Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

董责险与企业数字化转型：监督激励效应还是机会主义效应？

作为资本市场中的风险防范工具,董责险既可能监督激励管理者以促进企业数字化转型,也可能诱发管理者机会主义行为以抑制企业数字化转型。采用2012—2022年沪深A股制造业上市公司数据分析发现：购买董责险能够显著促进企业数字化转型,表明监督激励效应在其中发挥了主导作用;购买董责险促进了企业风险承担水平提升和融资约束程度下降,表明董责险的监督激励效应通过风险承担机制和融资约束机制促进了企业数字化转型;购买董责险对企业的管理费用率和总资产周转率没有显著影响,表明董责险的机会主义效应未能发挥作用,不能通过管理者自利机制来抑制企业数字化转型;董责险的数字化转型促进效应在非国有企业、公司治理较差企业和金融发展较差地区企业中更为显著,表明董责险能够弥补产权制度、公司治理和金融环境的不足,有效促进存在某些劣势的企业数字化转型。因此,应积极推动董责险市场健康发展,充分利用董责险的监督激励效应及其与产权制度的协同作用、对公司治理和金融环境的补充作用,有效促进企业数字化转型。     

管理会计信息披露及其市场识别——来自中国沪深股市的经验证据

财务会计通常被理解为对外报告会计。因管理会计服务于公司内部的管理决策,与公司价值具有内在关联性,因而管理会计信息的对外披露与市场识别此类信息之间具有理论上的逻辑一致性。文章以管理会计信息的整体披露水平能否被市场有效识别为研究命题,对沪深股市年度报告中管理会计信息披露的市场识别程度及其规律进行了实证研究。结果表明:管理会计信息披露能够被市场投资者识别并使用,但此类信息的披露需要市场耗费一定的时间予以吸收;同时,与财务会计信息披露相比,管理会计信息披露水平提高同等程度,更容易被市场识别。     

Greenmail premia, board composition and management shareholdings

This paper investigates the association between premia paid in targeted share repurchases (greenmail) and the characteristics of the boards of directors. A nonlinear relationship is found between the premium paid and the proportion of shares held by the inside directors. The premium decreases as the proportion of unaffiliated outside directors increases.     

Disproportionate insider control and firm performance

The effect of disproportionate insider control on firm performance is ambiguous. Disproportionate control may enhance insiders’ ability to expropriate perquisites; on the other hand, it may provide stability of management and reduce short‐term market pressures. Using a hand‐collected sample of U.S. dual‐class firms, we find that disproportionate control is positively associated with accounting‐based performance, but negatively associated with Tobin's Q. These results are consistent with the incentives of entrenched insiders who are interested in profitability but less beholden to capital markets.