Does the presence of professional football cause crime in a city? Evidence from Pontiac,Michigan

Using daily panel data from Detroit, we empirically explore the relationship between the National Football League (NFL) and crime in a city. We exploit the natural experiment of the Detroit Lions’ move from Pontiac, Michigan, to downtown Detroit in 2002. Pontiac is used as the treatment city and non-game day crime, other suburban cities, and other cities outside Detroit MSA are used as the comparison groups. Employing a difference-in-difference approach, we find decreases in assaults and vandalism on home game days in Pontiac relative to the control cities after the Lions’ move. We find weak evidence of a net decrease in larceny and vandalism in Pontiac on home game days following the loss of professional football. No changes in assaults and auto theft are reported. While not conclusive, our results suggest that professional football leads to additional larceny and vandalism incidents but no effects on assaults and auto theft.     

Optimal Emissions Taxation under Imperfect Competition in a Durable Good Industry

This paper investigates optimal emissions taxation under imperfect competition in a durable good industry where products are sold (instead of rented). As a benchmark, attention is paid to the special case of monopoly with exogenously given product durability. In line with previous literature, the optimal emission tax in this benchmark model falls short of marginal damage (underinternalization). Extending the benchmark model either to the case of an oligopolistic market structure and/or to the case of endogenous product durability then provides two cases in which the optimal emission tax overinternalizes marginal damage.     

Considering Aquacultural Externality in Coastal Land Allocation Decisions in India

Commercial aquaculture in India has come under attack for having caused negative agricultural and environmental impacts. This paper formulates an interactive model of non-renewable and renewable resources to characterize land allocations between aquaculture and agriculture in ecologically and economically sustainable fashion. Through an empirical application, various economic and policy circumstances that affect the optimal land allocation mix are evaluated. The aquaculture industry must address two economic effects: off-site negative effects on renewable food and other coastal resources, and on-site self-pollution of shrimp ponds. Current regulatory and land-use policies are inadequate to address these effects.     

Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

国土资源行政管理的若干应用基础理论问题（下）－资源开发与资源产业

从自然资源投入产出关系分析入手 ,论述了资源产业的两大产业群———资源开发业与资源再生产业 ,揭示了其内外经济关系。     

Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41.     

Environmental protection versus economic growth

This paper presents and analyses the differences in the eco-models implemented worldwide （such as whether and how carbon taxes being ＂recycled＂）, or in their efficiency parameters （inconsistent parameter values that account for different results）. This is the assumption that a real tradeoff exists between the production of environmental goods. The present article empirically proves that something must be given up in order to gain something else, and once equations are specified to trace out the path of the economy over time, the natural economic formulation of such equations will embody the notion of economic and bio-tradeoffs.     

中国财政性教育投资的实证分析与对策研究

在现代市场经济社会里 ,几乎所有国家的政府投资在为全社会提供教育服务方面都起着主导作用。我国财政性教育投资严重不足 ,而且教育投资结构很不合理 ,因此必须改变教育投资观念 ,切实、稳定增加财政的教育投资 ,优化财政教育投资结构     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Environmental standards as barriers to trade

This paper examines the case of a good, polluting in consumption, whose pollutive content is restricted by a government with strong environmental policies. When foreign producers are unable to comply with the restrictive environmental standard of such a country, to which they wish to export, they often allege that those standards constitute illegal barriers to free trade. An example of such a good is gasoline, excessively pollutive formulations of which are prohibited from importation into the United States by the 1970 Clean Air Act. Rather than banning them, such imports should be taxed, along with the domestically produced substitute good, according to their respective pollutant contents. This would foster economic efficiency and should be more acceptable to foreign producers than the outright prohibition mandated by the Clean Air Act. The results of this paper reaffirm the argument in a previous article in this journal (Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 29 (1995) 187), though the countries’ roles in the two papers are reversed, that free trade and Pigouvian environmental policies increase international welfare.