Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

A Cross‐national Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives and Financial Constraints*

We provide evidence on the impact of tax incentives and financial constraints on corporate R&D expenditure decisions. We contribute to extant research by comparing R&D expenditures in the United States and Canada, thereby exploiting the differences in the two countries' R&D tax credit mechanisms and generally accepted accounting principles. The two tax incentive mechanism designs are consistent with differing views of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms in these economies. Our sample also allows us to explore the effects of capitalizing R&D on Canadian firms. Employing a matched design, we document relations between tax credit incentives and R&D spending consistent with both Canadian and U.S. public companies responding as though they are not financially constrained. We estimate that the Canadian credit system induces, on average, $1.30 of additional R&D spending per dollar of taxes forgone while the U.S. system induces, on average, $2.96 of additional spending. We also find that firms that capitalize R&D costs in Canada spend, on average, 18 percent more on R&D. Collectively, this evidence is important to the ongoing debates in both countries concerning the appropriate design of incentives for R&D and is consistent with the assumptions found in the U.S. tax credit system, but not those found in the Canadian system.     

Modelling soccer matches using bivariate discrete distributions with general dependence structure

In this paper copulas are used to generate bivariate discrete distributions. These distributions are fitted to soccer data from the English Premier League. An interesting aspect of these data is that the primary variable of interest, the discrete pair shots-for and shots-against, exhibits negative dependence; thus, in particular, we apply bivariate Poisson-related distributions that allow such dependence. The paper focuses on Archimedian copulas, for which the dependence structure is fully determined by a one-dimensional projection that is invariant under marginal transformations. Diagnostic plots for copula fit based on this projection are adapted to deal with discrete variables. Covariates relating to within-match contributions such as numbers of passes and tackles are introduced to explain variability in shot outcomes. The results of this analysis would appear to support the notion that playing the 'beautiful game' is an effective strategy—more passes and crosses contribute to more effective play and more shots on the goal.     

“棘轮式”代理问题与子公司经理人激励:家族集团治理

家族集团中,在企业家通过本期产出水平来确定子公司经理人所应上缴的产出分配收益的情况下,经理人会通过调整自己的努力水平,间接控制自己在下期的上缴额度,从而导致激励效率损失.但是,如果企业家能收取固定的产出分配收益,并确定高额违约金,就能够有效地规避子公司经理人代理问题.     

论知识型组织员工的人性假设及其激励

基于知识型组织员工人力资源的独有特征，提出一种新的人性假设——“价值人”假设，即知识型组织中员工是工具价值与自我价值二维存在的统一体。在“价值人”假设条件下，知识型组织员工管理模式应从传统的“命令-控制”型向“引导-激励”型转变，运用激励的制度安排来激发员工的工作热情。     

On modeling incentive systems which utilize pollution charges for pollution abatement

This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.     

按劳分配与收入公平分配

按劳分配与收入公平分配存在正相关,主要表现在按劳分配存在前提和分配主体转换的公平性、分配依据和利益结构及其主体地位的合理性五个方面.按劳分配的实践与收入公平分配存在负相关,主要表现在由于理解上的偏差、应用中的偏差、实施对象客观条件不同而导致收入分配中事实上的不公平.为了强化按劳分配与收入公平分配的正相关、弱化按劳分配的实践与收入公平分配的负相关,必须采取相应对策.     

由中国国歌的英语译法浅析汉英正反译法的相互应用

翻译学是一门综合社会科学,包括文学翻译,句法翻译,科技翻译,同声翻译和电脑翻译等学科,其采用的方法的手段又是多样的,诸如:直译、意译、扩译、省译、词类转换和正反译等等,但所遵循的原则是译者用一种语言表达原作者用另一种语言所表达的同一概念或思想。该文力图通过具体的实例浅析正反译法在翻译实践中的相互应用。     

税收公平伦理视角下的个人所得税制建构

税收公平原则富含社会伦理的思想。对个人所得税的征管，不仅要强调其经济功能，更要关注其社会公正和伦理维护的社会功能。我国的个人所得税制存在纳税人身份确定、纳税能力确定、征税范围确定三个方面的公平伦理扭曲。因此，新的个人所得税构想中应当强调全民纳税、量能负担原则，实行低累进税率和负所得税税率，同时要改进征管模式。     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997