japanese firms from different perspectives. I then analyse the problem of choosing an organizational form. In particular, I argue that, precisely because of its related diversification, the multi‐business Japanese firm adopting the M‐form finds it difficult to differentiate its diverse businesses internally.     

On the forecastability of share prices on the Viennese stock exchange

In this paper the Viennese stock exchange data are analysed by using ARMA and GARCH technology. After using AIC and BIC for estimating the linear structure of the time series, to the resulting innovations a GARCH(1,1) model is fit. The resulting residuals are then tested for serial independence and constancy of its distribution to check whether the models are reasonable. Main result is that the residuals of this ARMA-GARCH(1,1)-model are reasonably iid (which is checked by BDS and classical independence tests) for index data and significantly less well-behaved for stock data. Second, there is considerable autocorrelation in the data (especially in the Viennese indices WBK and ATX) which can be exploited even with 1.25% transaction costs (which is checked by a posteriori analysis of a strategy which exploits an underlying time-varying AR(1) model), however, much higher profit can be made with 0.5% transaction costs. Furthermore, the same techniques are applied to US Standard & Poor 500 index and the results for both data sets are compared giving the result that the US-market looks much more mature than the Viennese one.Financial Support by the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, and the Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung, Vienna, Grant P 9176 is gratefully acknowledged. This paper is a slightly abbreviated version of the Research Report No. 135 by the same authors (see References), which contains many detailed plots of the results.     

Politics and economics in weak and strong states

While much research in political economy points out the benefits of “limited government,” political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by “weak states,” which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium, which I refer to as “consensually strong state equilibrium,” can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in OECD countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government.     

Corruption, inequality, and fairness

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.