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1.
Haze pollution has become a new threat to China's sustainable development, but it may be that local government behaviour can play an important role in the prevention and control of pollutants. A dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is used to study the relationship between local government competition and haze pollution. To further explore the indirect impact of factor market distortion on haze pollution and control potential endogeneity problems, a newly developed intermediary effect model that incorporates the characteristics of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is utilized to explore how factor market distortion indirectly affects haze pollution. The research results show that regional haze pollution in China is characterized by significant spatial correlation, and local government competition has a positive impact on haze pollution; that is, local government competition exacerbates haze pollution. In general, local government competition not only directly leads to an increase in haze pollution but also further intensifies it by distorting the local factor market, and the intermediary role of factor market distortion is approximately 7.04%. The results of the regional inspection found that competition among local governments in the eastern region did not lead to haze pollution, and distortion of the factor market did not exist as an intermediary effect. However, both direct and intermediary effects are significant in the central and western regions. Therefore, an official performance appraisal system that includes ecological constraints should be established to guide the benign transformation of local government competition, and an environmental management mechanism must be developed for joint prevention and control to reduce haze pollution. In addition, the free flow of factors and marketization are equally important.  相似文献   
2.
Yutao Han  Xi Wan 《The World Economy》2019,42(5):1620-1640
In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. Moreover, both the high‐tax and low‐tax countries can be worse off. This conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high‐tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound.  相似文献   
3.
Based on the day-night PM2.5 difference of the nearest atmospheric monitoring points to measure whether there is illegal emission, this paper explores the impact of environmental protection officials' tenure (EPLT) on illegal emissions. The results show that there is a positive correlation between EPLT and illegal emissions. Stable EPLT can reduce illegal emissions by increasing environmental information disclosure and environmental subsidies. It can increase illegal emissions by weakening public pollution reporting and media supervision, environmental law enforcement and promoting corruption. In addition, EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT is less than 3.55 years, while EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT exceeds 6.21 years. Further, when mayor's tenure and EPLT are both stable, the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emission is stronger. Stable company director's tenure can also aggravate the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emissions.  相似文献   
4.
近年来,在线平台的迅猛发展推动了全球经济数字化加速转型,但同时也引发了包括增值税政策适用在内的诸多挑战.通过研究《欧盟增值税指令》和欧州法院的判例法,以及分析个人数据与在线平台运行之间的关系可以推断出,个人数据是在线平台提供访问服务构成的增值税应税范围内的供应,且与消费者是否向在线平台支付金钱形式的对价无关.在实践中,使用客观价值方法来确定在线服务供应的应税金额存在实际困难,而使用直接联系标准解决易货交易问题,会导致增值税税基在本质上得到扩张.因此,建议当前不要将在线平台访问服务的供应视为一项应税交易.此外,对于商家为获得消费者数据而向平台付款的情形,因其不符合直接联系标准,也不应被视为服务对价.  相似文献   
5.
In the context of personal income tax (PIT) reform in China in 2018, this paper examines some of the major issues of concern regarding the reform and income distribution. Using the China Personal Income Tax Micro‐simulation model, the paper compares the differences between the 2011 and 2018 PIT systems, and finds that residents relying on different income sources may face a large degree of real tax rate change. Once the tax system is altered to PIT 2018, the coverage of PIT for wage earners will decrease from 46.9 to 23.4 percent, the income redistributive effect will drop from 1.95 to 1.22 percent and the PIT's role in fiscal revenue will also be negatively affected. Nevertheless, if individual income continues to grow, the share of PIT in fiscal revenue is expected to return to the 2018 level in 2022, but its income redistribution function is difficult to recover in the short term. The paper finds that the effect of PIT on income distribution depends on the tax structure. Gradual transition to an “entirely comprehensive” tax system when conditions are appropriate will achieve better income redistribution results at a lower average tax rate.  相似文献   
6.
U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra-firm, cross-border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross-border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross-border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax-efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.  相似文献   
7.
对纳税筹划问题的理性思考   总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5  
纳税筹划近年来日益受到人们的关注,但国内研究多侧重于筹划策略和方法。本文试图从理论上对纳税筹划的必然性、可能性及其经济和社会效应进行较深入的探讨,完善纳税筹划的指导思想,纠正对其错误的认识。  相似文献   
8.
梅莉 《现代财经》2005,25(12):74-78
明代的香税以泰山和武当山的数量和影响为最。武当山香税的征收始于明孝宗弘治六年(1493年),是明代最早征收香税之地,由湖广布政司和提督太监委派的官员即均州千户所千户和太和宫提点负责。打着维修庙宇的旗号而征收的香税,在嘉靖以后还用于赈济灾荒,抵宗藩、官兵俸粮之不足等事项,正是明代中后期国家政治腐败、财政危机、加派风行的必然结果。  相似文献   
9.
现行的增值税征收方法,对年度内存货数量变化较大的一般纳税人企业来说还不够完善。该文从增值税的本质出发,对此进行了初步探讨,提出对增值税实施汇算清缴,以弥补其不足之处;同时设计了汇算清缴所需的会计处理方法和会计分录。  相似文献   
10.
This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.   相似文献   
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