FIRM SIZE AND PRICING POLICY

We relate pricing policy of firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational backlash if it ‘reneges’, i.e., deviates from its earlier price offer. This allows the firm to effectively commit to its offers, leading to a unique equilibrium without delay. Interestingly, this equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium of the related model that does not allow for reneging possibilities. For smaller firms, however, the reputational effects are much less intense, and consequently the equilibria may involve deviation possibilities. In this case, the equilibria are non‐unique and may involve delays as well.     

论欧洲货币一体化的不可逆转性——基于退出成本的分析

通过对欧洲货币一体化的历史进程进行分析,发现多数欧元成员国偏向选择固定汇率制度。本文根据合作程度不同对各国汇率制度进行了重新分类,并通过模型的构建,对三种不同合作程度的固定汇率制度的退出成本进行了比较。结果表明：退出成本最高的欧洲单一货币形式的固定汇率制度较为稳健且不易受到“投机”的攻击,因此《欧盟宪法条约》受挫之后部分成员国发出退出欧元区的威胁是不可置信的;欧洲货币一体化进程不可避免,也不可逆转。