Declining Discount Rates: The Long and the Short of it

The last few years have witnessed important advances in our understanding of time preference and social discounting. In particular, several rationales for the use of time-varying social discount rates have emerged. These rationales range from the ad hoc to the formal, with some founded solely in economic theory while others reflect principles of intergenerational equity. While these advances are to be applauded, the practitioner is left with a confusing array of rationales and the sense that almost any discount rate can be justified. This paper draws together these different strands and provides a critical review of past and present contributions to this literature. In addition to this we highlight some of the problems with employing DDRs in the decision-making process, the most pressing of which may be time inconsistency. We clarify their practical implications, and potential pitfalls, of the more credible rationales and argue that some approaches popular in environmental economics literature are ill-conceived. Finally, we illustrate the impact of different approaches by examining global warming and nuclear power investment. This includes an application and extension of Newell and Pizer [‘Discounting the benefits of climate change mitigation : how much do uncertain rates increase valuations?’ Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46 (2003) 52] to UK interest rate data.     

A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies

This study examines the quantitative properties of optimal sustainable monetary policies using a monetary model with a stabilization bias. As in Kurozumi (2008), the optimal sustainable policy is a strategy considered in the absence of commitment technologies; however it is implemented following an optimal quasi-sustainable policy derived by assuming that the commitment technologies are present. This study finds that solving for the policy function of the optimal quasi-sustainable policy yields a result basically identical to the Ramsey-optimal commitment policy under a set of parameters commonly used in the literature. The simulation shows two further results: policymakers have incentive to deviate from the Ramsey-optimal commitment policy when the lagged output gap is large and the optimal quasi-sustainable policy endogenously diminishes the steadfastness of policymakers׳ commitment.     

贸易保护政策的动态不一致性 ——以我国出口退税政策为例

本文从企业与政府之间博弈的视角,揭示贸易保护政策的动态不一致性问题。理论分析表明,在理性预期与信息不对称的假设前提下,政府在与私人企业的博弈中,往往处于劣势地位,容易受企业行为的牵引,其结果将导致贸易保护政策的动态不一致性。本文以我国出口退税政策的实施作为上述论断的经验证据,结果表明,出口企业的策略性行为可能是导致我国出口退税政策频繁变动的内在原因之一。     

Excess Liquidity,Housing Price Booms and Policy Challenges in China

Incorporating asymmetric cost and benefit of supplying excess liquidity into an otherwise standard time inconsistency model, this paper offers an explanation of the excess liquidity and housing price booms recently experienced in China. We find that the central bank's incentive to stimulate economic growth with excess liquidity fuels real estate prices and accelerates inflation bias. Therefore, the central bank should free itself from the pressure to achieve an economic growth rate higher than the potential level, and assign an appropriate weight to the real estate price fluctuations in the central bank's objective function, so that the central bank's policy of stimulating economic growth with excess liquidity can be constrained.     

Self‐regulation through Goal Setting*

Goals are an important motivator. But little is known about why and how people set them. We address this issue in a model based on two stylized facts. First, goals serve as reference points for performance. Second, present‐biased preferences create self‐control problems. We show the power and limits of self‐regulation through goals. Goals increase an individual's motivation—but only up to a certain point. Furthermore, they are painful self‐disciplining devices. Thus, greater self‐control problems may result in tougher goals; but for a severe present bias goals either lack a motivating force, or are too painful to be accepted.     

我国民营企业发展中政策导向与法律之协调

目前制约民营企业进一步发展的因素是多方面的,其中,政策导向与相关法律制度的不协调成为诸多制约因素中最根本的因素。为更好地促进我国民营企业的发展,政策导向与相关法律必须在制度设计、理论指导和政府角色的定位等方面进行协调。     

Personalized managerial response and negative inconsistent review helpfulness: The mediating effect of perceived response helpfulness

Understanding the effect of managerial response on online review management has attracted the attention of scholars in recent years. However, the effect of personalized managerial response on the negative inconsistent review is a lack of evidence. This study investigates how personalized managerial responses influence negative review helpfulness according to the various levels of review inconsistency and the underlying mechanism behind the effect. We adopted a secondary data analysis based on the TripAdvisor dataset and used an online experiment study to investigate the impact mechanism. Findings reveal that the personalized managerial response positively influences review helpfulness, review inconsistency (negative rating with positive textual sentiment) moderates the effect of personalized managerial response on review helpfulness, and perceived response helpfulness mediates the above relationships. More specifically, personalized managerial response to negative inconsistent reviews has a pronounced effect on consumers’ perception of response helpfulness and their evaluation of review helpfulness. This study improves the current understanding of managerial responses, and provides practical guidance for hoteliers, consumers, and travel websites.     

Equilibrium concepts for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time

A new notion of equilibrium, which we call strong equilibrium, is introduced for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in Huang, Y.‐J., & Nguyen‐Huu, A. (2018, Jan 01). Time‐consistent stopping under decreasing impatience. Finance and Stochastics, 22(1), 69–95 and Christensen, S., & Lindensjö, K. (2018). On finding equilibrium stopping times for time‐inconsistent markovian problems. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 56(6), 4228–4255, which in this paper are called mild equilibrium and weak equilibrium, respectively, a strong equilibrium captures the idea of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium more accurately. When the state process is a continuous‐time Markov chain and the discount function is log subadditive, we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is always a strong equilibrium. Moreover, we provide a new iteration method that can directly construct an optimal mild equilibrium and thus also prove its existence.     

Time inconsistency and delayed retirement decision: the French pension bonus

With the increase in life expectancy and demographic shocks, several public policies in the last decades aim to encourage individuals to postpone retirement. One of them, the pension bonus, gives an increased pension if individuals retire beyond their Full Retirement Age. Previous ex post analyses found that the responsiveness to this type of financial incentives, which encourage to postpone retirement, is heterogeneous among agents and that the global effect is rather limited. Deriving from previous research in Behavioural Economics, this article analyses the impact of time inconsistency in the decision to delay retirement to get the bonus. Using public national survey data, short-term and long-term impatience are measured with questions on retiring motivations. After controlling for the endogeneity of the bonus knowledge, econometric results show that time-inconsistent agents are less likely to retire with the bonus.     

Half empty, half full and why we can agree to disagree forever

Aumann [Aumann R., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statisitics 4, 1236–1239] derives his famous we cannot agree to disagree result under the assumption that people are expected utility (=EU) decision makers. Motivated by empirical evidence against EU theory, we study the possibility of agreeing to disagree within the framework of Choquet expected utility (=CEU) theory which generalizes EU theory by allowing for ambiguous beliefs. As our first main contribution, we show that people may well agree to disagree if their Bayesian updating of ambiguous beliefs is psychologically biased in our sense. Remarkably, this finding holds regardless of whether people with identical priors apply the same psychologically biased Bayesian update rule or not. As our second main contribution, we develop a formal model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity. As a key feature of our approach the posterior subjective beliefs do, in general, not converge to “true” probabilities which is in line with psychological evidence against converging learning behavior. This finding thus formally establishes that CEU decision makers may even agree to disagree in the long-run despite the fact that they always received the same information.