Information and Knowledge as Antecedents of Consumer Attitudes and Intentions to Buy and Recommend Fair-Trade Products

The authors propose and empirically test a causal model to understand how the availability of fair-trade information and consumer knowledge about this issue affect consumers’ attitudes and intentions toward fair-trade products. The model is built upon the attitude-behavior paradigm and the premises of agency theory. It is tested through structural equation modeling with a sample of 292 Spanish consumers. The findings are that consumers do not have good knowledge about fair trade and that this is significantly determined by the lack of information about this in the market. It is also observed that consumers’ perceptions about the availability of fair-trade information have negative effects on their concern about this issue and that such information as is available is not effective in reducing consumer skepticism. The research represents an extension of previous fair-trade literature because the role of information and communication in improving consumer attitudes and buying intentions has rarely been explored in the case of ethical products.     

Application of collective knowledge diffusion in a social network environment

ABSTRACT

We present a group dynamics model that shows knowledge integration as a process occurring over time. As each individual in the group contact others, his own knowledge changes, and over time the collective knowledge is obtained. This allows modeling knowledge diffusion in a social network and while the models presented in this paper are not competitive in that area, they approach the problem from previously unconsidered direction. We test the behavior of the model in a multi-agent simulation and we test a simple advertisement campaign in a social network. We provide discussion of elements needed for making model more competitive.     

Organizational versus Market Knowledge: From Concrete Embodiment to Abstract Representation

Synopsis In contrast to the neoclassical economic presumption in favor of markets, we argue that organizations, not markets should be taken as our default assumption. We do so on information processing grounds. We distinguish between Zen and market Knowledge. The first is embodied and hard to articulate and the second abstract-symbolic. In human evolution, the first type of knowledge came first, and, on any pragmatic definition of knowledge, it still incorporates most of what we mean by the term. We take codification and abstraction as the two data processing activities that lead to the articulation of knowledge into an abstract-symbolic form. We develop a conceptual framework, the Information-Space (I-Space) to show how far the articulation of knowledge leads to its being shared. Whereas an unlimited sharing of information and knowledge leads to market-oriented outcomes, a more limited sharing leads to organizational outcomes. A market-oriented economics has tended to look to physics for its models; the field of organization theory has tended to look to biology. A more organization-oriented economics would thus look more to biology for its models.     

企业知识管理绩效综合评价案例研究

知识管理是现代企业管理的重要内容。正确分析和评价企业的知识管理绩效，对于促进企业知识管理、提高企业知识管理水平以及增强企业竞争优势，具有重要的现实意义。文章构建了企业知识管理绩效评价的指标体系，并运用模糊综合评价模型对企业知识管理绩效进行了综合评价。     

The persistence of knowledge‐based advantage: an empirical test for product performance and technological knowledge

Resource‐based theory maintains that intrinsic characteristics of resources and capabilities, such as their tacitness, complexity, and specificity, prevent imitation and thereby prolong exceptional performance. There is little direct evidence to verify these claims, yet a substantial literature encourages firms to formulate competitive strategies around resources with these attributes. Further, work outside the resource‐based tradition suggests that these attributes can slow innovation, and it is not clear when this effect outweighs the benefits of inimitability. This paper seeks to clarify whether and how the complexity, tacitness, and specificity of a firm's knowledge affect the persistence of its performance advantages. We find that the complexity and tacitness of technological knowledge are useful for defending a firm's major product improvements from imitation, but not for protecting its minor improvements. The design specificity of technological knowledge delayed imitation of minor improvements in this study. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

工程项目管理虚拟组织的构建及运行

建筑工程项目管理是一项复杂的系统工程，面对知识经济的挑战，针对当前的建筑工程项目应如何进行科学管理问题，提出应利用虚拟组织的形式，借助网络平台在工程项目管理中引入知识管理，通过管理各方知识的交流、整合、优化、应用，实现建筑工程整体化，力争以最小的成本最佳的完成项目的建设目标。     

交易费用与企业技术创新战略决策

对企业技术创新战略决策进行了两阶段分析，并采用交易费用理论对创新企业技术创新来源决策进行了分析，认为企业内部技术创新是企业吸收外部技术的基础，大部分企业技术创新将走自主创新与引进创新相结合的道路。