Efficient versus Sustainable Livestock Grazing in the Sahel

To date, there is no consensus on optimal stocking rates in the semi‐arid Sahel. We develop a model for livestock management based on a detailed analysis of ecosystem dynamics, and we apply it to calculate optimal and sustainable livestock stocking rates in a Sahelian rangeland. The general model accounts for stochastic rainfall and the long‐term impact of grazing on rangeland productivity. For the case study area, the model shows that the optimal stocking rate is higher than the sustainable stocking rate. Hence, with current prices, it is optimal for the pastoralist society to deplete their resource base. In our case study, we also find that the current stocking rate exceeds the optimal stocking rate, which adds to soil depletion.     

Incentivizing sustainable rangeland practices and policies in Colombia’s Orinoco region

Livestock grazing, along with agriculture, are key drivers of deforestation and land degradation that subsequently affect ecosystem service provision in the tropics. Although environmental and agricultural policies may curtail these negative effects, information is needed on how specific programs and instruments could be used to incentivize ranchers into adopting rangeland practices to achieve land conservation. We examine what encourages livestock ranchers to adopt more sustainable rangeland practices with various technical and conservation attributes in Colombia’s Orinoco region. First, we analyze a management alternative based on an improved pasture (IP) approach traditionally used in tropical South America, and another practice that promotes silvopastoral systems (SP) that better sustain the long term provision of ecosystem services. Second, we assess the influence that technical assistance and conservation payment instruments can have on the adoption of the IP or SP programs. Using expert-based elicitation, questionnaires, choice experiments, and econometrics, we found that when either SP or IP management alternatives include a complete technical assistance program (CTAP), emphasizing forage or cattle production, the propensity to adopt the conservation focused SP alternative significantly increases. The SP alternative with CTAP for cattle production was valued by ranchers at $290 ha/year and the CTAP prioritizing forage production was valued at $233 per ha/year. Nonetheless, a basic technical assistance program for cattle production using the IP alternative was valued at $128, but when including the CTAP, the value increased to $262. Adopting conservation practices in the form of compensation payments for not grazing portions of their land in the SP was valued by ranchers at an average of $8 and $10 in the IP. Our findings show that decisions to adopt conservation oriented rangeland practices and policies are not strictly based on monetary payments for ecosystem services alone, but also on technical support.     

Institutions,governance and incentives in common property regimes for African rangelands

The general distinctions between open access, state property, common property and private property are now well established in the academic literature. When applied to African rangelands, however, common property admits a wide variety of resource management regimes. To formulate effective policies it is necessary to understand the structure and operations of particular regimes. In this paper we discuss three examples of common property regimes, two from the southern African nation of Lesotho and one from the west African nation of Senegal, to illustrate some of the key characteristics of common property regimes. In particular, it is important to understand the structure of governance, the types of institutions that govern behavior, and the compatibility between governance, institutions and individual incentives. A common property regime can only be effective if its institutions are compatible with the structure of governance. The extent of its effectiveness also depends upon the incentives and expectations of individuals expected to enforce the rules of the institutions or comply with their terms. At present, most African governments lack the organizational capacity and political will necessary to implement state property regimes, official regulations on resource use, or individual property rights for rangelands resources. In many cases it is more appropriate for governments to define and enforce group rights to particular resources, then help to establish conditions in which internal group dynamics yield efficient resource management outcomes.