粤港澳大湾区制造业集聚与区域创新

以2009—2020年粤港澳大湾区11个城市为研究对象，探讨制造业集聚与区域创新的关系。研究发现，制造业集聚显著提高区域创新水平，可通过提高企业竞争这一路径实现。进一步分析发现，金融业集聚对区域创新发展具有显著的正向关系，金融产业和制造业产融协同集聚显著提高区域创新水平。研究结果表明，制造业集聚加剧产业内部企业创新竞争，带动区域创新发展，且金融业在创新中起到积极的推动作用。指出应鼓励区域企业创新竞争，优化营商环境，为产业融合发展提供保障。     

Trade liberalization and wage inequality: Evidence from Korea

This paper investigates the heterogeneous income distribution effects of trade liberalization using Korean survey data from years of 2000–2015. Following the Stolper-Samuelson theorem most of previous research studying the effects of trade liberalization on wage differences focus on workers’ characteristics (e.g., skilled or unskilled) while heterogeneity within the same worker group has not been yet substantially investigated. To fill this gap, this paper provides empirical evidence of wage inequality across firms within the same group of workers caused by trade liberalization, potentially implied in the new-new trade models with firm heterogeneity. Employing a difference-in-differences (DID) specification, we find that the wages of unskilled workers in Korea have increased since its FTAs with more advanced countries, such as members of EU and the US, came into effect, while the effects on the wages of skilled workers are negative but not statistically significant. We also show that wage effects are heterogeneous across firms within unskilled and skilled worker groups, while the positive effects are statistically significant and largest for unskilled workers in medium-large sized firms. These findings are in line with both traditional and new-new trade models.     

普惠金融发展的地区差异、收敛性及影响因素研究*——基于中国省级面板数据的检验

本文利用2005—2016年省级面板数据，对我国各地区普惠金融发展水平进行测度，并在此基础上探讨其收敛性及影响因素。结果表明：（1）我国普惠金融发展水平在考察期内总体偏低，并且呈现出显著的地区差异性。（2）绝对β收敛在全国、中部和西部均存在，而东部不存在；条件β收敛在全国、东部和西部均存在，而中部不存在。（3）政府干预程度、市场化程度、人力资本质量、非正规金融以及外商直接投资对普惠金融发展均具有重要的影响。     

The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

Large scale infrastructure investment and economic performance – a case study of Oresund

We analyse the effect of a large scale infrastructure investment, namely the construction of the Oresund bridge, on the local and supra-regional economy. We employ the synthetic control method to construct counterfactual regions that mimic the trajectory of Malmo and Southern Sweden without treatment. Our results point to a positive effect. However, placebo tests in space and time only reveal statistical significance at a larger regional level. The results suggest that spillover effects are eminent.     

Personal Income Tax Reform in China in 2018 and Its Impact on Income Distribution

In the context of personal income tax (PIT) reform in China in 2018, this paper examines some of the major issues of concern regarding the reform and income distribution. Using the China Personal Income Tax Micro‐simulation model, the paper compares the differences between the 2011 and 2018 PIT systems, and finds that residents relying on different income sources may face a large degree of real tax rate change. Once the tax system is altered to PIT 2018, the coverage of PIT for wage earners will decrease from 46.9 to 23.4 percent, the income redistributive effect will drop from 1.95 to 1.22 percent and the PIT's role in fiscal revenue will also be negatively affected. Nevertheless, if individual income continues to grow, the share of PIT in fiscal revenue is expected to return to the 2018 level in 2022, but its income redistribution function is difficult to recover in the short term. The paper finds that the effect of PIT on income distribution depends on the tax structure. Gradual transition to an “entirely comprehensive” tax system when conditions are appropriate will achieve better income redistribution results at a lower average tax rate.     

Effects of pro-growth policies on employment: evidence of regional disparities

The main objective of our research is to study the direct impact of pro-growth economic policies on employment creation globally and regionally, as evidence has countered policy-makers’ expectation that output growth leads automatically to job creation. We innovate by using the ratio of employment to the population above 25 years as dependent variable instead of the customary employment elasticity. We apply generalized methods of moments’ econometrics on dynamic panel data models and find that growth stimulates employment creation on average across 76 countries. The policies promoting private sector credit, investments, openness, services, education spending, tertiary enrollment, and a fixed exchange rate are the ones that create employment. Larger government size undermines job creation, while policies promoting FDI and industrial development fail to stimulate employment. However, we establish that the effect of pro-growth policies on employment varies significantly across regions, with evidence of weaker links between economic policies and employment in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.     

Measuring lnequality in the Middle East 1990–2016: The World’s Most Unequal Region?

In this paper we combine household surveys, national accounts, income tax data and wealth data in order to estimate income concentration in the Middle East for the period 1990–2016. According to our benchmark series, the Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world, with a top decile income share as large as 64 percent, compared to 37 percent in Western Europe, 47 percent in the US and 55 percent in Brazil (see Alvaredo et al. 2018). This is due both to enormous inequality between countries (particularly between oil‐rich and population‐rich countries) and to large inequality within countries (which we probably under‐estimate, given the limited access to proper fiscal data). We stress the importance of increasing transparency on income and wealth in the Middle East, as well as the need to develop mechanisms of regional redistribution and investment.     

The Great Recession,Austerity and Inequality: Lessons from Ireland

The advent of the Great Recession and the widespread adoption of fiscal austerity policies have heightened concern about inequality and its effects. We examine how the distribution of income in Ireland—a country which experienced one of the most severe economic contractions—has evolved over the years 2008 to 2013. Standard cross‐sectional analysis of the income distribution shows broad stability in the Gini coefficient and in decile shares, with one main exception: the share of the bottom decile fell sharply, with the largest fall in average incomes being for that group. Longitudinal analysis shows that the falls in the average income for the bottom decile were not due to decreasing income for those remaining in the bottom decile, but to falls in income from those initially located in higher deciles. The extent of redistribution through taxes and transfers increased strongly, as measured by the Reynolds‐Smolensky index, which rose from 0.20 before the onset of the crisis to 0.27 in 2013. Analysis indicates that about three‐quarters of this increased redistribution is due to automatic stabilisers and one‐quarter to discretionary policy changes.